JOSE P. BENGZON, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, PETITIONER, VS. BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND MARIANO CHAN (ALIAS ONG LIAN CHO), …

The deportation of the respondent Mariano Chan alias Ong
Lian Cho was, after the required investigation, ordered by the Bureau of
Immigration for having maintained a house of prostitution. Pending the execution
of the order of deportation, said respondent filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by the
other respondent Hon. Judge Ocampo; and during the pendency of the habeas corpus
proceeding the respondent Judge Ocampo, upon motion of the other respondent
above mentioned, ordered the provisional release of the latter under the
condition that he should file a bond of P10,000 and report to the Bureau of
Immigration on Monday, Wednesday and Saturday of every week.

The question involved in the present case is whether or not the
respondent Judge acted in excess of the court’s jurisdiction in granting the
petition of the respondent Mariano Chan for his temporary release on bail during
the pendency of the habeas corpus proceeding instituted by him against the
Commissioner of Immigration on the ground that the Bureau of Immigration has no
power or jurisdiction to detain and order the deportation of the said
respondent.

The only legal provision which has some bearing on the question
is section 12, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court which provides the following:

“Hearing on return. Adjournments.—When the writ is
returned before one judge, at a time when the court is in session, he nay
forthwith adjourn the case into the court, there to be heard and determined. The
court or judge before whom the writ is returned or adjourned must immediately
proceed to hear and examine the return, and such other matters as are properly
submitted for consideration, unless for godd cause shown the hearing is
adjourned, in which event the court or judge shall make such order for the
safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case
requires. * * *”.

According to the above quoted provisions the judge in a habeas
corpus proceeding must immediately proceed to hear aid decide the case, unless
for good cause shown the hearing is adjourned, in which event the court or judge
shall make such order for the safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained
as the nature of the case requires. It is obvious that the phrase “for the
safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained” can not be construed to mean
temporary release on bail, because a person arrested or detained can not be
released on bail unless that right is granted expressly by law, as the right of
defendants in criminal cases to be released on bail under certain condition, as
well as the right of a person, whose release has been ordered by judgment in a
habeas corpus proceeding to be temporarily released on bail if appeal is taken
by the officer or person detaining, granted by section 20 of Rule 41, Rules of
Court. On the contrary, the word “safekeeping” according to the dictionaries
means “the act or state of keeping or being kept in safety.” A person arrested
is not safely kep$ if released on bail.

It is not necessary for us to determine, (a) whether the
Commissioner of Immigration has authority to release an alien under bail or
other conditions after the Board of Immigration has ordered his deportation as
in the present case, although it seems that there is no provision of law
expressly authorizing such release; and, (b) whether an alien under
arrest in a deportation proceeding has the right to be released under reasonable
bond or condition before the Bureau of Immigration has rendered its decision
ordering his deportation, and therefore the courts of justice may, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, grant his temporary release on bail if the Commissioner of
Immigration refuses to grant or requires unreasonable bond or conditions for his
release; because these are not now the questions submitted to us for
decision.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the respondent judge
acted in excess of the jurisdiction of the court in releasing the defendant on
bail during the pendency of the habeas corpus proceeding, and therefore the
order complained of is set aside with costs against the respondent Mariano Chan.
So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.