DOROTEA DE LA CRUZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. DEOGRACIAS MARCELINO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Proceeding from the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, this
case involves the right of legal redemption of a co-owner. No questions of fact.
His Honor, the trial judge, aptly describes the situation as follows:

“Que la aqui demandante, Dorotea de la Cruz, y Ruperto
Villanueva eran condueños y proindiviso de una pesqueria que es objeto de la
presente causa; que en 10 de agosto de 1939 ambos condueños cedieron en
arrendamiento dicha propiedad por un periodo de 28 años desde el otorgamiento de
dicha escritura, cuyo plazo termina el agosto 10 de 1962, a los esposos Ladislao
Caparas y Sixta Adriano. (Exhibit A); que mas tarde, o sea el 23 de marzo de
1946 los citados esposos Caparas y Adriano traspasaron dicha propiedad a Ruperto
Villanueva (Exhibit B); que en diciembre 12 de 1946 Ruperto Villanueva hipoteco
la mitad proindivisa de dicha propiedad a Francisco Aniag, que mas tarde fue
rescatada y redimida mediante el pago a Francisco Aniag de las obligaciones
contraidas por aquel, habiendose cancelado consiguientemente la escritura de
hipoteca por la mitad proindivisa del terreno (Exhibit C); que en 13 de febrero
de 1947, el referido Ruperto Villanueva vendio absolutamente al aqui demandado
Deogracias Marcelino todo su derecho, interes y participacion en la propiedad
objeto de la demanda de autos como tambien cedio y traspaso al aqui demandado
todo su derecho e interes en el arrendamiento de la pesqueria en cuestion,
habiendose registrado dicha escritura de venta absoluta por Ruperto Villanueva a
favor de Deogracias Marcelino en la oficina del Registrador de Titulos de
Bulacan el 5 de marzo de 1947 (Exhibit D).

“La demandante, Dorothea de la Cruz, una de los condueños de la
propiedad mencionada, cuya mitad ha sido vendida por el otro condueño Ruperto
Villanueva, a favor de Deogracias Marcelino, trata ahora de rescatar la mitad
proindivisa vendida por su condueño Ruperto Villanueva del comprador Deogracias
Marcelino, depositando como, en efecto se deposito en la Escribania de este
Juzgado la cantidad importe de la venta el 12 de marzo de 1947, en la misma
fecha en que se presento la demanda de autos.

“El demandado, Deogracias Marcelino, contiende que dicho
deposito hecho por la demandante es nulo e ilegal, por no haberse cumplido los
requisitos exigidos en el articulo 1524, en relacion con los articulos 1518 y
1176, 1177 y 1178 del Codigo Civil; y contiende, ademas, que aun suponiendo que
la oferta y consignacion de pago se hubiese hecho en debida forma y bajo las
condiciones prescritas por la ley, sin embargo, el unico derecho que tiene la
demandante es el rescate de la mitad proindivisa de la nuda propiedad,
perteneciente al condueño Ruperto Villanueva, que fue vendida al aqui demandado
Deogracias Marcelino y en esta redencion legal no lleva consigo necesariamente
el derecho de redencion del derecho de arrendamiento del demandado sobre la
totalidad de la pesqueria.”

Upon the above statement, the court reached the conclusion that
plaintiff Dorotea de la Cruz could not legally redeem, because she had not
offered to repurchase the one-half belonging to Ruperto Villanueva before
actually filing this action against the defendant Deogracias Marcelino and
making the deposit of money.

Articles 1522 and 1524 of the Civil Code, which are the
statutes applicable, say that any co-owner may exercise the right of redemption
if the share of any co-owner is sold to a third person; and such right may be
exercised only within nine days counted from the date of the record of the
transfer in the Registry of Deeds.

Of course it is usual—and the better practice—for the co-owner
to first approach the third person and offer to buy back the share of the
co-owner. If the third person agrees, the repurchase is effected. If he does not
agree, or there is any question as to the amounts to be paid, resort is made to
the courts. However, there is nothing to prevent the co-owner from going to the
court directly—as in this case—and practically make the offer to repurchase
through it. The third person (defendant) could upon answering the complaint,
manifest his conformity—or else oppose the plaintiff’s petition. If he agrees,
the suit should cause him no prejudice, in the form of costs for example, or
damages if any. If he opposes, the litigation will necessarily proceed to
judgment.

