RICHARD BRESLIN, CARLOS GUZMAN, OSCAR J. FARZENDE, JOHNNIE IDENCIO, AND ELENOM CUETO, PLAINTIFFS AND PETITIONERS, VS. LUZON STEVEDORING COMPANY, SOTERO RODAS AND FELIPE NATIVIDA…

The plaintiffs, now petitioners, filed an action against the
defendant, Luzon Stevedoring Co., now respondent, in the case No. 4609 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for the recovery of money alleged to be due
to the plaintiffs from the defendant in the latter’s capacity as agent for and
in behalf of the corporation Pacifico Islands Towing Co. Inc. The defendant filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action,
because the defendant is being sued as a mere agent and is not the real party in
interest. Before the motion to dismiss had been acted upon the plaintiff filed
an amended complaint so as to care the defect of the complaint by alleging that
the defendant was being sued as principal and not as an agent. The first
paragraph of the amended complaint reads as follows: “Comes now the plaintiffs
in the above entitled case through their undersigned counsel and with the leave
of this Hon. Court first had and obtained, beg to amend their complaint before
this Honorable Court, respectfully showing: * * *.” The amended complaint was
accompanied by a notice to the adverse party, through its attorneys, informing
them that the plaintiffs will submit the amended complaint for admission by the
court on March 27, 1948. The defendant asked for the postponement of the hearing
for April 3, 1948, and the court set the hearing and heard the motion on April
10, 1948. The lower, court on June 8 denied the admission of said amended
complaint on the ground that it has been presented without the court’s leave;
and on June 22 dismissed the plaintiff’s action on the ground that “the
defendant is being sued in its capacity as agent of the Pacific Islands Towing
Co. Inc.” that “there is no allegation in the complaint or elsewhere in the
pleading or record, that the plaintiffs were hired by the defendant,” and
therefore “the plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendant.” A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and denied by the
respondent judge; hence the filing of the petition for certiorari with
the Court Of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, in passing upon the question whether or
not the court has original jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
certiorari, held the following:

“The main question raised in the pleadings is whether or not an
error was made in denying admission of the amended complaint and, accordingly,
in ordering the dismissal of the case. This issue, in turn, hinges on whether or
not it was absolutely necessary that the leave of the Court be secured prior to
the filing of the amended complaint. Apart from the foregoing, although related
thereto, is the determination of whether the proper remedy for the petitioners
herein, if the orders complained of were erroneous, would be a writ of
certiorari or an appeal by writ of error. We do not deem it proper, however, to
pass upon any of these questions, for the reasons presently to be stated.

“It should be noted that there were no issues of fact before
the lower court at the time of the issuance of the orders aforementioned.
Indeed, both decided purely questions of law, namely, whether or not the leave
of court should have been secured, or, at least, requested, before the filing of
the amended complaint, and whether the original complaint stated a cause of
action. If petitioners herein had sought a review of these orders by appeal or
writ of error, the case would have fallen under the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, only question of law being involved therein
(Art. VIII, section 2, Constitution of the Philippines). Accordingly, the writ
of certiorari prayed for herein is not sought in, aid of the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court, which it does not have under the facts of the case,
for which reason we have no authority to entertain the present petition,
pursuant to the rule laid down in the case of Roldan vs. Villaroman (38 Off.
Gaz., 2299).

“What is more, it appearing that the orders sought to be
reviewed by certiorari are the very same orders against which an
appeal could be taken, a decision of this Court on the validity or propriety of
said orders would, in effect, amount to an encroachment upon the power of the
Supreme Court to pass upon the same questions, in the exercise of its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction.

“Wherefore, let the record of this case be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action, pursuant to section 31 of Republic Act No.
296.”

