VICTORIO REYNOSO AND JUAN REYNOSO, PETITIONERS VS. VICENTE SANTIAGO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, PIA REYNOSO, AGUSTINA REYNOSO, MELITON PALABRICA, LEONCIO CA…

Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso apply for a writ of mandamus
to compel Judge Vicente Santiago of the Court of First Instance of Quezon to
order the opening of a testate estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo in the
place of special intestate proceeding No. 2914, and to appoint Victorio Reynoso
as executor of the decedent’s last will and testament.

Briefly, the facts are as follows: On April 29, 1947, Leoncio
Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented an application in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon for the administration of the property of the
deceased, application which was docketed as intestate proceeding No. 2914.
Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salvadora Obispo’s surviving spouse and
eldest son, respectively, opposed the application and filed a document, which
purported to be the last will and testament of Salvadora Obispo, with a
counterpetition for its probate. Upon trial the court rejected that instrument
as a forgery, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the
court below, found the will authentic and drawn with all the formalities of law.
The dispository part of the decision of the Appellate Court, promulgated
November 27, 1948, reads as follows:

“Se revoca la sentencia de que se apela, y reuniendo el
exhibito A los requisites exigidos por la ley, se ordena, (a) la Iegalizacion de
dicho documento como testamento y ultima voluntad de la finada Salvadora Obispo,
para que surta todos sus efectos legales; (b) la apertura de la testamentaria de
dicha finada; y (c) el nombranriento de un albacea de la misma testamentaria de
conformidad con el precepto del articulo 6, de la Eegla 70 de los Reglamentos de
los Tribunales.”

Thereafter Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso filed two
petitions, one in special proceeding No. 2914 and another under a separate and
new docket number (3107) and with a different title (Testate Estate of the
deceased Salvadora Obispo). The first prayed that the special administrator,
Meliton Palabrica, who had theretofore been appointed in special proceeding No.
2914, be ordered to turn over the properties of the deceased and the proceeds of
coprax, nuts and other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and to render
an accounting within a reasonable time. It also asked for the closing of the
intestate proceeding. The other petition prayed that the estate be administered
and settled in special proceeding No. 3107 and that Victorio Reynoso be
appointed executor of Salvadora Obispo’s last will and testament. It also
contained a prayer for an accounting by Palabrica and delivery by him to the new
executor of the properties that came to his possession including the proceeds
from the sales of coprax, nuts, etc.

The two petitions were decided separately by Judge Santiago on
April 20, 1949. With respect to the opening of another expediente, His
Honor believed that the proposed change or substitution was “not only
unnecessary but inconvenient and expensive.” An intestate proceeding like
special proceeding No. 2914, he said, could and should be converted into a
testate proceeding in the same original expediente without the
necessity of changing its number, name or title.

This petition has no merit. Whether the intestate proceeding
already commenced should be discontinued and a new proceeding under a separate
number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and lies
within the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the heirs or creditors. Amor propio is
perhaps the only thing that is at stake on this phase of the controversy.

As to the appointment of the deceased’s husband as executor or
administrator, the court said that action on the petition should be withheld for
the time being, because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which the special
administrator in special proceeding No. 2914 is plaintiff and appellee and
Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant. It involves the question whether an
extensive parcel of coconut land is conjugal property or the exclusive property
of the husband.

On this feature of the second petition we disagree with the
respondent judge. If one other than the surviving spouse is appointed, which is
possible, the feared conflict will not materialize. If Victorio Reynoso is
chosen, a special administrator may be named to represent the estate in the suit
against him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that “If the executor or
administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice
thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power
and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in
the settlement of other claims.” The situation in which Victorio Reynoso is
found with reference to the land in litigation between him and the estate, comes
within the spirit if not exactly within the letter of this provision.

Subject to this observation, an administrator should be
appointed without delay in accordance with the final decision of the Court of
Appeals. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there
is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause. The
Court of Appeals having decreed the probate of the will and the appointment of
an albacea, there is no valid reason for the further retention of the
special administrator. The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary
for the prompt settlement and distribution of the estate. There are important
duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator can
not perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not
be accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.

But whether or not Victorio Reynoso should be appointed as
administrator we do not and can not of course decide in a petition for mandamus.
While the surviving spouse is entitled to preference in the appointment (section
6, Rule 79), circumstances might warrant his rejection and the appointment of
someone else. Mandamus lies where the duty is specific and ministerial. It does
not lie where judgment or discretion is exercised in the performance of the act.
Applying the rule to this case, it is proper to command the court below to
appoint a regular administrator, but it is not proper to tell it whom to
appoint.

The petition for the constitution of a separate proceeding for
the administration of the estate under the will is denied. The petition for the
appointment of a regular administrator is granted subject to the provision of
section 6 of Rule 79 in the selection of the person to be appointed. Without
costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla,
Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.