The trial judge held that a previous tender was a condition
precedent to the right of redemption, because article 1525 makes applicable to
legal redemption the provisions of articles 1511 and 1518, and the last one says
that the co-owner may not exercise the right of redemption without returning to
the third person the price of the sale, plus (1) the expenses of the contract
and the lawful payments by reason of the sale and (2) the useful and necessary
expenditures incurred upon the thing sold.

The position is not entirely groundless; but it is the
consensus among the members of this Court that the above articles merely
enumerate the amounts to be paid by the co-owner who wishes to redeem. They do
not postulate any previous notice to the new owner nor a meeting between him and
the redemptioner, much less a previous formal tender, before any action is begun
in court to enforce the right. A sensible and prudent man would naturally
endeavor to present the offer privately, to avoid the inconvenience of court
proceedings. But it is not always just to graft into the statute such rules of
common sense as may be deemed appropriate. And then, considering that the
co-owner has nine days only^[1], the
“previous tender” requisite might in some instances frustrate the assertion of
the co-owners prerogative. He might not know the third person’s whereabouts. The
latter might even conceal himself to prevent redemption.

Wherefore the declaration is imperative that such offer or
tender is not an essential condition precedent to the co-owner’s right to
redeem. The important thing is to assert it in time and in proper form. This
action and the consequent consignation must be held proper. Plaintiff’s right to
redeem must be upheld. Observe that nobody claims the amount deposited is
insufficient to satisfy the expenses chargeable to the redeemer.

On the other hand, we approve his Honor’s opinion that the
plaintiff is not entitled to reacquire the lease privileges that had previously
been granted to the Caparases, not even those pertaining to the one-half
ownership she is authorized to reclaim. In the first place, the co-owner’s right
of redemption seems to exist only where there has been a sale or
alienation—not in the event of a lease. In the second place, granting
arguendo that the execution of the lease was a sale or alienation of
lease rights, inasmuch as Dorotea de la Cruz herself also leased her portion and
therefore “alienated” her lease rights, she may not now claim any privilege to
repurchase, because obviously, when a co-owner disposes of his share he may not
thereafter repurchase it nor that of the other co-owners; for the simple
reason—as rightly stated by appellee—that he has relinquished his status as
co-owner, which is the basis and origin of the right to redeem.

Now, the amount of P4,200 has been deposited in court for the
repurchase of the one-half share owned by Ruperto Villanueva and also for
the re-acquisition of the lease interests over the whole landed property. As
stated before, none questions the sufficiency of the money so deposited.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as we hold that the lease privileges may not be
repurchased, and inasmuch as the record contains no data to enable us to make a
fair apportionment, the matter will be returned to the court below for a
determination of amounts necessary to buy back the half naked ownership, and for
such appropriate directives as may be in consonance with the law and the views
herein expressed. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.

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[1] This limitation is still in force. Sempio vs. Del
Rosario, 44 Phil., 1.

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

PARAS, J.:

Dorotea de la Cruz (plaintiff-appellant herein) and Ruperto
Villanueva were co-owners of a certain fishery. In 1939, they leased the same to
the spouse Ladislao Caparas and Sixta Adraino for a term of 23 years. In 1946,
said spouses transferred their rights to Ruperto Villanueva who, in the same
year, mortgaged and undivided half of the fishery to Francisco Aniag. This
mortgage was later paid off by Ruperto Villanueva. In 1947, the latter conveyed,
by way of absolute sale, all his rights and interest in the fishery to
Deogracias Marcelino (defendant-appellee herein). Appellant seeks to exercise
her right of legal redemption against appellee. The Court of First Instance of
Bulacan rendered judgment against appellant.

I concur with the majority of the court in so far as they
uphold appellant’s right of redemption, but dissent from their ruling that said
right does not include the leasehold over the whole fishery acquired by appellee
form Ruperto villanueva. When the latter bought back the lease from the spouses
Ladislao Caparas and Sixta Adraino, he became the full (naked and beneficial)
owner and thereby ceased to be the lessor of his undivided half, in the same way
that when Ruperto Villanueva conveyed his rights to appellee, the latter
acquired the leasehold corresponding to the one-half share of appellant, plus
the full (naked and beneficial) ownership of the other half belonging to Ruperto
Villanueva (who was no longer a lessor). I hold, therefore, that the appellee
has the right to keep in lease only one-half of the fishery pertaining to
appellant, who should respect and be bound, as to her share, by the contract of
lease executed by her in 1939.