G.R. No. L-745. August 27, 1947
JOSE L. MOYA, DEMANDANTE Y APELADO, CONTRA JOHN BARTON, DEMANDADO Y APELANTE.
PABLO, M.:
Juzgado de Primera Instancia del distrito, despues de la vista correspondiente,
le condeno a desalojar la casa situada en la calle 2 Lactaw, San Juan, Rizal, y
a pagar los alquileres desde el mes de noviembre de 1944 hasta el 30 de
septiembre de 1945 a razon de P20 al mes, y desde el primero de octubre del
mismo año hasta que desaloje la casa, P40 mensual con las costas.
Contra esta decision el demandado apelo para ante este Tribunal señalando
tres errores en que, segun el, incurrio el Juzgado inferior: (1) al no aplicar
la orden de moratoria, (2) al fijar en P40 mensual el alquiler justo y razonable
de la casa, y (3) al ordenar el desahucio del demandado.
La contencion del demandado en cuanto al primer señalamiento de error esta
bien fundada. (Cruz y Gumatoy contra Avila, 76 Phil., 133; De la Fuente y
Teodoro contra Borromeo, 76 Phil., 442; Vda. de Ordoñez contra
Angkiangco, 77 Phil., 387.) Pero seria molesto al mismo demandado si el
demandante incoase otra accion para cobrar los alquileres debidos hasta el 10 de
marzo de 1945. Ambas partes tendran que someterse a las molestias innecesarias
de una segunda vista. Es practica bien establecida el evitar multiplicidad de
acciones que “es odiosa ante la ley y no se permite ni en equidad ni en
justicia.”
Hay varias maneras de poner en practica la moratoria: una ley que limita la
jurisdiccion de los juzgados durante cierto periodo de emergencia para ver
solamente causas que no versan sobre el pago de obligaciones monetarias; una ley
que suspende todos los procedimientos durante una invasion militar sobre cobro
de obligaciones monetarias; una ley que prohibe, durante el tiempo de
emergencia, la ejecucion de las sentencias sobre cantidad de dinero; una ley que
suspende todos los procedimientos judiciales contra personas que estan en el
servicio militar y naval por un tiempo limitado y razonable fueron declaradas
constitucionales en Estados Unidos. La ley inglesa sobre moratoria de 1914, tal
como fue enmendada por la de 1916, disponia que ninguna persona pedira la
ejecucion de una sentencia u orden judicial sobre el pago de alguna cantidad de
dinero. El fin primordial de la medida es evitar el completo colapso de la
economia nacional, ya dislocada por la guerra. Si las palabras “temporary
suspension of the enforcement of payment” de la orden de moratoria significan o
(a) la suspension de la presentacion de toda accion o (b) la
suspension de la vista de la causa o (c) la suspension de la ejecucion de
la sentencia, puede dar lugar a una honrada divergencia de opinion; pero cuando,
como en la causa que se esta ventilando, la obligacion objeto de litigio, esta
en parte protegida por la moratoria y en parte, no, no seria injusto dictar
sentencia por el pago de toda la obligacion, sin perjuicio de ordenar que no se
ejecutara la sentencia en cuanto a las cantidades debidas antes del 10 de marzo
de 1945 mientras no se decrete el levantamiento de la orden de moratoria.
Dos causas de accion alego el demandante en su demanda: (a) que a sus
varias invitaciones al demandado para que convinieran sobre el alquiler
razonable de la casa, el demandado no presto atencion, y (b) que el
necesitaba la casa para su uso.
Cuando el demandante invito al demandado a una entrevista para tratar sobre
el alquiler de la finca, el demandado no presto atencion; por tal motivo, no
llegaron a un acuerdo. Segun el mismo demandante, la finca esta amillarada en
P1540; el veinte por ciento de esta cantidad asciende a P308 y la duodecima
parte de P308, a P25.67. No debe exceder a esta cantidad el alquiler mensual, de
acuerdo con el articulo 3, Ley del Commonwealth No. 689, enmendada por la de la
Republica No. 66.
