LUCIO PALANCA CHILIANCHIN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. EUSEBIO COQUINCO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

The plaintiff mortgaged on July 30, 1941, the property he seeks
to recover in the present case, to secure the payment of the sum of P22,000
Philippine currency he borrowed from Bartolome E. San Diego, within three years
“with interest of ten percent per annum payable monthly in advance within the
first ten days of every month, plus 10 per cent on the said P22,000 as penalty
in case of default of payment of said interest as stipulated, together with an
additional ten percent of the total sum due, owing and unpaid at the time any
legal action is brought in the proper court for collection thereof * * *.”

On June 8, 1942, the mortgagee Bartolome E. San Diego filed an
action of foreclosure of mortgage against the plaintiff in this case on the
ground that the latter failed and refused to pay the mortgagee the monthly
interests due on the said sum of P22,000 for the period from the first of
December, 1941, up to the date of the filing of the complaint, plus the penalty
of 10 per cent of the sum due and the additional 10 per cent as attorney’s fees.
Because the plaintiff was in Negros Occidental during the Japanese invasion and
occupation, the summon was served upon Carlos Palanca the son of the plaintiff,
and Atty. Zosimo Rivas who testified as the first witness for the plaintiff in
this case was the attorney for the defendant in that case who was sentenced to
pay the mortgaged debt and given six months time to pay it, after which the
property mortgaged was to be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment. The
defendant appealed from the judgment to this Court. During the pendency of the
appeal, in order to prevent the property mortgaged from being sold at public
auction, Carlos Palanca, as attorney in fact of his father Lucio Palanca
Chilianchin, and with the intervention of said Atty. Zosimo Rivas, sold the
property mortgaged on September 15, 1943, for the sum of P69,000 to Eusebio
Coquinco the defendant in this case, and paid the judgment in favor of Bartolome
E. San Diego out of the proceeds of the sale.

After the death of Carlos Palanca and of the notary public
Atty. Celino O. Molina before whom the power of attorney Exhibit A executed in
favor of Carlos Palanca appears to have been acknowledged by the plaintiff Lucio
Palanca Chilianchin, the latter filed on January 30, 1946, the complaint in the
present case against Eusebio Coquinco to recover the property sold to the latter
by Carlos Palanca as attorney in fact of said Lucio Palanca, on the ground that,
since the war with Japan broke out on December 8, 1941, the plaintiff had never
been in Manila arid the late Carlos Palanca forged and used said power of
attorney Exhibit A to be forged and acknowledged before a notary public, and
that the plaintiff has never executed and ratified said power of attorney of
September 2, 1941, and therefore the dead of sale of the property in question
Exhibit executed by Carlos Palanca in favor of said defendant is null and
void.

After the trial of the case, in which only the plaintiff
introduced evidence from, which the foregoing facts appear, and the defendant
did not, because the attorney in fact Palanca who sold the property and the
Notary Public Celso O. Molina before whom said power of attorney was
acknowledged were already dead, the lower court rendered a judgment in favor of
the defendant which reads in part as follows:

“La cuestion principal a resolver en esta causa es la de si la
firma del demandante en la esritura de poder de que se valio Carlso A. Palanca
para vender las propiedades en cuestion al demandado es falsificada o no.
Consiquio la parte actora demostrar la afirmativa? A nuestro juicio no. Sus
pruebas dejan mucho que desear. En primer lugar, no ha estblecido que la firma
del demandante en el documento original de poder presentado al Registrador de la
Propiedad es falsificada. Tampoco ha acreditado que el documento, Exhibit ‘A’,
sea copia al carbon o duplicado original del poder que obra en la oficina de
Registrador de Titulos. En el supuesto de que lo sea, las pruebas orales
aportadas por el demandante no son suficientes, a juicio del Juzgado, para
establecer la alegada falsedad de dicho documento. Contra la asercion de los
testigos Almario Palanca y Armando Arcas de que cuano firmaron en el Exhibit A
no estaba present el demandante y que no le vieron firmar dicho documento y la
manifestacion del demandante de que no es firma suya la que aparece en dicho
documento, esta la certificacion del notario publico Sr. Celso O. Molina de que
comparecio ante el el otorgante Lucio Palanca Chilianchin, una persona a quien
el conocia personalmente como el otorgante de la escritura y quien ratifico ante
al ser dicha escritura un acto de su libre voluntad y otorgamiento, la cual
certificacion lleva la firma del citado notario y el timbre de su cargo. El
demandante se contento con decir que no es la firma que aparece el citado
Exhibit A y no exhibio al Juzgado muestras de su firma autentica. Es mas, su
propio hijo y testigo, o sea Almario Palanca aseguro que firmo en dicho exhibito
bajo la creencia de que la firma de su padre, en el estampada, era genuina,
porque dicha firma era semejante al a genuina de sup padre, pues para el se
parecian iguales puesto que habia visto a las anteriores firmas de su citado
padre y que antes de estampar su propia firma se fijo en la firma de Lucio
Palanca Chilianchin y le parecio la genuina de este (p. 11 t.n.t. y pp. 28-29 de
Junio 5, de 1946). La alegacion del demandante de que el no estaba en esta
ciudad el mes de septiembre de 1941 puesto que se hallaba en Negros Occidental
atendiendo un asunto de su esposa, sobre ser de character negativo y, por tanto
no debe prevalecer sobre el acta notarial ya mencionada, no esta corroborada.
Teniendo en cuenta que antes de la guerra habia frecuentes viajes de aviones de
Manila a Negros, y vuelta, y que el demandante tenia negocios en esta ciudad, no
esta fuera de la posibilidad el que el haya volado de Negros a Manila para
atender a sus negocios aqui en 2 de septiembre de 1941 y otorgar el poder
cuestionado. El viaje en avion de Negros a Manila entonces duraba dos horas
escasas. No hav pruebas en autos que excluya dicha posibilidad.

