G.R. No. L-3311. October 31, 1949
MOTHER M. MARGOLARI, F.M.M., PETITIONER, VS. TIBURCIO TANCINCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, MACARIO M. OFILADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EX-OFICIO SHERIFF OF THE C…
TORRES, J.:
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge Tiburcio
Tancinco, wherein Mercedes Reyes Vda. de Agudo is suing out a writ of habeas
corpus, directed to Mother Superior M. Margolari, F.M.M. (the petitioner in the
case before us) to produce the body of Philomena Agudo before said court,
because it is alleged that she is being detained and deprived of her liberty by
said Mother Superior, and that the custody of Philomena Agudo be given to
Mercedes Reyes Vda. de Agudo, on September 2, 1949, the court Issued a writ
addressed to the Sheriff of Manila, commanding the latter to produce the body of
said Philomena Agudo and to summon the respondent Mother Superior M. Margolari
of the Saint Anthony’s Institution, to appear likewise before the court issuing
the said order.
At the hearing of said case and upon receiving the testimony of
Mercedes Reyes Vda. de Agudo, on September 8, 1949, the court issued an order in
the following terms:
“In the interest of equity and pending the final determination
of this proceedings, the Sheriff of the City of Manila is hereby directed to
take immediately from the care of Mother M. Margolari. Mother Superior of St.
Anthony’s Institution the body of Philomena Agudo and to deliver the said
Philomena Agudo to the care and custody of the Social Welfare Commissioner,
Manila.“The expenses incident to Philomena’s stay in the above named
Institution shall, be borne by the petitioner herein. A representative of the
Social Welfare Commissioner shall accompany Philomena Agudo to this Court at the
next hearing of this case on September 14, 1949 at 8:00 o’clock in the
morning.“It is also ordered that any interested party or parties in
this case may be allowed to visit Philomena at the Social Welfare Commission at
any appropriate time of the day.”
In an urgent motion, counsel for Mother M. Margolari moved for
the reconsideration of said order of September 8, 1949, on the ground that: (1)
There is no necessity for Philomena Agudo to be placed under the care and
custody of the Social Welfare Commissioner; the respondent is placing Philomena
Agudo at the disposal of the court, for which purpose she was offering to post a
bond of P1,000 to guaranty Philomena Agudo’s appearance at any time she is
needed by the court. (2) Philomena Agudo, being of age and with sufficient
discretion to decide where it is best for her to stay, does not want to leave
the Saint Anthony’s Institution. (3) She fears, that if she is taken out from
the Saint Anthony’s Institution, she may be physically molested and harassed,
(4) She is a strong willed girl who can not be influenced by anybody, and having
made up her mind to embrace the religious life, not even her own mother can
prevail upon her to give up her intention; on the other hand, if she did not
wish to take up the religious life, neither the respondent Mother M. Margolari
nor anyone else can prevail upon her to embrace such life. And (5) in an
affidavit attached to this record as Annex F, Philomena Agudo declared that she
is a postulant in the Saint Anthony’s Institution of her own free will and
volition and not due to force, duress or intimidation or undue influence on the
part of anybody, and that she is staying in that institution voluntarily and
deliberately and has “not authorized” her “mother or anybody” to file the habeas
corpus petition, and therefore repudiates such move to take her away from the
convent, “as contrary to her desire and wishes and she is happy and content in
the convent.”
It is further stated in the motion for reconsideration that
sometime in February, 1948, she had applied for admission as a postulant in the
Saint Anthony’s Institution and was admitted only sometime in June, 1949. During
the intervening period of about one year and four months, between her
application and admission, “she had every chance and opportunity to deliberate
and decide whether she should take up the religious life or not.” The fact
that—the motion for reconsideration concludes—”she was not immediately accepted
also proves that no undue and improper influence had been brought to bear upon
her by the respondent; otherwise, said postulant would have been immediately
admitted.”
Counsel, therefore, prayed that the order issued by the court
“placing Philomena Agudo under the care and custody of the Social Welfare
Commissioner and/or the Welfareville pending the trial of the instant
proceedings be reconsidered, and that she be allowed to continue staying in the
Saint Anthony’s Institution.”
