VICTOR CASTRO, ROSARIO VIÑA, CONCEPCION VIÑA, PACITA VIÑA AND CARLOS VIÑA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JUAN ORPIANO AND SEGUNDINA RIVERA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This action, here on appeal from the Court
of First Instance of Davao, presents the questions as to the legal
effects of the sale of a homestead within five years after the patent
was issued, and particularly as to the standing of the plaintiffs,
brothers and sisters of the sellers, now deceased, in the premises. The
cause was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts.

Briefly, it was stipulated that on December 6, 1936, Jose Castro,
described as married to Fidela Viña, obrtained the
above-mentioned-patent, which embraces a parcel of public land with an
area of 23 hectares 4, On December 18, 1939, Castro and his wife
conveyed this property to the defendant in consideration of P2,710,
P500 of which was paid on the execution of the deed and the balance
payable at the rate of P50 a month until the whole amount was
satisfied. The deed of conveyance was not registered in the office of
the register of deeds, much less was a new certificate of title issued
in the name of the vendee.

During the Japanese occupation, Castro, his wife, and all their
children were slain. Surviving the couple as the statutory next of kin
were Castro’s brother and Mrs. Castro’s brothers and sisters; it is
these who brought the present action, the purpose of which is to
recover the land plus damages and costs of suit, on the ground that the
conveyance to the defendant was invalid.

Upon trial the suit was dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs. The court ruled that —

“The sale and transfer of the rights and interest
of the property in question for valuable consideration in favor of the
defendant Segundina Rivera has been perfected and consummated as
between the parties. Consequently, the defendants are entitled to the
posrsession and ownership of the land in question.”

“The
approval of transfer by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is a prerequisite to the registration of the instrument with
the Register of Deeds for the issuance of its title which has not yet
been presented for approval to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, but same will not Invalidate the agreement entered into
between the parties as embodied in Exh. “A”, (the deed of conveyance).

“If the transfer (Exh. “A”) of the property in question was executed in
violation of Commonwealth Act No. 141 it shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the patent and causing the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the Government and will become again a
part of the public domain.”

That the sale in question, having been effected less than five
years after the patent was granted, was void and of no effect, there
can hardly be any disagreement. In an analogous case, Labrador &
Canonizado vs. De los Santos, et al., 66 Phil. 579, This
Court has said: “The alienation by Santiagorde los Santos of his land
in favor of the plaintiffs Antonio LaBrador and Felipa Canonizado was
made in violation of the provision of section 116 of Act No. 2874 as
amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, which prohibits the encumbering
or alienation of a land acquired as a homestead within five years from
the issuance of the homestead patent, wherefore, it is illegal and
void. As the declaration of nullity of a contract void ab initio operates
to restore things in the state and condition in which they were found
before the execution thereof, the land in question was returned to the
ownership of Santiago de los Santos, in his lifetime, and that of his
children, after his death, with the obligation on the part of said
Santiago de los Santos to return to the purchasers, the plaintiffs, the
price of the sale, with Interest (Art. 1303, Civil Code). Santiago de
los Santos being the vendor, had the declaration of nullity taken place
while he was living, he would have to return said price to the
purchasers; but having died before the declaration of nullity, the
plaintiffs should have presented their claim for the return of the
price in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased, and they
cannot go against the children of the latter inasmuch as the said
children inherit with the benefit of inventory and only that remaining
of the inheritance after paying the indebtedness of the testate or
intestate. While it is true that the defendants inherited the land in
question, the price of the sale cannot be charged thereon, because the
said section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No.
3517, prohibits, the subjection of such land to the payment of said
obligation which was contracted within five years from the issuance of
the homestead patent, as above stated. In any event, the plaintiffs may
Institute the Intestate proceedings of Santiago de los Santos and file
their claim before the committee on claims and appraisal to be named
therein.”

The only perceptible difference between that decision and the case
at bar is in the relations of the heirs to the sellers. In one case,
the heirs were the patentee’s children ant in the other they were4the
vendors’ brothers and sisters. Does this difference alter the result?

In the absence of descendants or ascendants the brothers and
sisters succeed to the entire estate of the decedent to the exclusion
of the latter»s more remote relatives, except where the right of
representation exists. (Arts. 913-921, Civil Code of Spain.)

But the defendant maintains that if the sale was null and void, the
Government and not the plaintiff has cause of action. It is inferred
from the tone of the last paragraph of the quoted portion of the
appealed decision that the trial court shares this view.

Whether as the result of the void sale the land reverted to the
State is a point which we do not have, and do not propose, to decide.
That is a matter between the State and the grantee of the homestead or
his heirs. Note, however, that Labrador and Canonizado vs. De los Santos, supra,
does not seem to sustain the defendant’s and the lower court’s theory
of forfeiture. In any event, the plaintiff’s right to the possession
and use of the property can hardly be disputed while the Government
does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Possession as
well as ownership is a property right transmitted by operation of law
to the distributes, whoever they may be, of decedent’s estate, and the
heirs’ right to the possession is unquestionably superior to any of
the purchaser’s in the void sale. Upon the annulment of the sale, the
purchaser’s claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As
against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to
keep the land than any intruder.

The conclusion then is that the plaintiff has a good ground of
action which the Government alone could contest, granting for the sake
of argument that, as a matter of law, the property was forfeited to the
original grantor.

As to the defendant’s recourse for the recovery of the purchase
price and its interest, the decision above cited says that the
purchaser “may file a claim in the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased” which the purchaser as creditor can Institute. This the
defendant will have to do. However, this suggestion is not to be
understood as an expression of opinion on the liability of the property
in question to attachment, levy, or sale without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (Commonwealth Act No. 456
amending Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141) in case of inability of
the administrator to pay the said price and Interest from other sources.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and another In line
with this decision will be entered, with costs against the defendant
and appellant.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.