G.R. No. 13178. March 25, 1961
PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
July 9, 1957 assuming jurisdiction to take cognizance of the labor
dispute certified to it by the President of the Philippines between the
Pampanga Sugar Development Corporation and its employees under Section
10 of Republic Act No. 875.
It appears that previous to such
certification a voluntary certification election was conducted by the
Department of Labor wherein the PASUDECO Workers Union was chosen as
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of the
company as against another union named Sugar Workers Association.
Subsequently, a collective bargaining agreement with respect to the
terms and conditions of employment was entered into between the winning
union and the Pampanga Sugar Development Corporation, which agreement
as well as the certification of the PASUDECO Workers Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative was approved by the Court of
Industrial Relations.
During the 1955-1956 milling season
the members of the Sugar Workers Association the union that lost in the
election, declared a strike at the sugar mill of the company at San
Fernando, Pampanga, as a result of the refusal of said company to
entertain the demands submitted to it by said union. And having been
advised of said dispute which remained unsettled for sometime and
affected the sugar industry, the President of the Philippines, on
November 23, 1956, wrote respondent court stating that, pursuant to
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875, he certifies to said court “the
labor dispute between the management of the Pasudeco and its employees, and requests the Court to take immediate steps in the exercise of its powers granted by law.”
On December 7, 1956, the PASUDECO requested the court not to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute as thus certified contending that since
the Sugar Workers Association is merely a minority union which lost in
the certification election it has no right to represent the employees
of the company nor to present the demands it has submitted on December
14, 1955 and as such it cannot create a labor dispute that may give
jurisdiction to the industrial court even if the same is certified by
the President of the Philippines. Respondent court, however, declared
itself with jurisdiction to act on the dispute regardless of the
collective bargaining agreement entered into between the PASUDECO
Workers Union and the Pampanga Sugar Development Corporation. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari.
It appears that the
Sugar Workers Association, a minority union, submitted to the
management of the Pampanga Sugar Development Corporation a set of
demands which eventually reached the industrial court involving, among
others, payment for past overtime service, a general wage increase
retroactive to December 1, 1954, reinstatement of all laid-off
employees, retirement plan due to long service, old age and disability,
termination of pay, and recognition of union check off, and because
they were not heeded due perhaps to the fact that said union was not
the collective bargaining representative, its members went on strike.
As the strike coincided with the milling season of 1955-1956 and
affected an industry which is important to our national economy, the
President certified the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations
for settlement pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875, which we
copy hereunder for reference:
“When in the
opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor
dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest and when
such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of
Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a restraining
order forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the
employees, pending an investigation by the Court, and if no other
solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing
the terms and conditions of employment.”
It
thus appears that when in the opinion of the President a labor dispute
exists in an industry indispensable to national interest and he
certifies it to the Court of Industrial Relations the latter acquires
jurisdiction to act thereon in the manner provided for by law. Thus the
court may take either of the following courses: it may issue an order
forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout its
employees, or, failing in this, it may issue an order fixing the terms
and conditions of employment. It has no other alternative. It cannot
throw the case out on the assumption that the certification was
erroneous.
This is the situation that obtains herein. A
strike was declared by a good number of employees and workers of the
PASUDECO coincidental with the milling season which threatens to impair
an industry important to our national economy and considering the
dispute as one that involves national interest he certified it to the
industrial court for adjudication. Note that the certification only
makes reference to a labor dispute between the company and its employees.
It does not state that the dispute was caused by a major or a minor
union. It is obvious that respondent court has acquired jurisdiction
over the dispute and, contrary to petitioner’s contention, it acted
properly in declaring itself competent to act thereon.[1]
It is true, as petitioner contends, that the Sugar Workers Association
is a minor union which lost in the certification election conducted by
the Department of Labor wherein another union was chosen as the
exclusive representative of all the employees of the company and that,
under the law, the union thus selected is deemed to be the exclusive
representative of said employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment.[2]
The fact, however, is that because of the strike declared by the
members of the minority union which threatens a major industry the
President deemed it wise to certify the controversy to the Court of
Industrial Relations for adjudication. This is a power that the law
gives to the President the propriety of its exercise being a matter
that only devolves upon him. The same is not the concern of the
industrial court. What matters is that by virtue of the certification
made by the President the case was placed under the jurisdiction of
said court.
The question whether a minority union may create
a labor dispute cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations in
disregard of the representative chosen in a certification election and
of the collective bargaining agreement entered into by said
representative and the company is a legal matter that does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court. This is an issue that the court should
determine once the dispute is submitted for decision. Here may come in
many other matters that are worth looking into, such as the right of a
minority to be protected against the abuses of the majority, failure on
the part of the union representative to secure the best terms and
conditions of employment as the circumstances may demand, or whether
the time has come to order a new certification election. As a matter of
fact, there is an intimation bf the government counsel that the
collective bargaining agreement concluded between the company and
PASUDECO Workers Union already expired of December 1, 1957 thereby
implying that new terms and conditions of employment may be the subject
of new negotiations. These are matters that come within the
jurisdiction of the court.
Wherefore, petition is denied, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
[1] Philippine Association of Free Labor Union, et al. vs. Tan, 99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz., 5836; National Garments and Textiles Workers, Union, PAFLU vs. Caluag, L-9104, September 10, 1956; Allied Free Workers’ Union vs. Apostol, 102 Phil., 296; SMB Box Factory Workers’ Union-PAFLU vs. Victoriano, 102 Phil., 646; Benguet Consolidated Mining Company vs. Coco Labor Union (NLU), 105 Phil., 915; Chua Workers’ Union (NLU) vs. City Automotive Company, et al., L-11655, April 29, 1959; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Rizal Cement Workers’ Union (FFW), et al., 109 Phil., 34.
[2] Section 12(a), Republic Act 875.