DOMINADOR TEMPOROSA, PETITIONER, VS. NICASIO YATCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA, AND SANTOS B. PAMPOLINA, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner in this case has filed a complaint against one of the
respondents, Santos B. Pampolina, Justice of the Peace of San Pedro, Laguna, for
illegal detention, and after an investigation conducted by the respondent judge
of the Court of First Instance, the latter refused to issue a warrant of arrest
and dismissed the complaint. From the order of dismissal the petitioner filed a
notice of appeal and after hearing the respondent Judge denied the appeal
interposed by the attorney for the petitioner on the strength of the ruling laid
down by this Court in the case of People vs. Ocampo (63 Phil., 121), in
which it was held that a resolution dismissing the complaint and denying the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is not appealable.

What is called a preliminary investigation in this petition for
mandamus is the investigation prior to the arrest of the defendant and
for the purpose of determining whether there is any ground to believe that the
accused has committed the offense complained of in order to issue the warrant of
arrest under section 1 of Rule 108, which was taken from section 13 of General
Orders No. 58. According to the decision of this Court in the said case of
People vs. Ocampo, “appeal does not lie from a resolution of a judge of
a Court of First Instance denying the issuance of a warrant of arrest and
dismissing the complaint, after having heard the statements of the complainant
and his witnesses, as provided by section 13 of General Orders No. 58.” The
appeal provided in section 14 of General Orders, No. 58 was from a resolution of
a justice of the peace ordering the release of an accused after conducting the
corresponding preliminary investigation held after the defendant has been
arrested, for the purpose of preventing the release of the defendant. Rule 108
does not provide for appeal if Justice of the Peace or Court of First Instance
dismisses the complaint after the investigation previous to arrest, because such
dismissal does not bar the filing of another warrant for the same offense, and
there is no defendant to be released by the dismissal.

As to the question whether appeal lies to this Court or to the Court of
Appeals from the order of the respondent judge dismissing administrative charges
filed by the petitioner against the other respondent, and whether the respondent
judge who refused to allow the appeal may be compelled to allow it, we are of
the opinion and therefore so hold that no such appeal lie, and hence
mandamus to compel the respondent judge to allow such appeal does not
lie. Because section 229 of the Administrative Code which provides for
administrative investigation against a justice of the peace by the Court of
First Instance does not provide for an appeal from the action taken thereon by
the judge of the Court of First Instance. And section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court which refers to investigation of complaint against judges of the Court
of First Instance or of the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court does not also
provide for an appeal from the recommendation of the latter to the Chief
Executive.

Therefore, the petition is dismissed.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo,
Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.