THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELANT, VS. LIBORIO SEGOVIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

On February 2, 1953, an information for malicious mischief was filed against
the accused by the city attorney of Legaspi, Albay, before the Municipal Court
of Legaspi. He pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution has presented its
evidence, he moved to quash the information on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged, but the motion was
denied, thereafter, the accused presented his evidence, after which the court
rendered a decision finding him guilty of the crime of malicious mischief as
defined in Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer ten
(10) days of arresto menor or pay a fine of P75.00, to indemnify the offended
party in same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.

From this decision, he appealed to the court of first instance where again he
was charged with the same offense. On November 10, 1956, he reiterated his
motion to quash the information on the same ground that it does not allege the
necessary elements to constitute the crime of malicious mischief. This time the
court sustained the motion and dismissed case. The court cancelled the “bond for
his provisional release. The Government appealed.

The fundamental rule in considering a motion to the ground that the
averments of the information sufficient to constitute the offense charged is
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential
elements of the offense as defined in the law. te above ground imports a
hypothetical admission of the alleged in the information “but challenges their
sufficiency for failure to meet the essential requisites of the as specified by
substantive law.”^[1] However, it was held that “Prima facie, the ‘facts charged’
are those described in the complaint, but they may be amplified or qualified others
appearing to be additional circumstances, upon admissions made by the people’s
representative, which admissions could anyway be submitted by him as amendments
to same information. x x x Of course, it may be added that upon similar
motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of
the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky
revelation of his evidence” (People v. Navarro, 75 Phil., 516, 518-519). Does
the herein information meet this test?

The information filed in the lower court reads :

“That on or about January 13, 1953, in the District of Daraga, City of
Legaspi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused moved by resentment and anger and with intent to damage
another’s property did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
to death a female white pig spotted brown owned by Julian Stabella which act of
the accused caused damage and prejudice to said Julian Marbella in the amount of
P75.00 Philippino Currency.” (Information, p. 31, Record; Underlining
supplied)

Analyzing the information we find that, as alleged, the accused wilfully
damaged the property of one Marbella when he shot to death a pig owned by the
latter with the felonious intent of causing an injury because of resentment and
anger. In other words, the accused caused damage to the property of another,
with the intent to cause injury, due to an evil motive, and these are precisely
the elements instituting the crime of malicious mischief (Article 327, Revised
Penal Code; see Padilla, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, Vol. II, p. 645, 1955
ed.)

Commenting on the acts committed by the accused as charged in the information
and as admitted by the solicitor General, this official said: “Certainly the
deliberate act the accused Segovia in shooting to death the female white pig
owned by Julian Marbella was obviously due to malicious intent on his part. As
it has been established before the Municipal Court the accused shot not only
once but four times this female white pig with his shotgun, Caliber .22 when he
saw it among the plants. There was certainly the element of vengeance and anger
with malicious intent of avenging whatever damage the pig might have done to his
plants. The proper thing which the accused should have done when he saw the pig
among his plants, was to drive it away, and after assessing the value of
whatever damages the pig might have caused to his plants, he should have filed a
civil action for damages against the owner, in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code. But in this case he took the law in his own hands x x x.” We
agree with this comment. It is obvious that the trial court erred in sustaining
the motion to quash.

The plea is advanced that the Government can no longer appeal from the
decision of dismissal without placing the accused in double jeopardy considering
that he was already convicted by the Municipal Court of Legaspi. This claim
ignores the fact that he appealed from the judgment of conviction and hence it
was vacated. The rule is that when an appeal has been perfected, the judgment of
the justice of the peace or municipal court is vacated and the case is tried de
novo in the court of first instance as if it were originally instituted therein
(section 8, Rule 119). No new information need be filed in the latter court in
order that it may acquire jurisdiction to try the case (Crisostomo v. Director
of Prisons, 41 Phil., 368; People v. Cu Hiok, 62 Phil., 501). If the case, on
appeal by the accused, is as originally instituted, and the motion was filed
before arraignment or plea, it is obvious that the dismissal of the case was no
bar to appeal because it does not place the accused in jeopardy under Section 9,
Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, The claim is therefore without merit.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, the case is reiuanded
to the lower court for hearing on No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,
concur.

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^[1] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 2, 1957 ed., P. 762.

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DISSENTING OPINION

 

FELIX, J.,

I only need a few words to establish my point and I fully confident of making
a perfect bull’s-eye hit on ruling pronounced on jeopardy in the majority
decision.

I have no quarrel with my colleagues as to the sufficiency of the information
in the case at bar. Probably the lower Court was erroneous in dismissing the
information but I consider that the act of setting aside the order appealed from
and of remading the case to the lower court for hearing on the merits, is
absolutely uncalled for and improper, for in so doing we place the defendant in
double jeopardy. In the majority Decision it is stated that:

On February 2, 1953, an information for malicious mischief against the
accused was filed by the City Attorney of Legaspi, Albay, before the Municipal
Court of Legaspi, wherein he pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution had
presented its evidence, he moved to quash the information on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged, but the
motion was denied. Thereafter, the accused presented his evidence, after which
the Court rendered a decision finding him guilty of the crime of malicious
mischief as defined in Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him
to suffer ten (10) days of arresto menor or pay a fine of P75.00, to indemnify
the offended party in the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

From this decision he appealed to the Court of First Instance where again he
was charged with the same offense. On November 10, 1956, he reiterated his
motion to quash the information on the same ground that it does not allege the
necessary elements to constitute the crime of malicious mischief. This time the
court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. The court cancelled the bond
for his provisional release. The Government appealed.

Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court proscribes:

SEC. 9. FORMER CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL OR FORMER JEOPARDY.-When a defendant
shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

In the case at bar, the defendant pleaded not guilty of the offense in the
Municipal Court of Legaspi where the formation was filed, and both the
prosecution and the accused presented evidence which, despite the defenses
interposed by the latter, caused his conviction and sentence to the penalty
aforementioned. On appeal, however, and upon motion to quash, the information,
rightly or wrongly, was dismissed and the defendant exonerated from criminal
liability. Confronting the provisions of the aforequoted Section 9 of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court with the acts established and enumerated in the majority
decision, it cannot be denied that the defendant was prosecuted and convicted of
the offense charged in a Court of competent jurisdiction and that his conviction
therein after he had pleaded not guilty to the charge and after evidence was
submitted the case, constitutes, in the language of the Rules of Court, a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense though he may have been latter
acquitted thereof on appeal to the proper Court of First Instance. It is true it
the defendant appealed from the decision to the lower Court; that, for
procedural purposes, the decision convicting the defendant of such offense was
vacated; and that the elevation of the case to the Court of First Instance for
trial de novo was upon the instance and on appeal of the defendant, but all this
succession of events cannot be any means obliterate nor wipe out facts that have
already existed and brought to life, a metaphysical impossibility even our
Creator cannot accomplish, so that once the defendant is acquitted or the case
dismissed in the upper Court under the circumstances of the case at bar, he is exonerated forever and the prosecution of his case cannot subject to further
proceedings.

In the case of People vs. Doyle, 54 Phil. 862, this Court held that:

“This dismissal of a criminal case of estafa which was appealed from a
Justice of the Peace to the Court of First Instance, the former being vested
with jurisdiction to try and decide, is equivalent to an acquittal of the
defendant in said case, and the filing of a new information in which the case
dismissed is included, exposes said defendant to a second conviction of one and
the same offense, and therefore constitutes double jeopardy”.

In the case of People vs. Fajardo, 49 Phil. 206, the same principle was
upheld:

“The Justice of the Peace having, as he had jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint for estafa filed in the case, the trial court committed an error of
law in holding that it had no jurisdiction to try the case on appeal; but its
judgment, however, in dismissing the case and releasing the accused is
unappealable for the reason that he was already placed in jeopardy, and
therefore the motion for dismissal must be granted”.

That We cannot disregard what has been done in the Municipal Court of Legaspi
is a matter already repeatedly decided by this Court. We see for example that in
the case of People vs. Hermino, 64 Phil.

“Appellant confessed his crime after the prosecution had presented its
evidence, at least in the Municipal Court where the case originated. It cannot
he stated that the appeal taken by him to the Court of First Instance again
restored the case to its original stage for the very reason that the law
requires a trial DE NOVO, that that there had been no presentation or evidence
before he confessed or admitted his crime, because a trial DE NOVO gives the
impression and necessarily implies the existence of a previous trial. The
confession, in order to constitute a mitigating circumstance, must not only be
spontaneous but also be made prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution (Art. 13, Sec. 7, Revised Penal Code)”.

The same doctrine was enunciated in the case of People vs. Bawasanta, 64
Phil. 409, wherein it was said:

“Trial de novo means a new trial in the same manner, with the same effect,
and upon the same issues as the case was tried in the lower Court, in accordance
with the rules of practice in the appellate court (Sandlin vs. State – 1910 – 3
Okla. Cr. 578; State vs. Fort – 1909 – 164 Ala. 578; Crisostomo vs. Director of
Prisons, 41 Phil. 368), and it does not mean that all the proceedings in the
lower court had thereby bean wiped out so as to preclude the ascertainment of
whether the defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty in the lower court for the
purpose of determining the existence of this mitigating
circumstance“.

See also the cases of People vs. Sy Chay (alias Sy Kuan),
44Phil. 900 and People vs. De la Peña, 66 Phil. 45l.

Now, if the trial de novo does not wipe out the proceedings in the inferior
court and the law allows this Court, for purpose of determining the
circumstances attending the in the court of origin, to go over the record
thereof, in cases of trials de novo after appeal to the Court of Instance, under
what principle of justice or even reason and logic are We to disregard in the
case at bar the fact that the defendant has already been convicted in the
inferior court? This question is unanswerable and, as stated before, constitutes
a bull’s-eye hit majority decision. Said in Latin, that is “quod erat
demonstrandum“.

WHEREFORE, I firmly and unhesitatingly maintain that remanding of this case
to the lower court for trial on merits is equivalent or tantamount to placing
the defendant in double jeopardy. So the present appeal of the government must
be necessarily dismissed, without pronouncement to costs.