No se ha presentado prueba alguna de que el demandante tuviese necesidad de
la casa para su uso personal. Al contrario, como testigo declaro que invito al
demandado a que le viera en su casa situada en la calle Eloisa No. 51, Sampaloc,
Manila, para tratar del alquiler de la casa. Tampoco hay pruebas de que el
demandado deliberadamente y sin motivo justificado, no haya querido pagar el
alquiler; si no pago los P50 mensuales que exigia el demandante fue porque creia
que eran excesivos. Las pruebas justifican su contencion. Erro el Juzgado a
quo al ordenar el desahucio del demandado. Este puede continuar ocupando la
casa. Ningun arrendatario sera desahuciado a menos que (1) voluntaria y
deliberadamente no pague los alquileres o (2) que el arrendador tenga necesidad
de ocupar la finca arrendada o (3) que el arrendatario subarriende la finca sin
el consentimiento por escrito del arrendador. (Secs. 2 y 11, Ley del
Commonwealth No. 689, tal como fue enmendada por la Ley No. 66 de la
Republica.)
Creemos que es insostenible la teoria de que el demandante tiene derecho a
desahuciar al demandado aun despues de aprobada la Ley del Commonwealth No. 689,
tal como fue enmendada por la Ley de la Republica No. 66. El articulo 1581 del
Codigo Civil dispone que “Si no se hubiese fijado plazo al arrendamiento, se
entiende hecho por años cuando se ha fijado un alquiler anual, por meses cuando
es mensual, por dias cuando es diario. En todo caso cesa el arrendamiento, sin
necesidad de requerimiento especial, cumplido el termino.” Para comprender el
alcance de esta disposicion legal no esta de mas decir que bajo la teoria de
libre contratacion, sobre que descansa el Codigo Civil, el arrendador y el
arrendatario pueden convenir libremente por la duracion del arrendamiento. Y ese
convenio es ley entre ellos. Pero si no hay convenio sobre la duracion y la
renta se paga de mes en mes, se entendera que el arrendamiento dura solamente un
mes. A la expiracion del mes, termina el contrato. En el caso presente, a falta
de convenio expreso, el demandado tenia derecho a ocupar la casa solamente un
mes. Al terminar el primer mes en que comenzo a ocupar la finca terminaba el
convenio; pero, por tacita reconduccion, se renovaba el arrendamiento de mes en
mes. En ese concepto continuo ocupando la finca.
Al aprobarse la Ley de la Republica No. 66 en 18 de octubre de 1946, la
presuncion supletoria establecida por el articulo 1581 del Codigo Civil ha
quedado modificada. “La sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de España de 26 de
octubre de 1918 declara que la disposicion del presente articulo 1581 es
puramente supletoria para el caso de que las partes no hayan fijado plazo de
arriendo.” (10 Manresa, 4.a Ed., 635.) La presuncion legal de que el
arrendamiento dura de mes en mes ha sido sustituida por la de la Ley de la
Republica No. 66, durante los cuatro años en que estara en vigor: que en vez de
quedar renovado por tacita reconduccion el arrendamiento a un mes mas, segun el
articulo 1581 del Codigo Civil queda renovado a un año.
Lo que modifico la Ley No. 66 es la presuncion legal de la duracion del nuevo
contrato de arrendamiento, a falta de termino convenido. Y esta ley no violo el
contrato de arrendamiento vigente durante el mes de octubre de 1946 entre las
partes. El nuevo arrendamiento que comenzo en primero del mes de noviembre de
1946 es completamente nuevo: ya esta regulado por la Ley No. 66 y no por el
articulo 1581 del Codigo Civil. La razon que tuvo el Congreso al adoptar esta
ley la hemos tratado en el asunto de Kalaw Ledesma y Ledesma contra
Pictain, pagina 95, post.
Dos razones tiene el demandado para no estar obligado a desalojar la finca:
1.a porque el demandante no necesita la casa para su uso y 2.a porque exigia al
demandado una renta irrazonable e injusta.
Se confirma la sentencia en cuanto condena al demandado a pagar al demandante
los alquileres desde el primero de noviembre de 1944 hasta el 30 de septiembre
de 1945 a razon de P20 al mes, y desde el primero de octubre del mismo año la
cantidad de P25.67 mensual; pero la sentencia sobre los alquileres debidos hasta
el 10 de marzo de 1945 no podra ser ejecutada hasta que se haya decretado el
levantamiento de la orden de moratoria. Se revoca la sentencia en cuanto ordena
el desahucio del demandado.
