JUAN SANCHEZ, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. OSCAR DEL ROSARIO, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

In a petition for quo warranto brought by Juan Sanchez, a defeated
candidate for the office of councilor in the municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan,
against Oscar del Rosario, a winning candidate for the same position, the Court
of First Instance of said province rendered judgment unseating respondent from
said elective office on the ground of the latter’s ineligibility. Hence, this
appeal.

It remains uncontested that appellant Oscar del Rosario was, on the date of
his election, only 21 years, 3 months and 7 days old, having been born on 3
August 1938. He was thus disqualified to run for an elective municipal office
under Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code (People vs. Yanza,
107 Phil., 888; Feliciano vs. Aquino, G. R. No. L-10201, September 23,
1957), which reads:

“Qualifications of Elective Municipal Officer.—An elective municipal
officer must, at the time of the election, be a qualified voter of his
municipality and must have been a resident therein at least one year; he must be
loyal to the Republic of the Philippines, and not less than twenty-three
years of age. He must also be able to read and write intelligently either
Spanish, English or the local dialect.” (Italics supplied.)

Appellant, however, insists (1) that petitioner having already known
respondent’s age disqualification before the elections and having then failed to
question the latter’s candidacy, is estopped from instituting these proceedings
for quo warranto; (2) that petitioner has no legal personality to bring
this suit, since he would not. anyway be entitled to the office sought to be
vacated by respondent; (3) that the petition filed by one Maximo Ortega with the
Commission on Elections to annul the certificates of candidacy of Nacionalista
Party candidates (among whom is herein appellant) is res judicata in the
instant litigation; and (4) that the age requirement prescribed by the aforesaid
Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code becomes directory merely after
the elections.

We find these contentions unmeritorious.

Estoppel is untenable; indeed, this Court has already made the observation
that the right to an elective municipal office can be contested, under existing
legislation, only after proclamation, and that there is no authorized
proceedings upon which an ineligible candidate could be barred from running for
office (see Castañeda vs. Yap, 91 Phil., 819; 48 Off. Gaz., No. 8, 3364;
Cesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil., 97). Petitioner merely followed the steps
outlined under Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, thus:

“Procedure against an ineligible person.—When a person who is not
eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right to the office
may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office before the
Court of First Instance of the province, within one week after the proclamation
of his election, by filing a petition for quo warranto. The case shall be
conducted in accordance with the usual procedure andl shall be decided within
thirty days from the filing of the complaint. A copy of the decision shall be
furnished the Commission on Elections.”

Respondent argues that petitioner could have questioned the former’s
candidacy in the Commission on Elections long before the elections were held;
but, as will later be explained, it is doubtful whether said body could have
granted any relief at all. Finally, the matter in litigation is one affecting
public interest, so that estoppel, if at all, should be applied very sparingly
and only on serious grounds.

That petitioner would not be entitled to the elective office even if
respondent is ordered to vacate the same is likewise an invalid objection
against the institution of this suit, for, otherwise, Section 173 of the Revised
Election Code would clearly be rendered nugatory. Under said law, the
contestant’s right to the office involved is not contemplated, and thus this
Court has repeatedly ruled that respondent’s declaration of ineligibility does
not entitle the petitioner to said office (Luison vs. Garcia, 103 Phil.,
453; Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 84 Phil., 489; 47 Off. Gaz., No. 2, 727; Calano
vs. Cruz, 94 Phil., 230; 50 Off. Gaz., 610). Yet, in said rulings, the
petitioners have never been considered to be without any legal personality to
file the necessary quo warranto proceedings. We need not conjecture into
the philosophy of the law; suffice it to say that the legislature expressed its
intentions very plainly.

Why appellant’s third contention that the petition filed by one Maximo Ortega
with the Commission on Elections questioning the certificates of candidacy of
all Nacionalista Party candidates for municipal offices in Bocaue is res
judicata is not sustainable was amply explained by the lower court in these
words:

“Neither can the decision of the Commission on Elections bo considered as a
bar to the present petition, for, it appears that the petition filed with the
Commission on Elections was general in character, and referred to all the
candidates in the last elections for municipal offices in Bocaue, Eulacan, for
reasons other than that of the ineligibility by reason of non-age. An action may
bar another action if the requisites prescribed by the Rules are present;
namely: (1) That the parties ire identical: and, (2) That the action refers to
the same subject-maUer, These requisites are not present in this
case.”

We may add, however, that the duty of the Commission on Elections to give due
course to certificates of candidacy, filed in due form, is ministerial in
character (see Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil., 136). Stated in another
way, while the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates,
nevertheless, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The
Question of eligibility or ineligibilty of a candidate for non-age is thus
beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body^[1], and could not have consequently been
litigated therein.

Averring that vox populi suprema est lex, appellant argues that the
people’s choice, expressed in the local elections, should be respected and that,
accordingly, the age qualification should be construed merely directory as to
him. This same question was raised and considered quite extensively by us in the
case of Feliciano vs. Aquino, supra; and while this Court was
divided on whether the age requirement prescribed by the election law is exacted
of the candidate at the time of the elections or only upon assumption of office,
here, however, it appears that said qualification was not satisfied in either
instance by herein appellant.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed is affirmed, with costs against appellant
Oscar del Rosario.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Note that under Sec. 32 of the Revised
Election Code, the candidate need not state in his certificate of candidacy his
exact age or other qualifications, the statement that he is eligible for office
being sufficient.