MANUELA MENDOZA ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On March 26, 1956, Emilio Magnayon, brakefitter in the Caloocan shop of the
Manila Railroad Company, was examined and found to be suffering from “poor
vision and athrophy of upper extremities” and being unfit for work he was
recommended to be retired due to physical disability. Acting upon said
recommendation, the general manager of the company recommended his retirement
effective June 1, 1956.

On June 21, 1956, Magnayon filed with the GSIS his application for retirement
under Republic Act No. 660, with the recommendation far approval of the
executive officer of the company. This application was approved by the GSIS
effective as of June 1, 1956. And basing upon this favorable action, he applied
to the defendant union, of which he was a member, for payment of his retirement
gratuity under the provision of Article VI, Section 1 (f) of the Union
Constitution and By-Laws, which states:

“(f) Ang sino mang kasaping kusang tumiwalag o itiniwalag sa kanyang
paglilingkod sa MRR Co., na may pabuya o wala man, kailan pa man at siya ay
nakatutupad sa pagbabayad sa Kapisanan ay dapat pagkalooban ng halagang Isang
Libong Piso (1,000.00) kailan ma’t siya ay mayroong 30 taong tuluyang
paglilingkod sa Kompanya at hindi naman kukulangin sa 8 taong pagkakasapi sa
Kapisanan; subali’t kung hindi matutugunan ang takdang paglilingkod sa Kompanya
at pagkakasapi sa Kapisanan ay pagkakalooban naman siya ng halagang Isang Daang
Piso (P100.00) sa bawat taon ng kanyang pagiging kasapi sa
Kapisanan.”

Defendant union approved the application for retirement and paid Magnayon the
sum of P300.00 on June 25, 1956, and to his widow Manuela Mendoza, P500.00 on
September 26, 1956 as partial payment of his gratuity based on physical
disability. On the same date (September 26, 1956), Magnayon died, whereupon his
widow demanded that she be paid the death benefits due her under Article VI,
Section 1 (a) of the Union Constitution and By-Laws, which provides:

“(a) Sa pagkamatay ng Kasaping Nakatupad—Ang tagapagmana ay tatanggap
ng abuloy sa Kapisanan ng halagang Dalawang Libong Piso
(P2,000.00);”

Benigno Santos, an employee in the mechanical department of the same company,
was also examined before September 10, 1956 by its medical department and found
to be suffering from “cancer maxillary region right, error of refraction and
arcus sinilitis, total both eyes”, and as a consequence, he was declared unfit
for work. On September 10, 1956, his application for retirement was submitted to
the general manager of the company with a favorable recommendation.

On October 8, 1956, Santos’ application for retirement bearing the
recommendation for approval of said company was received by the GSIS which in
turn approved the same effective as of September 16, 1956. Thereupon, Santos
applied for retirement from defendant union, of which he was a member, under the
same provisions of the constitution and by-laws of the union, and the same
having been approved, on October 5, 1956, the union paid Santos the amount of
P1,000.00 as “gratuity granted to a retiree due to physical disability.” On
October 10, 1956, Santos died, whereupon his widow Maria Enriquez demanded
payment of the balance of Pl,000.00 due her as death benefits under the
provisions of Article VI, Section 1 (a) of the Union Constitution and By-Laws,
quoted above.

Because of the failure of defendant union to pay the death benefits which the
two widows claimed to be entitled to, they commenced the present action before
the Court of First Instance of Manila against defendant union praying that it be
ordered, to pay Manuela Mendoza P1,200.00 and Maria Enriquez P1,000.00, or a
total of P2,200.00 representing the balance of the death benefits due them for
the death of their husbands, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The case having
been submitted on the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted by the
parties, the court rendered decision on November 2, 1957 dismissing the
complaint. Plaintiffs interposed the present appeal.

We agree with the lower court that the deceased had already been retired at
the time of their death and for that reason plaintiffs herein are not entitled
to the death benefits contemplated in Article VI, Section 1(a) of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the defendant union. And this is so because from the
provisions of said constitution and by-laws it is clear that the death benefit
is intended to be paid to a member of good standing only when he meets
death while still a member of the union. It does not apply when he dies
after his retirement. Here it is undisputed that at the time of the death of the
husbands of appellants which took effect on September 26, 1956 and October 10,
1956, respectively, they were already deemed retired because their retirement
became effective on June 1, 1956 and September 16, 1956, respectively. The fact
that the widows received their official notice of retirement from the GSIS after
the death of their husbands is of no moment because what determines the date of
retirement is the date of its approval if the same is made known to the retiree
even if the official notice thereof comes afterwards. As correctly observed by
the lower court:

“* * * When they therefore applied for retirement from the union and for
payment of their gratuity, they were already retired from the Company, and their
retirement from the service was precisely the basis of their application for
retirement gratuity from the union. The union approved their applications for
retirement gratuity and paid them the amounts due them under applicable
provisions of the union constitution and by-laws; therefore, insofar as the
union is concerned, it had discharged its obligation under its constitution and
by-laws.”

If we will follow the theory of appellants we will have a situation wherein
they will be allowed to get the retirement pay of their husbands on the dates
when the same becomes effective, and after the occurrence of their death later
they would also be allowed to get the death benefits accorded to their
beneficiaries under the constitution and by-laws of the union on the simple
expedient that the official notification of the approval of their retirement
only came after their death. We are not prepared to adopt such interpretation
which is contrary to logic and sound reasoning.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.