TESTACY OF SIXTO LOPEZ. JOSE S. LOPEZ, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. AGUSTIN LIBORO, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed
unsuccessfully the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament
(Exh. “A”) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas,
on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in question was executed.
In the court below, the present appellant specified five grounds for his
opposition, to wits (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2)
that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of
the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental
capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was
not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged
instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by
duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the
testator’s sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and
(5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.

In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in
these words: “That the court a quo erred in holding that the document
Exhibit ‘A’ was executed in all particulars as required by law”. To this
objection is added the alleged error of the court “in allowing the petitioner to
introduce evidence that Exhibit ‘A’ was written in a language known to the
decedent after petitioner rested his case and over the vigorous
objection of the oppositor.”

The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one
side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in
Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.

The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against
fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the
loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476) In the
present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be
necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than
the conventional numeral words or characters. The unnumbered page’ is clearly
identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in
relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the
first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the
last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at
the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the
caption “TESTAMENTO”, the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the
testator was in the full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in the
logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the
maker’s property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above
mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures
of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other
than page one. Abangan vs. Abgangan, supra, and Fernandez
vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.

Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first assignment of
error, the matter of the credibility of the witnesses is assailed under this
heading. On the merits we do not believe that the appellant’s contention
deserves serious consideration. Such contradictions in the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses as are set out in the appellant’s brief are incidents,
not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived,
or to recall in the same order in which they occured.

“Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the field of
experimental psychology show that the contradictions of witnesses generally
occur in the details of a certain incident, after a long series of questionings,
and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good
faith. Inasmuch as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like
manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions they should not
agree in the minor details; hence, the contradictions in their testimony.”
(People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil. 99.)

The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his
name. The reason for this was that the testator was suffering from “partial
paralysis”. While another in testator’s place might have directed someone else
to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing
curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the
means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both
ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be “signed” is satisfied if the
signature is made by the testator’s mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and
Ona, 53 Phil. 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)

With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion
that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant
to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in
which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the
opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit
further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this
discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. (64 C.
J., 160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not it
will allow the case to by reopened for the further introduction of evidence
after’ a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the
evidence, and the case may be reopened after the court has announced its
intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted
it or has denied the same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order
has not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed.(64 C. J., 164.)

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have
produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original
case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse
of discretion appears. (Siuliong & Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil. 393; U.
S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil. 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is
allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through
inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct
evidence previously offered. (I Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed.,
545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The ommission to present evidence on the testator’s
knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or
oversight.

Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the
will for its silence on the testator’s understanding of the language used in the
testament. There ?is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly
stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be Established by proof
aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil.
781, in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it
did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even
extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in
a Tagalog region, from which the court said “a presumption arises that said
Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.”

The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and
testament of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed, costs.

Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and
Padilla, JJ., concur.