Moran, Pres., Paras, Briones, Hontiveros y Tuason, MM., estan
conformes.
FERIA, M.:
Conforme con la parte dispositiva.
BENGZON, M.:
Conforme con el resultado.
DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.:
The lower court found, upon plaintiff’s evidence, that in 1942, defendant
occupied the house of plaintiff located at 2 Lactaw Street, San Juan, at a
monthly rent of P20; that in July, 1945, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant
asking him to pay the rents from November, 1944; that upon seeing that the
backstairs of the house had disappeared, plaintiff requested defendant to vacate
the premises and to restore the stairs.
Defendant alleges that no agreement has been entered into between plaintiff
and defendant as to the payment of rents; that on one occasion he paid P240 to
Rosita de la Paz, who alleged that she was a cousin of plaintiff; that the
backstairs was destroyed by termites.
There being no evidence that plaintiff had ever authorized Rosita de la Paz
to accept payments in his name, the lower court decided that the payment made to
said Rosita de la Paz cannot be credited against plaintiff.
The lower court sentenced defendant to vacate the premises and to pay the
rents from November, 1944, to September, 1945, at a monthly rent of P20, and
from October, 1945, at the rate of P40, which he found reasonable.
Defendant assigns as a first error of the lower court the fact that the
latter failed to grant him the benefits of the moratorium provided in
Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, and in conjunction
with Presidential Proclamation No. 6. The assignment is well taken. (Palacios
vs. Daza, 75 Phil., 279.) The lower court erred in ordering defendant to
pay the rents due before March 10, 1945.
Defendant questions the reasonableness of the monthly rent of P40, alleging
that it must be reduced to P20. Defendant invokes the provisions of section 3 of
Republic Act No. 66. Defendant’s contention is untenable, because it is based on
the assumption that Republic Act No. 66 has a retroactive effect, which is
erroneous. There is nothing in said act giving it a retroactive effect.
In the third and last assignment of error, defendant invokes again Republic
Act No. 66 in support of his contention against his ejectment. We cannot agree
with such proposition.
The complaint initiating this case was tiled on September 29, 1945.
Commonwealth Act No. 689 was put into effect only on October 15, 1945, while
Republic Act No. 66, amending it, went into effect more than a year after, that
is, on October 18, 1946. Plaintiff is right in his contention that laws have no
retroactive effect unless an unmistakable intent to the contrary appears, and in
the case of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66 there are specific
provisions making both exclusively prospective, as the first shall be effective
for a period of two years “after its approval” and the second “for a period of
four years after its approval.” There should not be any question that defendant
cannot now invoke the benefits of said acts, and that plaintiff is entitled to
recover the possession of the house in question. This position is in accordance
with the invariable one taken by this Supreme Court in a long line of cases
decided after liberation, (Estrella and Estrella vs. Sangalang, 76 Phil.,
108; Domingo Vda. de Buhay vs. Cobarrubias, 76 Phil., 213; Roque
vs. Cavestani de los Santos, No. L-218, Aug. 8, 1946; De Guzman
vs. Moreno, No. L-257, Oct. 2, 1946; Ramirez vs. Reyes, 77 Phil.,
1030; Licauco vs. Reyes Estaniel, 77 Phil., 1092, unreported; Inquimboy
and Pelay vs. Juachon, 78 Phil., 873, unreported; Phil. Sugar Estates
Development Co. vs. Prudencio, 76 Phil., 111; art. 1581, Civil Code.)
On the question of the retroactivity of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic
Act No. 66, we reproduce here what we have said in our opinion in Santos
vs. De Alvarez, (78 Phil., 503). We also concur in the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Hilado in this case.
For all the foregoing, we are of opinion
that the decision of the lower court must be modified by eliminating thereof the
order to defendant to pay the rents due before March 10, 1945, the remainder to
be affirmed.
