CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. AMBROSIO SANTOS, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, NATIVIDAD REYES AND ADRIANA REYES, RESPONDENTS.

Under date of January 22, 1947, the herein respondents, Natividad Reyes and
Adriana Reyes, filed a verified complaint (civil case No. 129) in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal against the herein petitioners, praying that a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the petitioners to restore
to the respondents the possession of two contiguous lots located in the
municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal, and to take away the wire fence built
around said lots by the petitioners; that after trial said injunction be made
permanent; that the petitioners be sentenced to pay P20,000 by way of damages,
and that the respondents be granted such other remedy as may be proper under the
law. The complaint alleges in substance that the respondents acquired the two
lots on June 6, 1945, from their former owner, Realty Investments, Inc.; that
from such date the respondents have been in possession of the lots; that in
December, 1946, the latter began constructing on the lots four houses of strong
materials valued at about P14,000; that on January 7, 1947, when the houses were
about to be finished, the petitioners forcibly entered the lots and ousted
therefrom the respondents and the persons constructing the house; that said
petitioners thereafter built around the lots a wire fence and posted armed men
on the lots with a view to preventing the respondents and their laborers from
entering therein and proceeding with the construction of the houses above
mentioned.

Under date of February 1, 1947, the petitioners filed a verified answer in
said civil case No. 129, alleging in the main that the contract of June 6, 1945,
between the Realty Investments, Inc., and the respondents, upon which the latter
base their claim of ownership over the lots in question, was a mere contract to
sell, which was converted on April 26, 1946, into a conditional contract to buy,
which was in turn rescinded on December 19, 1946, by the Realty Investments,
Inc.; that the petitioners are the registered owners of the lots, having bought
the same from the Realty Investments, Inc., on December 28, 1946; that the
petitioners have been in peaceful possession thereof, by themselves and through
their predecessor in interest, Parsram Aildos (who transferred to the
petitioners his right to buy the lots from the Realty Investments, Inc.), since
November, 1941; that the respondents, on or about December 28, 1946, over the
opposition of the petitioners and their predecessor in interest, entered the
lots and began the construction of the four houses mentioned in the complaint;
that it was the mayor of Pasay who ordered the suspension of said construction,
and that the persons guarding the premises are members of the Detective and
Protective Bureau, Inc., who are merely enforcing the order of said mayor.

Under date of February 1, 1947, the petitioners filed a verified written
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
based on practically the same allegations contained in their answer.

After a hearing in which the matter was argued at length, the herein
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Honorable Ambrosio
Santos, issued an order dated March 14, 1947, directing the issuance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by the respondents, upon their
filing of a bond in the sum of P5,000. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
dated March 28, 1946, was denied by the respondent judge in his order of April
15, 1947. On this latter date, the respondent judge issued an order approving
the bond of P5,000 filed by the respondents and directing the issuance of the
corresponding writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Whereupon, on April 19, 1947, the petitioners instituted the present petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction, praying that the orders of the
respondent judge of March 14 and April 15, 1947, be annulled and that the
respondent judge be ordered to set civil case No. 129 for trial on the merits
with a view to determining the question of title and possession over the two
lots in question.

The respondent judge, without attempting to settle the issue relating to the
ownership of the lots, found, in his order of March 14, 1947, that the
respondents have been in material and physical possession of the lots until
January 7, 1947, and that in December, 1946, said respondents commenced to build
four houses of strong materials on said lots and the construction work was
suspended only on January 7, 1947, due to the forcible entry of the petitioners
who thereafter built around the lots a wire fence and placed armed men on the
premises to make the ouster of the respondents and their laborers effective.
After a careful examination of the record before us, we find said conclusions to
be correct. It is significant that the petitioners admit the existence of a
contract in favor of the respondents for the purchase of the lots in question,
and that said contract preceded the alleged deeds of sale executed by the Realty
Investments, Inc., on December 28, 1946, in favor of the petitioners. More
significant still is the stubborn fact that there are actually on the lots four
houses of strong materials about to be finished, the construction of which by
the respondents in December, 1946, is not denied by the petitioners. These
circumstances strongly militate against petitioners’ pretense that they had ever
been in peaceful possession of the lots prior to that of the herein
respondents.

The legal question that, arises is whether the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, such as that ordered by the respondent judge,
is proper, in view of the established rule that injunction generally will not be
granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place
it into that of another whose title has not clearly been established by law.
(Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil., 225, citing earlier cases.)

We are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his
discretion in granting the injunction. We hereby reiterate the general rule
pointed out in Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, supra, but we consider the
case at bar as not falling thereunder. Rather, it is a situation contemplated in
the following passages of said decision:

“But the fact that the petitioner might have been in sporadic possession of
all or some of the lands in question, in the last months of 1945, having entered
the same, by means of threats and intimidation, will not prevent the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of herein respondent, as defendant in
said civil case No. 8930, in whose name said lands had been registered under the
Torrens System, and who has been in possession thereof, during the last 20
years, as said possession of the petitioner is completely and absolutely
illegal.

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     *             *

“The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo until the merits can be heard. The status quo is the last actual
peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.
(Frederick vs. Huber, 180 Pa., 572, 37 Atl., 90.)

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     *             *

“In cases involving the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the
exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court will not generally be
interfered with; and the refusal of the trial court to permit the plaintiff in
this case to file a counterbond cannot be considered as an abuse of sound
judicial consideration, bearing in mind particularly the admission made by the
plaintiff himself that sometime in 1945, or thereabouts, he occupied and took
possession of all or some of the lands in question, without waiting for the
final decision of the competent courts in said civil case No. 8930. It is a
general principle in equity jurisprudence that ‘he who comes to equity must come
with clean hands.’ (North Negros Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664.)”
(Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, supra.)

The action of the petitioners in encircling the lots in question with a wire
fence and in guarding the place, may at most be considered as a mere
interference with or disturbance of respondents’ possession and, as such, is
even of less extent than the possession admittedly held by the petitioners in
the case of Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, supra. We have therefore a much
better instance in which a preliminary injunction may be availed of “to preserve
the status quo until the merits can be heard.” Said status quo is
the “last actual peaceable and uncontested” possession of the herein respondents
which preceded civil case No. 129, and certainly not the guarded possession of
the petitioners. The necessity of restoring the parties in this case to their
former situation is called for by the fact that the suspension of the
construction of respondents’ houses may result in a much greater damage than the
granting of the injunction upon the filing of a bond which can amply indemnify
the herein petitioners.

The injunction was granted by the respondent judge almost two months after
the filing of the complaint, and only after the parties had argued the point in
open court and after considering the verified pleadings with their supporting
papers. Again, the petitioners were able to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was also denied by the respondent judge after taking into account all the
considerations invoked by the petitioners. We are thus unable to hold that the
respondent judge acted hastily in the matter and without a hearing. Of course,
it was not yet necessary for the respondent judge to require and receive such
evidence as may be sufficient to settle the question of title, which should be
decided after the trial on the merits. It is needless to state in this
connection that the complaint in civil case No. 129 clearly makes out an action
to quiet title.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and
Tuason, JJ., concur.

MORAN, C.J.:

I concur in the result.