G.R. No. L-11750. May 28, 1958
ANUNCIACION BOBILES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. LEANDER ALMIÑE, ET AL., DEFENDANT-APPELLEES.
BENGZON, J.:
in the court below her intention to raise points or questions of law before this
Court.
She sued Leander Almiñe and his parents seeking to recover damages for his
breach of promise of marriage. She alleged that relying on his pledges of
sincere love and of matrimony, she allowed the said Leander the privileges of a
husband, as a result of which she gave birth to a baby boy, but without any
reason whatsoever, he refused to fulfill his promise; and that his parents in
various ways helped him accomplish his deceitful purposes, yet they would not
make compensation for his wrongful behaviour. Hence, she asked for damages which
she specified, and for other relief.
Witnesses testified, and documentary evidence -mainly the letters of
defendant Leander – was introduced. However, the judge presiding the court of
first instance of Masbate held that although carnal relations had been proven,
the evidence showed no n promise on the part of the defendant Leander Almiñe to
marry the herein plaintiff.” Consequently, he dismissed the case and this appeal
followed.
The letters and the transcript of the stenographic notes are attached to the
record before us. The plaintiff’s brief insists that the testimonial and
documentary evidence sufficiently established a promise of marriage. Indeed, the
love-letter Exh. A says in part:
“In my vision I hold you and me kneeling and praying before priest infront of
the altar swearing to be true to each other until death separates
us.”
Yet the question whether promises had been made is one of fact, for the Court
of Appeals to decide in view of the amount involved.
There is of course the rule (Sec. 3, Rule 42) that where the appellant states
in his notice of appeal that it “is based purely on questions of law”, no other
question shall be allowed, such statement being construed as a waiver of all
questions of fact.[1] Herein plaintiff’s
notice of appeal said she was “appealing the decision” to the Supreme Court “on
points or questions of law.” This statement could mean either “appeal purely on
questions of law” or “appeal mainly on questions of law.” It could also imply
the plaintiff’s impression that whenever questions of law are raised, the appeal
should be carried directly to the Supreme Court – even if questions of fact are
also involved.
As this is a pauper’s litigation[2] and
as appellee objected not to the consideration of the factual issue raised by
appellant, we deem it more consistent with the interests of justice not to
preclude revision of the evidence.
Wherefore, the record will be referred to the Court of Appeals for
adjudication according to law.
Paras, C.J., Montemayor,
Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia,
and Felix, JJ., concur.
[1]Millar v. Nadres, 74 Phil. 307; Portes
v. Pabellon, 47 Of. Gaz. 655; etc. cited in Moran, Rules of Court 1957 Ed. Vol.
I p. 673.
[2]Wherein “courts must be vigilant” for
the protection of the indigent party. Art. 24 New Civil Code. Anunciation
Bobiles, plaintiff-appellant vs. Leander Almiñe, et al, defendants-appellees.