DISSENTING
HILADO, J.:
I dissent from the foregoing judgment which condemns the tenant to pay the
rents from November 1, 1944 to March 10, 1945, (although suspending execution of
the judgment therefor) despite the fact that Executive Order No. 32 suspends the
enforcement of payment of such debts. Under the debt moratorium decreed in said
Executive Order, it would have been prohibited for the lessor even to
extrajudicially demand payment of the rents covered thereby; which means
that he would have had no cause of action to file a suit demanding it; and this,
in turn, carries with it the corollary that no court of justice had, as this
Court now lacks, the power to render a judgment for such payment. How could the
court have the power to render a judgment ordering payment when the creditor has
no cause of action to demand such payment? The Executive Order suspends the
“enforcement of payment.” This must mean that the creditor cannot even
extrajudicially require his debtor to pay. If so, he neither has the right to
sue him on the debt. How could the courts render a judgment on it in his favor?
The mere suspension of execution can clearly not create the denied power to
render the judgment. In my opinion, what is prohibited is the giving of the
judgment at all, not only its execution.
I also dissent from the foregoing judgment which denies the ejection of the
tenant from the house in question. The majority decision invokes section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66. It is undisputed,
however, that the contract of lease under which the tenant herein occupied and
lived in said house antedated by several years the enactment of these post-war
laws. It is likewise unquestioned that said contract did not fix a term for the
lease, but provided for a monthly rental. When said contract was entered into
article 1581 of the Civil Code was in full force and effect. It stipulates:
“ART. 1581. In default of an agreement as to the duration of the lease, it is
understood as being from year to year, when an annual rent has been fixed; from
month to month, when the rent is monthly; and from day to day when it is
daily.“In either case the lease shall terminate without necessity of a special
notice, upon the expiration of the term.”
This article—there is no showing nor pretense that its provisions were
excluded by the contracting parties—became a part of the contract by virtue of
the principle that the applicable laws existing at the time and place of the
making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, form a part thereof, just
as much as if the parties had bodily incorporated said laws into their
agreement, in the absence of a stipulation excluding such laws.
“As this court often has held, the laws in force at the time and place of the
making of a contract, and which affect its validity, performance, and
enforcement, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly
referred to or incorporated in its terms. Von Hoffman vs. Quincy, 4
Wall., 535, 550; 18 Law. ed., 408, 409; Walker vs. Whitehead, 16 Wall.,
314, 317; 21 Law. ed., 357, 358; Edwards vs. Kearzey, 96 U. S., 595, 601;
24 Law. ed., 793, 796.” (Northern Pacific Railroad Co. vs. Wall, 241 U.
S., 87; 60 Law. ed., 905, 907.)“It is also settled that the laws which subsist at the time and place of the
making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a
part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.
This principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction,
discharge, and enforcement. Illustrations of this proposition are found, in the
obligation of the debtor to pay interest after the maturity of the debt, where
the contract is silent; in the liability of the drawer of a protested bill to
pay exchange and damages, and in the right of the drawer and indorser to
require, proof of demand and notice. These are as much incidents and conditions
of the contract as if they rested upon the basis of a distinct agreement. Green
vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat., 92; Bronson vs. Kinzie, 1 How., 319;
McCrachen vs. Hayward, 2 How., 612; People vs. Bond, 10 Cal., 570;
Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 231.” (Von Hoffman vs. Quincy, 4
Wall. [U. S.], 535, 550; 18 Law. ed., 408, 409.)“The laws which exist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and
where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it. This embraces
alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and
enforcement.“Nothing is more material to the obligation of a contract than the means of
its enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are
parts of the obligation which is guaranteed by the Constitution against
impairment;“The obligation of a contract ‘is the law which binds the parties to perform
their agreement;’“Any impairment of the obligation of a contract, the degree of impairment is
immaterial, is within the prohibition of the Constitution;“The states may change the remedy, provided no substantial right secured by
the contract is impaired. Whenever such a result is produced by the act in
question, to that extent it is void. The states are no more permitted to impair
the efficacy of a contract in this way than to attack its vitality in any other
manner. Against all assaults coming from that quarter, whatever guise they may
assume, the contract is shielded by the Constitution. It must be left with the
same force and effect, including the substantial means of enforcement
which existed when it was made. The guaranty of the Constitution gives it
protection to that extent. Von Hoffman vs. Quincy, 4 Wall., 535; 18 Law.
ed., 403.” (Walker vs. Whitehead, 16 Wall., 314, 317; 21 Law. ed., 357,
358; italics supplied.)
