BIBIANA T. VDA. DE INFANTE AND FEDERICO T. INFANTE, PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. RUPERTO JAVIER, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF SAN ENRIQUE, AND DEOGRACIAS E. LERMA, REPRESENTA…

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros requiring the respondent justice of the peace of
San Enrique, same province, to issue writs of execution in civil cases numbered
8 and 9 of his docket. The decision also enjoins the respondent Chief of the
Tenancy Division of the Department of Justice to refrain from interfering in the
same cases.

The main issue concerns the jurisdiction to dispose of a
controversy in which the landlord seeks to deprive his tenant of possession of
the farm. Appellants claim exclusive jurisdiction for the Department of Justice,
whereas the appellees maintain that the justice of the peace has
jurisdiction.

It appears that on April 17, 1947, Bibiana T. Vda. de Infante
and Federico T. Infante (petitioners-appellees) filed complaints for ejectment
in civil cases Nos. 8 and 9 of the justice of the peace court of San Enrique,
Occidental Negros. After due hearing the court rendered judgment ordering the
defendants therein, Lorenzo Fimeza, et al., to vacate the premises. These were
tenants of plaintiff who had returned to their farm after having been driven
away. Defendant’s attorney received copy of the decision on May 20, 1947.

However, on May 8, 1947, Lorenzo Fimeza and companions filed
with the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice
(hereafter referred to as Tenancy Division) complaints against Bibiana T. Vda.
de Infante in volving the same parties and properties described in the justice
of the peace cases Nos. 8 and 9. And on May 25, 1947, the petitioners and their
tenants agreed to submit their dispute to the Tenancy Division in a written
stipulation which reads partly as follows:

“3. That the complainant tenants objected to the jurisdiction
of J. P. to hear and decide the ordinary civil cases of ejectment as these cases
are tenancy cases and the objection of the tenants and the J. P. overruled such
objection and hence the decision. (Annex ‘A’.)

“4. That the parties agree to submit their above entitled cases
upon the strength of the stipulation of facts and should the Dept. rule that the
proceedings had by the J. P. were irregular, to set the above entitled cases for
reinvestigation. In case of the contrary the parties also agree to abide with
the decision.

“5. That the tenants agree to respect the bond filed by the
respondent landlord in order to secure the temporary possession and use of the
land involved pending final decision of the case by Dept. with respect to these
cases.”

In the meantime, having been duly informed by the Department of
Justice of the provisions of Act No. 461 and its circulars on the subject, the
justice of the peace of San Enrique declared in an order of August 20, 1947,
that its actuations in civil cases Nos. 8 and 9 were of no effect and value.

On December 4, 1947, the Tenancy Division found after
investigation, for the tenants and issued corresponding orders in their favor.
Nevertheless, on December 20, 1947, petitioners moved in the justice of the
peace court for execution of the ouster judgment in the cases numbered 8 and 9.
Denial of such motion, gave rise to the instant special civil action for
mandamus and for injunction, which has been favorably acted upon by the lower
court.

The respondents appealed, and their main arguments turn around
the proposition that conflicts between land owners and their tenants as to
possession or cultivation of the farms do not fall within the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace courts, because such controversies have been placed by
law under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice by Commonwealth Act No.
461, as amended, which reads partly as follows:

“Any agreement or provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, in all cases where land is held under any system of tenancy the
tenant shall not be dispossessed of the land cultivated by him except for any of
the causes mentioned in section nineteen of Act Numbered Four thousand and
fifty-four or for any just cause, and without the approval of a representative
of the Department of Justice duly authorized for the purpose. The Department of
Justice is, likewise, charged with the duty of enforcing all the laws, orders
and regulations relating to any system of tenancy and it may issue such orders
as may be necessary in pursuance thereof, * * *.” (Sec. 1, Republic Act No.
44.)

In a decision promulgated on May 30, 1949 we concluded that in
view of the above statute, a justice of the peace has presently no jurisdiction
to entertain complaints for ejectment or illegal detention by landlords against
their share-croppers or tenants (Ojo, vs. Jamito, G. R. No. L-1511). That
decision, penned after this appeal had been submitted and argued, is of course
conclusive on the question at issue herein. The justice of the peace of San
Enrique had no jurisdiction.

There is truly much to be said in support of the trial judge’s
view and of appellee’s contention that the legislature may not deprive courts of
their judicial function. But as we declared in the above-mentioned opinion
“there is no doubt that Congress has power to diminish the jurisdiction of the
Courts of First Instance” (and of justice of the peace courts), and “confer the
jurisdiction in question upon the Department of Justice, and the Court of
Industrial Relations. Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution empowers the
Congress to define, describe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts, with the only limitation that it can not deprive the Supreme Court of
its appellate jurisdiction * * * therein specified”. Such congressional
authority must furthermore be acknowledged in connection with the express
constitutional duty of the state “to regulate the relations between landowner
and tenant and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture”.
(Article XIII, sec. 6, Constitution.)

Our conclusion on the matter of jurisdiction necessarily
requires a reversal of the order of mandamus which is premised on the duty of
the justice of the peace to carry out its decision in an ejectment case after he
has acquired jurisdiction. As we hold the justice of the peace had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it follows that his order to vacate (even
supposing it had become final) could not be enforced either by himself or by
others.

It also follows that injunction against the respondent
Deogracias E. Lerma as representative of the Tenancy Division may not properly
be issued, because he is acting or has acted within the scope of the authority
of the Department of Justice.

Judgment reversed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.