After consideration of the motion of the respondent, the court
denied the same and maintained its order of September 8, 1949. The court ruled,
however, that “in view of the oral manifestation of counsel for the respondent
that he will institute the necessary proceedings with the Supreme Court
impugning the validity of this Court’s order of September 8, 1949, the Sheriff
of the City of Manila is hereby ordered to hold in abeyance, for a period of one
day only, from the date the respondent is notified hereof, the execution of said
order of September 8, 1949.”
Counsel then filed on behalf of Mother M. Margolari, a petition
for certiorari with prohibition and preliminary injunction praying this Court to
issue an order requiring the court below to certify to this court the record of
case No. 9086, particularly the orders of September 8 and 12, 1949, so that the
same may be reviewed by us; to issue a writ of preliminary injunction after the
necessary bond has been filed, restraining the Honorable Tiburcio Tancinco,
Judge of the 5th Branch of the Court of First Instance and Macario Ofilada,
ex-oficio Sheriff of the City of Manila, from executing and enforcing the
aforementioned orders of September 8 and 12, 1949, and after hearing the parties
to render a decision declaring said orders of September 8 and 12, 1949, “to be
null and void, and forever restraining the respondent judge and sheriff from
enforcing or executing the same, and permitting Philomena Agudo to stay or live
where she may choose during the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings in the
Court below.”
Predicated on the above, the question brought before us for our
determination is whether or not the court below has acted illegally and with
abuse of discretion in issuing the above-quoted order of September 8, 1949,
taking Philomena Agudo from the care of M. Margolari, Mother Superior of Saint
Anthony’s Institution and committing her to the care and custody of the Social
Welfare Commissioner.
Counsel for Mercedes Reyes Vda. de Agudo argues that, pursuant
to Section 12 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the respondent judge has the
power to issue the order of September 8, for the safekeeping of the person of
Philomena Agudo. Said Section 12 says:
“SEC. 12. Hearing on return. Adjournments.—When
the writ is returned before one judge, at a time when the court is in session,
he may forthwith adjourn the case into the court, there to be heard and
determined. The court or judge before whom the writ is returned or adjourned
must immediately proceed to hear and examine the return, and such other matters
as are properly submitted for consideration, unless for good cause shown the
hearing is adjourned, in nhich event the court or judge shall make such order
for the safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the
case requires. If the person imprisoned or restrained is not produced because of
his alleged sickness or infirmity, the court or judge must be satisfied that it
is so grave that such person cannot be produced without danger, before
proceeding to hear and dispose of the matter. On the hearing the court or judge
shall disregard matters of form and technicalities in respect to any warrant or
order of commitment of a court or officer authorized to commit by
law.”
The facts which gave rise to these proceedings, examined in the
light of the clear provisions of the above-quoted rule, evidently lead us to the
conclusion that the order in question can find no support in the letter or
spirit thereof. Philomena Agudo is in no need of protection or safekeeping. Her
personal safety not being in danger, and inasmuch as she is safe in the convent
where she is now, the order complained of is without basis.
Petition is, therefore, granted. No pronouncement is made as to
costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.
CONCURRING
OZAETA, J.:
Concurring in the result of the majority decision, I wish to
record the mental processes by which I arrived at my own conclusion:
The main case pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila
out of which this incident arose is a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by
Mrs. Mercedes Reyes Vda. de Agudo to recover the rightful custody of her
24-year-old daughter Philomena Agudo which is alleged to be withheld from her by
the therein respondent (petitioner herein). Mother Superior M. Margolari, F.M.M.
Mrs. Mercedes Reyes Vda. de Agudo contends in said case that her daughter
Philomena left her custody wihtout her knowledge and consent to embrace the
religious life in St. Anthony’s Institution under the direction and control of
Mother Superior M. Margolari. Mrs. Agudo invokes article 321 of the Civil Code,
which says that notwithstanding the provision of article 320 to the effect that
a person of age is qualified for all acts of civil life, “unmarried daughters
who have attained their majority but are under twenty-five years of age cannot
leave the parental home without permission of the father or mother in whose
company they live, except to marry, or when the father or mother has remarried.”