“Por todas las consideraciones expuestas, el Juzgado falla el
asunto, absolviendo al demandado de la demanda de autos con las costas a cargo
de la parte demandante.”

The question for us to determine in this appeal is whether the
presumption established by law that the power of attorney Exhibit A executed
acknowledged before the notary public the late Celso O. Molina is authentic, has
been rebutted by evidence to the contrary produced by the plaintiff who pretends
that he has not executed saicl general power of attorney Exhibit A in favor of
his late son Carlos Palanca. If said power of attorney is a forgery, the sale of
the property in question to the defendant-appellee Eusebio Coquinco is null and
void, and the latter has to return to the plaintiff the property sold to him by
Carlos Palanca in order to prevent its sale ordered by the court to pay the
judgment creditor San Diego in the foreclosure proceeding case G. R. No. 48982
instituted against the said plaintiff. (Record of Appeal presented as evidence
Exhibit E by the appellant.)

In the case of Robinson vs. Villafuerte, 18 Phil. 171, 172, we
held the following:

“In order to prove the falsity of two powers of attorney,
executed on different dates before two different notaries, it is not enough to
show, by the testimony of several witnesses of doubtful capacity, and by
unauthenticatecl documents, that, on the dates of their respective execution,
the principal was absent from the place where it is supposed that the said
instruments were drawn up and authenticated; it is necessary that clear, strong,
and irrefutable evidenoe be produoed showing that the notaries could not have
certified that the said person was aotually in their presence, that they heard
him ratify the contents of the respective documents, and that they could not
have certified to the number of his cedula, the only one exhibited to both
notaries, without manifestly perverting the truth.

“* * * a notarial document, guaranteed by public attestation in
accordance with the law, must be sustained in full force and effect so long as
he who impugns it does not present strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or defect provided against by
law.”

In the present case the evidence for the plaintiff far from
proving the falsity tends to support or confirm the authenticity of the power of
attorney Exhibit A.

The assertion of the plaintiff that he has not executed said
Exhibit A, for the reason that his son Carlos was “vicioso” because he had
abducted a girl; that he was in Negros on September 2, 1941, the date when it
was signed and acknowledged, and that the signature of Lucio Palanca appearing
therein is not his signature “no es parecido a mi firma”, is refuted by the very
evidence presented by him in this case. As the lower court correctly said, the
plaintiff did not even present a sample of his authentic signature to support
his contention that it is not his the signature appearing in said document. He
did not call a handwriting expert to prove his assertion. His attorney, at the
beginning of the trial, made it of reoord that if the defendant present an
expert in handwriting to show that the signature in question is genuine, the
plaintiff will also present an expert to show the contrary, as if it were
incumbent upon the defendant to show that the signature of the plaintiff in
Exhibit A is genuine; and at the close of the hearing the said attorney asked
the court to give the plaintiff three days within which to present a handwriting
expert, but when the motion was about to be granted he withdrew his
petition.

“JUZGADO:
“Se admiten todos por lo que puedan
valer.
“Cierra usted ya sus pruebas?

“SR. SEVA:
“Quisiera cerrarlo, pero con esa reserva. La
reserva es que nos de tres dias para presentar al experto caligrafo.

“JUZGADO:
“Que va a declarar ese experto?

“SR. SEVA:
“Sobre si es o no realmente genuina la supuesta
firma que aparece en el Exhibit A. Retiro ya la reserva.” (Evidence of
plaintiff, pp. 28, 29.)

And it was also contradicted in part by his son Almerio Palanca
who testified that he signed the power of attorney Exhibit A, because the
signature appearing therein is similar to the genuine signature of his father
and he had no doubt of the honesty and integrity of his deceased brother Carlos
and that the latter was not capable of falsifying his father’s signature.

