THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AGATON MARTIN (ALIAS BORONG-BORONG), DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appellant was charged with treason on thirty eight counts but,
after trial, was found guilty by the People’s Court on only seven
counts (Nos. 1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 18, and 30), and sentenced to life
imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and costs. From this sentence he appealed.

As contended by the attorney de oficio and admitted by the Solicitor General, count 1 has not been proved.

Count 6 refers to the arrest, torture, and killing of
Teofilo Torres, a guerrilla suspect. To prove this count, the
Government presented three witnesses, namely: Felipa Bernal, Gregorio
Reyes, and Anastacio Cruz. The first testified that at about 2 o’clock
in the morning of July 9, 1944, a Japanese captain and several
Filipinos, among them Cirilo Tuason and the appellant herein, went up
her house in barrio Maybunga, Pasig, Rizal, and lined up all the men
(the three brothers leodegario, Gregorio, and Teofilo, all aurnaraed
Torres). Cirilo Tuason then pointed to Teofilo Torres as a guerrilla,
whereupon the Japanese captain tied his hands. Teofilo Torres was taken
away by the appellant and his companions and has not been heard from
since then. Anastiacio Cruz who was himself arrested on the same day,
but in a different house and by a different person, testified that he
knew Teofilo Torres was arrested as a guerrilla suspect but that he saw
him only when he was already downstairs with Cirilo Tuason and his
companions; that he and Teofilo Torres were taken to the garrison of
the Military Police in Pasig, that while there he heard Teofilo Torres
being maltreated in the adjoining room.and he afterwards saw him with
his face battered. Gregorio Reyes, who lived in the adjoining house and
was himself arrested on the same occasion, declared that Teofilo Torres
was arrested by several persons, among them the appellant herein, and
that he saw Teofilo Torres being tied by the Makapilis and the military
police as he was being led to the street.

It is contended that with the above evidence, appellant was not
shown to have done anything in connection with the arrest of Teofilo
Torres; that no two witnesses testified on the same overt act. While it
appears that appellant was not the one who pointed to Teofilo Torres as
a guerrilla suspect and tied his hands, there is no denying the fact
that he was in the group that made the arrest and can not therefore
escape responsibility in the absence of any exculpatory evidence.

Count 7 refers to the arrest of Guillermo Salandanan and
is supported by the testimony of Antonia Santos (mother of the victim),
Olivia Natividad, and Arcadio Cruz. According to this testimony the
arrest took place in the afternoon of August 11, 1944, in barrio
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Rizal, in front of the house of Olivia Natividad
and was effected by a group of armed men lead by the appellant. Asked
by Antonia Santos why they were arresting her son Guillermo Salandanan,
appellant informed her that it was because her son was a guerrilla.
After his arrest, Guillermo Salandanan was never heard from.

The defense contends that the proof on this count does not
establish collaboration with the enemy, for it does not show that
appellant was accompanied by any Japanese or that the person arrested
by him was surrendered to the Japanese. But the fact that Salandanan
was arrested because of his guerrilla activities clearly shows that
appellant was acting for or collaborating with the enemy, and the
insinuation that the said arrest may have been due to rivalry between
guerrilla units has no basis in fact as there is no evidence that
appellant was identified with any guerrilla unit.

Counts 11 and 12 refer to the arrest of Miguel Castillo,
Candido Cruz, and one Takio. The arrest of these individuals on
November 21, 1944, in barrio Ugong, Pasig, Rizal, by appellant and
several companions was testified to by Leona Natividad and Rita
Pascual. But there is no evidence as to the reason for the arrest other
than what may be inferred from Rita’s testimony that those apprehended
were made to lug the bananas, oranges, and sugar cane which appellant
and his companions had gathered in the place. Their hands were not even
tied as in other cases. We therefore have to agree with counsel de oficio that the proof on these counts does not establish collaboration with the enemy.

Count No. 18 refers to the zoning of Tipas, Pasig, Rizal,
for the purpose of apprehending guerrilla suspects. Several witnesses
testified that the said zoning was staged on December 1, 1944, and some
of them claimed having seen appellant there. They did not, however,
mention any act of direct participation on the part of appellant, and
much less have two witnesses testified on the same overt act. The
evidence is obviously insufficient to hold appellant guilty on this
count.

Count No. 30 refers to the arrest of Ernesto Buenviaje and
is supported by the testimony of Mercedes Mendiola, Alfonso Benito, and
Patricio Benito. Mercedes Mendiia was the wife of Ernesto Buenviaje and
she testified that on December 30, 1944, her husband, who was a
guerrilla, came down from the fountains to visit her in Sagad, Pasig,
Rizal; that informed that he was being sought by appellant for his
guerrilla activities, he toolf her to the house of their cousin,
2acarias, in sitio Caniugan, Maybuñga, Pasig, Rizal; that hardly had
they arrived at said house when appellant and his companions, including
members of the military police, came upon them, arrested her husband
and then tied and took him away. Thereafter, her husband was never
heard from.

This testimony was corroborated by Alfonso Benito and Patricio
Benito, who did not witness the actual arrest but later saw Ernesto
Buenviaje with his hands tied pass in front of their house in the
custody of appellant and several companions who were armed.

The defense finds contradiction between the testimony of Mercedes Mendiola, who said that the arrest took place at about 5:30 in the
afternoon and the declaration of the two corroborating witnesses who
said that they saw Ernesto Buenviaje being led by his captors already
on the following morning. It should be noted, however, that both of
these witnesses declared that they did not see the actual arrest
although one of them said that he heard about it, What they did see was
something that happened after the arrest and which therefore did not
have to coincide in point of time with the actual arrest. It would
appear that counsel merely surmised that from the house of Zacarias,
where Buenviaje was arrested at about 5:30 in the afternoon, he was
immediately led in front of the house of these two witnesses when there
is no proof at all that he was not taken to some other place before
that. As the Solicitor General observes, it is quite within the realm
of possibility for Buenviaje’s captors to have been detained for some
reason or other in that neighborhood and that they did not leave until
early the following morning when Alfonso Benito and Patricio Benito saw
them pass by. Our conclusion is that this count has been sufficiently
proven.

It should be stated in conclusion that, in connection with the counts on which we find appellant guilty, his defense of alibi
has nothing to support it except the doubtful testimony of his
prisonmates, which certainly can not prevail over that of the
witnesses for the prosecution who saw him commit the different
treasonous acts attributed to him and by whom he was clearly identified.

And lastly, as to the contention that the prosecution has failed to
establish appellant’s Filipino citizenship as an essential element in
the crime of treason imputed to him, it appears that the prosecution
did present appellant’s prison record, which sets out his personal
circumstances, with the testimony of the chief of the identification
section of the Bureau of Prisons that all the personal data contained
in said record were supplied by appellant himself, and that although he
was not the one who prepared said record, he, however, verified its
contents after its was prepared. Said record shows appellant to be a
Filipino citizen, and we think it is sufficient proof, of that fact in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

Wherefore, we find appellant guilty of treason on counts 6, 7, and
30 but not on counts 1,11, 12, and 18. This, however, necessitates no
change in the sentence imposed below, which is in accordance, with law,
so that the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.