Another provision of the Civil Code which in the same way formed a part of
that contract was article 1569 thereof, providing:
“ART. 1569. The lessor may dispossess the lessee by suit for any of
the following causes:“1. The expiration of the conventional period or the one fixed
for the duration of lease by articles 1577 and 1581;“2. Default in the payment of the rent agreed upon;
“3. Breach of any of the conditions stipulated in the contract;
“4. The use of the thing leased for purposes or services not stipulated and
which diminish its value, or the failure of the lessee to comply, with respect
to its use, with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article
1555.”
The obligation of that contract, therefore, as regards the term of the lease
was that, the rent being payable monthly, the lease was from month to month, and
terminated at the end of each month without need of special demand, in
accordance with said article 1581; and as to the right of the lessor to eject
the lessee, the former had the right to do so at the end of any month, under
paragraph 1 of article 1569, leaving aside the causes enumerated in paragraphs
2, 3, and 4. The obligation of that contract was inviolable and protected from
impairment by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
“The obligation of a contract includes every thing within its obligatory
scope. Among these elements nothing is more important than the means of
enforcement. This is the breath of its vital existence. Without it, the
contract, as such, in the view of the law, ceases to be, and falls into the
class of those ‘imperfect obligations,’ as they are termed, which depend for
their fulfillment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom they rest. The
ideas of right and remedy are inseparable. ‘Want of right and want of remedy are
the same thing.’ 1 Bac. Abr., tit. Actions in General, letter B.“In Von Hoffman vs. Quincy, 4 Wall., 535, 18 Law. ed., 403, it was
said: ‘A statute of frauds embracing pre-existing parol contracts not before
required to be in writing would affect its validity. A statute declaring that
the word “ton” should, in prior as well as subsequent contracts, be held to mean
half or double the weight before prescribed would affect its construction. A
statute providing that a previous contract of indebtment may be extinguished by
a process of bankruptcy would involve its discharge; and a statute for bidding
the sale of any of the debtor’s property under a judgment upon such a contract
would relate to the remedy.’“It cannot be doubted, either upon principle or authority, that each of such
laws would violate the obligation of the contract, and the last not less than
the first. These propositions seem to us too clear to require discussion. It is
also the settled doctrine of this court, that the laws which subsist at the time
and place of making a contract enter into and form a part of it, as if they were
expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This rule embraces alike
those which affect its validity, construction, discharge and enforcement. Von
Hoffman vs. Quincy (supra); McCracken vs. Hayward, 2 How.,
608.“In Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat., 1, this court said, touching the point
here under consideration: ‘It is no answer, that the Acts of Kentucky now in
question are regulations of the remedy, and not of the right to the lands. If
these Acts so change the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to
impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are just as much a
violation of the compact as if they overturned his rights and
interests.’” ‘One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is, that its value has
by legislation been diminished. It is not by the Constitution to be impaired at
all. This is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching
in any respect on its obligation—dispensing with any part of its
force.’ ” Bk. vs. Sharp, 6 How., 301. (Edwards vs. Kearzey, 96
U.S., 595, 601; 24 Law. ed., 793, 796; Italics supplied.)
It is certainly dispensing with a most vital part of the force of the
contract between the parties if the lessor should be deprived of his right
thereunder to terminate the lease at the end of a month and to compel him to
wait for four years from the approval of Republic Act No. 66 (October 18, 1946)
before he can recover his building even without any rent being paid for all that
period, so long as the non-payment is not willful and deliberate, or so long as
the said lessor should not need to occupy the building himself, and so long as
the lessee does not sub-lease the building without the written consent of the
proprietor, (Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by section 1 of
Republic Act No. 66.)
In such a case, if as a result of the war both lessor arid lessee had become
impoverished, although the leased building had been saved, and the lessee, thru
sheer poverty but lot willfully nor deliberately, became unable to pay any rent
for the entire period of four years provided in Republic Act No. 66, the lessor
would be compelled to virtually let his lessee live in his building free
although said equally impoverished lessor may not have any other income than the
rent of that building. Obviously, neither lessor nor lessee intended this when
entering into their agreement since said Acts were not yet in existence then.
The injustice of retrospectively applying them to said agreement cries to high
heaven. Such injustice would not ensue, on the other hand, it the new law were
applied only to leases subsequent thereto, for then the parties would contract
in view of the new law and, if unwilling to abide by its provisions,
would have the choice not to enter into the contract.