In the case of Roldan vs. Villaroman, 38 Off. Gaz., 2289, this
Court held that a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus arising
from an action within the jurisdiction of and pending before a Court of First
Instance, may be entertained by the Court of Appeals if it appears from the
allegations in the plaintiffs petition, complaint or information that the
parties have a right to appeal, according to law, from the final orders or
decisions of the lower court to the Court of Appeals, irrespective of whether an
appeal has already been or will actually be taken, or not. In the said case this
Court held, among others, the following:

“The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals has no
original jurisdiction to take cognizance of the certiorari proceedings
instituted by the respondents Villaroman and Cuevas because the decision to be
rendered in the criminal case against the latter, if appealed, would have to be
passed upon by the Supreme Court because of the death penalty which has to be
imposed in view of the allegations of the information and the evidence
presented. In opposition the respondents contend that the appeal which may be
interposed should not be the basis in the determination of the original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the petition for certiorari,
because if no appeal is taken from the decision to be rendered, there would be
no way of determining if the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to act
upon the certiorari proceedings, following the ruling in the case of Re
Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. (67 L. R. A., 761, 768, 769), cited in the memorandum of
counsel for the respondents, we hold that the basis of the original jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals should not be the appeal which may be interposed in the
criminal case against the respondents Villaroman and Cuevas, but the right to
appeal. Otherwise stated, the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
try and decide the petition for certiorari instituted by Villaroman and Cuevas
should be determined by the existing right of appeal from the decision to be
rendered in the criminal case and not by the contingency of whether or not such
appeal will be taken.” (Roldan vs. Villaroman, 38 Off. Gaz. 2298,
2203.)

A writ of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari against a lower
court is said to be in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
within the meaning of section 30 of Republic Act No. 296, known as “the
Judiciary Act of 1948,” and the corresponding provision of the former Organic
Act of the Court of Appeals, if the latter has jurisdiction to review, by appeal
or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the former, and said writs
are issued by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its supervisory power or
jurisdiction over the wrongful acts or omissions of the lower court that are not
appealable. But if the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction it could
not issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari in aid of an appellate
jurisdiction which it does not have. In other words, the supervisory power or
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue mandamus, prohibition, or
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, must coexist with and be a
complement to its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error,
the final orders and decision of the lower court, in order to have a complete
supervision over the acts of the latter.

It follows, therefore that a petition for mandamus, prohibition
or certiorari against acts or omissions of inferior courts in a case cannot be
entertained by the Court of Appeals, because the latter has no appellate
jurisdiction over the final orders and decisions of the justice of the peace and
municipal courts; that the Court of Appeals can not originally issue said writs
in civil or criminal cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance and
appealable to the Supreme Court (Roldan vs. Villaroman, supra); and that
writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari can not be originally secured from
the Court of Appeals against boards, corporations or persons who unlawfully
neglected, to perform their ministerial duty, for example against a register of
deeds, or who acted or are about to act without or in excess of its jurisdiction
in the exercise of their semi-judicial or ministerial functions, for there is no
right of appeal to the Court of Appeals from their acts or decisions that may be
aided or complemented by said writs.

The argument or reason in support of the resolution of the
Court of Appeals that if the petitioners herein had sought a review, by appeal
or writ of error, of the order of the lower court dismissing the plaintiffs’
complaint (because the order denying the admission of the amended complaint is
not appealable), the case would have fallen under the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, has no bearing on the question whether or not
the writ of certiorari prayed for herein is sought in aid of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; because the determining factor for the
solution of that question is, as above stated, whether the Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Court of First
Instance on the merits of the petitioners’ action for recovery of money, in view
of the nature of the action alleged in the complaint.

It is evident that the Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction. According to section 29 of Republic Act No. 296, “the Court of
Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and
proceedings properly brought to it from the Courts of First Instance” except
those enumerated in section 19 of the same Act which are within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and must be determined by the
allegations in the pleadings. As to whether on appeal the question of
jurisdiction of the inferior court or only question of law will be raised,
unless the pleadings show otherwise, it is to be presumed that no such question
of jurisdiction and questions of fact and law will be raised and, therefore, the
parties have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals; because the
presumption is that Courts of First Instance as court of general jurisdiction
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and that “things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life. (68 [z], Rule 123, of the Rules of Court.)

