JOSEFA FABIE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. NGO BOO SOO, DEFENDANT, SANCHO INOCENCIO, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

The main case is one for desalucio between Josefa Fabie
and Ngo Boo Soo; but the controversy now before us is between Josefa Fabie and
her former attorney, the case having been elevated here on appeal from an order
for the payment of the latter’s fees.

As a background to the case, it should be stated that, by the
will of Rosario Fabie y Grey duly probated after her death, Josefa Fabie was
made the usufructuary of the rents of two houses in the City of Manila, one on
Sto. Cristo street and the other on Ongpin street, while the naked title to both
was bequeathed to Juan Grey. The right of administration over the property
having been disputed between the usufructuary and the holder of the bare title,
the controversy was taken to court and the usufructuary, i. e., Josefa
Fabie, won, final decision in the case having been rendered by this Court on
December 12, 1945. Attorney for Josefa Fabie in that case is the present
appellee, Sancho Inocencio.

After liberation, Josefa Fabie had differences with her tenant
Ngo Boo Soo respecting the rent which the latter should pay for the house on
Sto. Cristo street. The dispute was taken to court but ended in a compromise.
However, it had for its aftermath the present controversy between Josefa Fabie
and her former lawyer.

The compromise agreement permitted Ngo Boo Soo to continue
occupying the rented premises at an increased rent and Josefa Fabie on her part
to withdraw the rentals which Ngo Boo Soo was to deposit in court. Acting on
this authority, Josefa Fabie filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to withdraw the rentals deposited by defendant. The motion was opposed by
Sancho Inocencio, her former attorney, who claimed that upon the funds sought to
be withdrawn he had a lien for a professional fee of P500. He later increased
the claim to P1,256.25 with the addition of P756.25 as his share of the rentals
by way of compensation for his professional services under an agreement in the
form of a power of attorney signed by Josefa Fabie on September 6, 1944, which
purportedly gave him 25 per cent of said rentals in perpetuity. Answering the
opposition, the movant alleged that the power of attorney referred to did not
express her true agreement, which was to compensate the attorney for services
rendered during the pendency of the aforementioned case between her and Juan
Grey, including services in other cases, “but not to grant him a life pension.”
The movant also alleged that the said power of attorney was invalid and illegal
and had already been revoked by her letter of July 16, 1946, and that, under the
agreement as intended by the parties, the attorney would only be entitled to the
sum of P265.75, which movant was willing to pay. In a subsequent petition filed
on August 30, 1946, the movant asked that the claim for unpaid attorney’s fee be
set for hearing, alleging that the sum claimed by the attorney under the power
of attorney in question did not constitute a charging lien under Rule 127,
Section 33, of the Rules of Court; that the reasonable value of the attorney’s
services did not justify the grant of a “life pension to the extent of 25 per
cent of all the rentals;” and that, under the Rules, the claim for attorney’s
fee must be ascertained by the court upon hearing in which the attorney must
prove that the amount claimed is unpaid and that it is reasonable and just.
Despite this petition, the lower court, without receiving evidence, rendered the
following order:

“Due consideration first had of the respective contentions of
the plaintiff and her former counsel, Attorney Sancho Inocencio, re the latter’s
claim and lien for attorney’s fees in this case as well as those under the
instrument signed by them on September 4, 1944, the Court believes and so holds
that said counsel, taking into account the extent of the services rendered by
him in the instant case as evidenced by its record, is entitled to the claim and
lien for attorney’s fees in this case in the amount of P500 in addition to the
sum of P250 already, paid to him. The Court is also of the opinion that the
claim of said counsel in the amount of P756.25, representing 25 per cent of the
rentals collected by the plaintiff covered by the instrument above referred to,
constitute a lien upon the funds now in question.

“Wherefore, the Clerk of this Court is hereby authorized and
instructed to deliver to Attorney Sancho Inocencio the total amount deposited in
this Court as rentals in payment of his claim and lien for attorney’s fees above
indicated.”

A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the movant has
brought the case here on appeal.

Without going into all the specifications of error, we think
the appeal may be disposed of under the contention that the lower court erred
“in declaring without any hearing or submission of evidence that Atty. Sancho
Inocencio is a co-owner t6 the e-tent of 25 per cent of the rentals due Josefa
Fabie as usufructuary of the two properties bequeathed to her by will.”

The pleadings presented by the parties have put in issue not
only the validity of the power of attorney on which the appellee’s claim for
professional services is founded but also the nature and extent of those
services and the reasonable value thereof. Resolution of those issues clearly
required evidence. But despite appellant’s petition for a hearing, the lower
court, without receiving any evidence, made a summary adjudication by handing
down the order herein appealed from. This act of the lower court amounts to a
denial of appellant’s right to a due process of law and renders its order
void.

We can not, however, subscribe to the contention that the
appellee’s claim for attorney’s fee has to be ventilated in a separate action.
The issues being sufficiently formulated in the pleadings already presented,
there is no need for multiplying suits by requiring the filing of such separate
action.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby revoked and the
case is ordered remanded to the court below for further proceedings, with costs
against the appellee.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason,
Montemayor, and Torres, JJ., concur.