And let it not be said that the post-war enactments are emergency measures
adopted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Firstly, it is well
settled that the police power gives way to the Bill of Eights. And this is as it
should be, since the police power is a legislative function (12 C.J., p. 904,
section 412), and its exercise has either to take the form of a law or derive
its sanction from law; and by the Bill of Rights the people have expressly
withheld from the legislature the power to enact laws impairing the
obligation of contracts.
“Bill of Rights. The police power of a state is subject to the ‘Bill of
Rights’ of both the federal and state constitutions, and must not violate its
inhibitions.” (16 C.J.S., p. 567; italics supplied.)“* * * The bill of rights contains the political aphorisms, general
principles, and fundamental ideas of free government, and is usually made a part
of the constitution of the state and reserved from legislative action so
that the people themselves shall retain the exclusive right either
to modify or disregard it.” (Eason vs. State, 11 Ark., 481, cited in note
58, p. 1181, 7 C. J.; italics supplied.)
Secondly, neither Commonwealth Act No. 689 nor Republic Act No. 66 has
retroactive effect, there being no provision therein for such retroactivity.
Article 3 of the Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless they provide the contrary. This is, indeed, a settled principle of
law.
Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that laws passed by
the legislature shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the
beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of
the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded.
Thirdly, and be it said to the credit of the legislator, both acts by their
very terms unequivocally reveal that the legislator recognized that he was not
above the Constitution, and intended to promulgate said measures, although
admittedly emergency in character, with due respect for the immunities reserved
by the people to themselves in the Bill of Rights. The very terms of section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by section 1 of Republic Act No. 66,
refer to a lease which does not specify any term. This section cannot
possibly be applied to a renewal lease under article 1581 of the Code, because
in such a renewal lease the term is specified therein as yearly, monthly,
or daily, as the case may be. And in the case at bar, just as in all similar
cases involving month-to-month leases entered into at least one month prior to
the new legislation, the original contract between the parties had already
expired before the new enactment and what is involved in each of said cases is
the renewal thereof.
Moreover, the last section of Commonwealth Act No. 689 expressly and
categorically confines the effects of the act in these words:
“SEC. 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of two years after its
approval.” (Italics supplied.)
Republic Act No. 66 amending the same section, in turn establishes the
boundaries of the law’s effectivity in no less certain terms thus:
“SEC. 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its
approval.” (Italics supplied.)
If the effectivity of one and the other act commenced after their
approval, it goes without saying that they were not to operate retroactively;
which is only one way of saying that they were not to affect leases, original or
renewal, existing before such approval. The renewal lease in question
herein was such a one.
Moreover, to the specific case of a pre-existing lease with a monthly rent
but without a fixed term, where the first month had already expired before the
taking effect of the new law, as in the case at bar, said law (whether
Commonwealth Act No. 689 before its amendment or Republic Act No. 66 which
amended it), would be impossible of application by its very terms read in the
light of the law existing not only at the time the contract was made but also
when the new law was enacted. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 before its
amendment, and the same section after its amendment by Republic Act No. 66,
speaks of “a lease for the occupation as dwelling of a building or part thereof,
* * *.” That the provision refers to a contract of lease is self-evident.
It cannot correctly be construed to comprise the “implied renewal” (“tacita
reconduccion”) mentioned in article 1566 of the Civil Code for the simple reason
that said article is only applicable where the contract of lease has
expired—it says: “If, on the expiration of the contract” (see
also 10 Manresa, 2d edition, p. 598, 3d par.). The illuminating commentaries
of Manresa on article 1566 found on page 600 of the cited volume of his work
incontrovertibly prove that the rule of “implied renewal” does not consider it
as a voluntary contract of lease, as it may exist under the cited provision
despite the lack of consent on the part of the lessor—that the rule is an
imposition of the law based upon reasons which were considered
justifying. Manresa says:
“* * * En cuanto al arrendador, el consentimiento puede en realidad no
existir, pero la ley lo presume siempre que se reunan las expresadas
circunstancias. Su acquiescencia puede obedecer a un desouido, una ausencia,
enfermedad, etc., suya o de sus representantes voluntarios o legitimos, y sin
embargo, la ley aun asi presume el consentimiento. Y asi debe ser, porque en
otro caso podria alegarse y aun probarse despues de mas o menos tiempo el hecho
de la enfermedad, ausencia, etc., en suma, la no existencia del consentimiento,
y al faltar este o faltar la capacidad para el caeria por tierra todo el
edificio fundado por el legislador, en perjuicio de los intereses del
agricultor, de la agricultura en general, y aun del mismo dueño, que por
cualquier circunstancia no pudo oportunamente tener otro labrador, o atender al
cuidado y produccion de sus fincas.” (Italics supplied.)