The plaintiff testified that he was in Occidental Negros on
September 2, 1941, because he was appointed guardian of his minor sister-in-law
and administrator of the hacienda and had to make all the transactions
with the Bank and the Central, and in support of this assertion he presented as
evidence the document Exhibit F which is a copy of a motion filed with the court
by the wife of the plaintiff Andrea Acuña, as guardian of the minor children of
her deceased sister Claudia Acuña and administratrix of the latter’s estate.
Although said Exhibit F is dated September 5, 1941, it does not support the
plaintiff’s contention that he could not have been in Manila on September 2,
1941, beoause it appears from said Exhibit F that it is not the plaintiff but
his wife Andrea Acuña who was the guardian of the minor children and the
administratrix of the estate of her late sister and who signed as such said
Exhibit F, and that the plaintiff had no intervention whatever in the
preparation and signing of said motion. Besides, the lower court rightly held
that “Teniendo en cuenta que antes de la guerra habia frequentes viajes de
aviones de Manila a Negros, y vuelta, y que el demandante tenia negocios en este
ciudad, no esta fuera de la posibilidad el que el haya volado de Negros a Manila
para atender a sus negocios aqui en 2 de septiembre de 1941 y otorgar el poder
cuestionado.”

One of the instrumental witness of the power of attorney
Exhibit A Almerio Palanca, a son of the plaintiff, testified that he subscribed
the power of attorney Exhibit A about the middle of the year 1943 although his
father the plaintiff was then in Negros Occidental and the power of attorney is
dated September 2, 1941, because his father’s signature is similar to that
appearing in said draft and he had no doubt of the honesty and integrity of his
brother Carlos who, he believed, was not capable of falsifying his father’s
signature. The testimony of this witness interested in annulling the power of
attorney and, consequently, the sale of his father’s property to the defendant
is unbelievable. He ought to know, as he was then a second year student of
medicine, that he would become a party to the falsification of said document if
he had signed as instrumental witness of the Exhibit A under the oircumstances
by him stated. And as one of the forced heirs of his father and therefore
interested in protecting the latter’s property, if his testimony were true he
would have taken steps to notify his father of the exeoution of the said power
of attorney and sale of the property mortgaged, if not during the occupation,
immediately after the liberation or during the year 1945, and would not have
waited for about one year until his father came here to Manila in January,
1946.

The testimony of the other subscribing witness Armando Arcas
does not deserve any credit. This witness who was living during the year 1941
and 1942 together with Carlos Palanca and Almario Palanca in the same house of
the Palancas at 2581 Lico, Manila, where he was still living at the time he
testified as a witness for the plaintiff testified that upon the request of the
late Carlos Palanca, he subscribed as instrumental witness the power of attorney
Exhibit A in September, 1943, and not September 2, 1941, which appears as the
date of the instrument, and he did not make him any question about the
discrepancy as to the year because, whan Carlos Palanca was asked about it by
his brother Almario Palanca, the other instrumental witness, the latter gave
good reasons which were very satisfactory to him (the witness did not state the
reasons given by Carlos Palanca), and so he put his signature thereon and did
not question Carlos Palanca any more, although he knew that he was committing
falsification by signing the document.

Moreover, the lower oourt’s conclusion that Carlos Palanca was
an attarney in fact of his father and the power of attorney Exhibit A is
authentic is corroborated by the fact not denied by the evasive answer of Atty.
Zosimo Rivas, a witness for the plaintiff that said Rivas, who appeared as
attorney for the plaintiff that was the defendant in the action of foreclosure
of mortgage of the property located here in Manila instituted by Bartolome E.
San Diego in June, 1942, in the Court of First Instance of this city, did not
set up the defensfc that the summons served personally upon Carlos Palanca did
not confer jurisdiction upon the court over the defendant Lucio Palanca
Chilianchin, because the latter was not then residing in Manila but in
Occidental Negros and Carlos Palanca was not an e atoorney in fact of his father
Lucio Palanca the plaintiff in the present case.

And, furthermore, knowing as the plaintiff knew that he had the
obligation to pay his mortgage debt of P22,000 to Bartolome E. San Diego in
three years, as well as the monthly interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum
on the said debt due since July 31, 1941, and that aocording to the terms of the
mortgage deed, the property mortgaged was to be foreclosed upon failure to pay
the monthly interest, it would be inconceivable that the plaintiff had not come
to Manila or inquire by letter about his property mortgaged, until he came up to
Manila in January, 1946, that is about fcne year after the liberation of the
Philippines from the Japanese occupation and the transportation facilities
between Negros Occidental and Manila had been resumed, had he not executed the
power of attorney Exhibit A in favor of his son the late Carlos Palanca,
authorizing the latter to administer his properties in Manila and specially to
pay the interests and mortgage debt due to San Diego.

In view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court
is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.