Of course the Court of Appeals is right when it states that “If
the petitioners herein had sought a review of these orders by appeal or writ of
error, the case would have fallen under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, only question of law being involved therein.” But it does not
follow, as the Court of Appeals concludes, that “the writ of certiorari prayed
for herein is not sought in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of this court
(Court of Appeals), which it does not have under the facts in the present
case.”

The plaintiffs in the civil case No. 4609 do not seek to have
the orders of the lower court reviewed by appeal or writ of error by the
appellate court, but to compel the lower court to admit the amended complaint
and decide the case on the merits; and they or the defendant have the right to
appeal from the final decision of the Court of First Instance on the merits to
the Court of Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court in view of the nature of the
action or the amount involved.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals has
original jurisdiction to entertain the petitioners’ petition for a writ of
certiorari or mandamus as the case may be, and erred in forwarding the case to
this Court for appropriate action. But, in view of the fact that we have also
original jurisdiction to entertain the petition, became the Court of Appeals has
no exclusive original jurisdiction to issue mandamus, prohibition and certiorari
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, in order to save time we shall pass upon
the merits of the petition, instead of remanding this case to the Court of
Appeals for action.

It is obvious that the lower court erred in denying the
petition for amendment of the complaint on the ground that the amended complaint
was presented without the court’s leave, because the above quoted statement in
the first paragraph of the amended complaint and the fact that a date was set by
the plaintiffs for the admission of the amended complaint, is a compliance with
the requirement of section 2, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. The filing of the
amended complaint together with the petition for its admission, far from being
against, is in accordance with the provision of the law, because the court must
have before it the amended complaint, and a mere statement that it shall be
presented after the leave had been granted would not be sufficient, in order
that the court may properly determine whether or not the amendment is presented
with the intent to delay the action, and whether the new copy of the pleading
filed with the court incorporating the amendments are indicated by appropriate
marks, as required by section 3 of said Rule 17 in amendments by leave of court
under section 2 of the same Rule. Besides it saves time, because in such case
the amended pleading shall be considered as ipso facto filed from the
time the court allows its admission; otherwise, the plaintiff shall have to file
his amended pleading within the period of time to be fixed by the court and computed from and after the court’s order granting the motion to file it.

But for the purpose of the present special civil action it is
not necessary to consider the error of the lower court above indicated. Although
the petitioners’ petition is for certiorari, in order to promote the object of
the Rules of Court and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding according to section 2,
Rule 1, of said Rules, we shall consider the present special civil action as of
mandamus in view of the facts alleged in the petition, as we have done in
previous similar cases. Therefore, the only question for us to determine in the
present case is whether or not the respondent judge has unlawfully neglected to
perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his
office, or excluded the plaintiffs from the enjoyment of a right to which they
are entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

According to the facts in the record, the amendment of their
complaint by the plaintiffs in the civil case No. 4609 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila is the first they have filed before the defendant has served
his answer upon the plaintiffs because no answer has yet been filed, and under
section 1 of Rule 17 “a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served,” that is, the plaintiff has
the right to amend once his petition before the defendant has filed his answer,
which is the responsive pleading to a complaint within the meaning of the said
section 1 of Rule 17. Therefore, it is obvious that, as the plaintiffs have the
right to amend their complaint, it is the correlative duty of the respondent
judge to accept the amended complaint; and said respondent, in refusing to
permit the amendment of the plaintiffs’ complaint, unlawfully neglected to
perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his
office, or excluded the plaintiffs from the enjoyment of a right to which they
are entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

In view of all the foregoing, the respondent judge is ordered
to admit the amended complaint filed by the petitioners in the case No. 4609 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, with costs against the other respondent
Luzon Stevedoring Co. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor,
Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.