Article 1566 of the Code, therefore, in cases where the rent is monthly
considers the lease itself terminated at the end of the first month, and
only provides, as Manresa explains, that the law conclusively presumes its
renewal under certain specified circumstances.
Another anomaly which will ensue from the majority decision is that, while
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, limits
the term of the lease therein spoken of to one year counted from the date of
occupation by virtue of said lease at the option of the lessee, the majority
decision would hold him, under section 2 of the same amended act, immune from
ejection for a period of four years from the date of the approval of Republic
Act No. 66 (October 18, 1946). In other words, as interpreted by the majority,
in section 1 the law in effect tells the lessee that under the circumstances
therein stated his leasehold shall be for one year counted from the date of his
occupation, but in section 2 it tells the lessor that under the conditions
therein mentioned he cannot eject his lessee for four years from October 18,
1946 (i. e. till October 18, 1950). To more graphically show the
absurdity of the theory, let us suppose that the lease and the lessee’s
occupation began on October 18, 1946, date of the approval of Republic Act No.
66, and that the circumstances of sections 1 and 2 of the act exist. According
to the majority opinion, in section 1 the law in effect tells the lessee that
his leasehold shall last till October 18, 1947, but almost in the same breath it
turns around and warns the lessor that he cannot eject his lessee till October
19, 1950. Here is a case of a lessee who for three entire years will occupy the
premises without right but yet immune from ejection.
With all due respect, I have to disagree with an interpretation of the law
which leads to such an absurd result. In my humble opinion, the rental law in
its present state, besides being merely prospective in its effects, affecting
only leases made after its approval, makes the immunity from ejection of lessees
provided for in said section 2 co-extensive with the duration of one year
provided for in the cases covered by section 1, or in cases of leases with fixed
terms, with the term agreed upon by the parties. Under this construction, we
would avoid the impossible situation of a lessee holding over for so long as
three years, or, in some cases even more, despite the expiration of his
leasehold of one year in the cases governed by said section 1. And as thus
construed, the law would then mean (1) that where the lease does not fix a term
it shall be for one year from the date of occupation; (2) that during that year
the lessee shall not be ejected except where he maliciously and deliberately
refuses or fails to pay the rent, or where the lessor needs the premises for
himself, or where the lessee sublets the premises without the written consent of
the lessor. Let it not be said that in this case section 2 of the law would be
unnecessary. It would still be necessary to achieve the aim pursued therein, for
without it the lessee may be ejected under the Civil Code even when the
non-payment of the rent is not willful or deliberate; and also because under the
Civil Code the need of the lessor is not a ground for ejecting the lessee during
the life of the lease, neither is the subletting of the premises by the lessee
unless expressly prohibited in the contract of lease. (Civil Code, article
1550.)
In my opinion the four-year provision of section 14 of the amended law simply
means that all leases of the class described in the law entered into during
the four years following its approval, which do not specify any term, “shall
be considered of one year’s duration counted from the date of occupation”
(section 1); and that during said year the lessee shall not be ejected except in
the cases already enumerated above (section 2). At the end of said four-year
period (i. e. on October 18, 1950) the law will expire, and will
consequently not affect leases entered into thereafter.
I am of the considered opinion that defendant should be ordered ejected and
to pay all rents due after March 10, 1945, with costs of all instances against
him, reserving to plaintiff the right to collect the rents due up to March 10,
1945, upon the lifting of the moratorium.
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the foregoing dissent as far as
it does not conflict with my dissenting opinion in G.R. No. L-597, Kalaw
Ledesma and Ledesma vs. Pictain.[1]
[1] Infra, page 106.