In her return the Mohter superior alleges: “That under the provisions of article
321 of the civil Code, Philomena Agudo, who is already 24 years of age, has the
right to leave the parental home without her parent’s consent, and to take the
religious life.”
Upon an adjournment of the hearing of the petition for habeas
corpus Judge Tancinco, acceding to an oral motion of counsel for Mrs. Agudo,
ordered that in the interest of equity and pending the final determination of
the proceedings Philomena Agudo be delivered to the care and custody of the
Social Welfare Commissioner, upon the authoirty of section 12 of Rule 102, which
says that when the hearing of a petition for habeas corpus is adjourned “the
court or judge shall make such order for the safe-keeping of the person
imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires.”
According to the manifestation made by counsel in open court
during the hearing of the present petition for certiorari to annul that order of
Judge Tancinco, the purpose of Mrs. Agudo in seeking such order was to place her
daughter Philomena beyond the control and supposed undue influence of the
authorities of the St. Anthony’s Institution so that when she, Philomena, should
testify in the habeas corpus proceeding her testimony would be free from such
influence. In other words, Mrs. Agudo apprehends that if her daughter should
remain in the custody of the St. Anthony’s Institution up to the time she is
called to testify in the main case, she might testify that she had left the
parental home and had decided to embrace the religious live of her won free will
and without have been induced by anybody to do so, and that such testimony might
not reflect the truth but only the wishes or instructions of the authorities of
the St. Anthony’s Institution, under whose control and direction she now is.
I am of the opinion that upon the circumstances above narrated
the nature of the case does not require the transfer of the custody of Philomena
Agudo from the St. Anthony’s Institution to the Social Welfare Commissioner
pending the determination of the habeas corpus proceeding, for the following
reasons:
- Mrs. Agudo’s fear that her daughter’s testimony might be unduly influenced
by the authorities of the St. Anthony’s Institution seems to have been induced
by a misapprehension regarding the materiality to the result of her petition for
habeas curpus of whether or not her daughter had left the parental home of her
own free will. As I construe article 321 of the Civil Code, upon which her
petition for habeas corpus is predicated, in order to invoke it she does not
have to prove that her unmarried daughter under twenty-five years of age left
the parental home thru the inducement of anohter person or that she is being
restrained or deprived of her liberty. Said article 321 says that “unmarried
daughters who have attained their majority but are under twenty-five years of
age cannot leave the parental home without permission of the father or mother in
whose company the live, except to marry, or when the father or mother has
remarried.” The real controversy is between an unmarried daughter under
twenty-five years of age and her mother. May the daughter, of her won free will
but wihout the consent of her parent, leave the parental home and live a life of
her own somewhere else? That, in my opinion, is the question (one of first
impression) which the respondent judge has to decide in the habeas corpus
proceeding pending before him. If he decides it int eh negative, the petition
for habeas corpus will prosper regardless of whether or not the unmarried
daughter in question left the parental home of her own free will and whether or
not she is free to remain in or leave the St. Anthony’s Institution, where she
now is. - The nature of the case does not requred the delivery of the preson of
Philomena Agudo to the Social Welfare Commissioner for safekeeping because it
appears from her affidavit attached to the recored that she feels safe in the
St. Anthony’s Institution and prefers to stay there pending the determination of
the habeas corpus proceeding rather than be delivered to the custody of the
Social Welfare Commissioner. Her wishes on this matter of prevention and
safekeeping pending the hearing cannot be disregarded without doing violence to
her dignity as a human person. To respect her wishes is not to prejudice the
right asserted by her mother under article 321 above cited, which the respondent
judge is called upon to decide after trying the case on the merits.
DISSENTING
REYES, J.:
I dissent. It seems evident that the purpose of the respondent
judge in entrusting to the Welfare Commissioner, until the next hearing of the
main case (Mercedes Reyes Vda. de Agudo vs. Mother M. Margolari, F.M.M.), the
custody of the person alleged to be illegally detained in said case is to place
the said person beyond the influence of either party. This does not constitute a
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of the authority conferred upon the
trial judge by section 12 of Rule 102 adn should therefore not be interfered
with by this Court.