LEON O. MANZANILLA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE G. JARAMILLA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from a judgment by default rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

The action is for a sum of money. Under the first cause of action, plaintiff
seeks to recover P500 as unpaid balance of the purchase price of tobacco sold by
him to defendant, while the second cause of action is for the recovery of P3,100
as the unpaid balance of the price of another quantity of tobacco obtained by
defendant from plaintiff through fraudulent machination.

Having failed to answer the complaint within the time prescribed by the
Rules, defendant was declared in default in an order issued on February 5, 1946,
which at the same time set the case for the reception of plaintiff’s evidence on
the 15th of that month. On February 9th, defendant filed a motion to have the
order of default lifted, alleging that he was out of town when summons was
served at his residence in Manila on January 10, 1946 and was not informed
thereof until February 5th. The motion, however, makes no showing that the
summons could not have been communicated to defendant in time for him to answer
the complaint within the period allowed by the Rules or to file the necessary
petition for an extension of that period. And while he was asking for an
opportunity to state his defense, there was no intimation as to what that
defense was going to be. The motion was therefore denied and the trial court,
after receiving plaintiff’s evidence, rendered judgment against defendant on
both causes of action.

The order denying the motion is not reproduced in the record on appeal, but
there can be no question that the motion was in fact denied, for it is so
admitted in defendant’s petition of March 18, 1946, asking for asking for
reconsideration of the judgment.

In this motion for reconsideration defendant alleged, for the first time,
that his inability to return to Manila and file his answer on time was due to
“circumstances beyond his control, such as the swelling of the river at
Naguilian and Timawini which impossibilitated travel, and the breaking down of
his truck.” He also, for the first time, made known his defense by alleging, in
substance, that the tobacco mentioned in the first cause of action was merely
consigned to him and that the balance of P500 which plaintiff seeks to recover
represents the uncollected price of tobacco which plaintiff himself sold on
credit without defendant’s fault; and that with reference to the transaction
described in the second cause of action, defendant’s obligation was merely that
of a guarantor for Francisco Dayao. The motion asks that the decision be set
aside and a new trial granted.

The motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendant appealed to the
Court of Appeals, alleging in his assignments of error that, in refusing to set
aside its order of default, the lower court deprived him of his day in court and
that the judgment below is contrary to law and the evidence adduced at the
trial. The appeal has, however, been indorsed here on the ground that it
involves only a question of law.

Defendant has no valid reason to complain against the denial of his motion of
February 5, 1946, for the lifting of the order of default. The motion admits
that the summons was received at his residence in Manila on January 10 of that
year. He, therefore, had until January 25 to file his answer or to ask for an
additional period for that purpose. Granting that he was in the province of
Isabela at the time, no showing is made that he could not have been communicated
with in time for him to do either of those things, or that anything at all was
done or attempted to be done by the one who accepted the summons on his behalf
to apprise him thereof. Neither does the motion show that he has a meritorious
defense. In short, the motion does not show that defendant’s failure to answer
the complaint on time was legally excusable or that anything would be gained by
having the order of default set aside. In the circumstances, we do not think the
lower court abused its discretion in denying the motion.

The correctness of the trial court’s ruling denying the motion for the
lifting of the order of default should be judged on the basis of facts brought
out before the ruling was rendered and not those alleged for the first time
thereafter, no reason having been given why those latter facts were not alleged
in the motion to have the declaration of default set aside.

Having arrived at the above conclusion, it would be idle to discuss here the
correctness of the lower court’s findings of fact and the judgment based
thereon, it not appearing that the said judgment goes beyond the bounds of
plaintiff’s complaint. In the present appeal, appellant has no standing to
discuss the sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence in the light of the defense
which he has belatedly asserted and which is not properly before us because the
case has not been reopened. As the Court of Appeals states in its resolution
elevating the record to this Court, the appeal “concerns purely questions of
law.” And those questions refer to the lifting of the order of default.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is confirmed, with costs
against the appellant.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, and
Torres, JJ., concur.