SYBIL SAMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER CONSUELO ENRIQUEZ-SAMSON AND CONSUELO ENRIQUEZ-SAMSON, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. NICASIO YATCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL…

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court to set aside an order entered on 3 February 1958 by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, that dismissed with prejudice a petition
for support (civil case No. Q-2620). As prayed for, petitioner Consuelo
Enriquez-Samson is appointed guardian ad litem of the other petitioner,
her minor child.

The petition for support alleges that Sybil Samson, a minor, is a legitimate
child of Consuelo Enriquez and Arsenio Samson who after being married on 18
April 1953 lived together in the house of the latter’s mother Dorotea Angeles
Vda. de Samson, at barrio Calumpang, Marikina, Rizal; that in February 1954
Consuelo and Sybil left the said house because her a mother-in-law used to
maltreat them; that Arsenio Samson, a professor at the National Teachers
College, refused or failed to heed her request to rent a separate dwelling where
they could live together; that since February 1954 up to the filing of the
petition Arsenio who already had taken a concubine had not given any support to
her and their son Sybil; and that in answer to her extrajudicial demands for
monthly support in the sum of P200 made on 21 June 1957, Arsenio had offered
only P30 a month, which she refused. The petitioners pray that Consuelo
Enriquez-Samson be appointed guardian ad litem of her minor child, the
other petitioner; that Arsenio Samson be compelled to give a monthly support of
P100 each for her as his spouse and for Sybil as his legitimate son; that should
Arsenio be unable to pay in full the monthly sum of P100 corresponding to Sybil,
the deficiency be paid by Dorotea Angeles Vda. de Samson, Sybil’s grandmother,
being next in the order of ascendants; that the respondents Arsenio Samson and
Dorotea Angeles Vda. de Samson be ordered to pay petitioners’ counsel P3,000 for
attorney’s fees; and that the petitioners be granted such other just and
equitable relief (Annex A.) On 3 October 1957 the respondents Arsenio Samson and
Dorotea Angeles Vda. de Samson filed their answer. On 11 January 1958 the
petitioners filed a motion for support pendente lite, which was granted
in an order entered on 28 January 1958 but in the sum of P120 only (Annex F). At
the hearing set for 3 February 1958, Consuelo Enriquez and Sybil Samson failed
to appear despite notice, whereupon the Court entered an order as follows:

When this case was called for hearing today, counsel for plaintiff moved for
the postponement of the hearing of this case on the ground that his client Sybil
Samson is pick and could not appear in court, as shown by the medical
certificate of Dr. Celso de los Angeles. In view of the said certificate of Dr.
de los Angeles, the court instructed the Municipal Health Officer of Marikina,
Rizal, to proceed to the place of Sybil Samson and to examine his physical
condition and to accordingly make the corresponding report to this court as to
findings thereof. From the findings of the said Municipal Health Officer of
Marikina, Rizal, however, the court finds that said plaintiff, Sybil Samson, is
only suffering from slight fever and is a walking patient, which is different
from the findings of Dr. de los Angeles.

In view thereof, Dr. Celso de los Angeles is cited to appear before this
court on February 14, 1958, to explain his reasons, if any, why he should not be
dealt with accordingly for issuing such medical certificate in favor of the
plaintiff herein.

When the party went to the place of the plaintiff, as instructed by this
court, it was found that plaintiff Consuelo Enriquez-Samson, mother of the
plaintiff Sybil Samson, was not in the house, notwithstanding the fact that in
her letter to her lawyer, she stated that she was attending to her son who is
sick. In effect, the court was misled into believing this fact which was found
out later to be not true.

In view thereof, and upon failure to appear in court on the part of the
plaintiff, let the above entitled case be, therefore, DISMISSED, with prejudice,
and without special pronouncement as to costs. * * * (Annex B).

On 11 February 1958 the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal entered on 3 February 1958 (Annex G). On 15 February 1958 Dr.
Celso de los Angeles sent to the Court a written explanation which reads as
follows:

The Honorable Judge
Court of First Instance
Quezon City

EXPLANATION

This is an explanation regarding the certificate I issued to Sybil Samson. I
was called to attend to him on the night of January 30, 1958 at about 11:00 p.m.
He had high fever, 40.5 C, and was delirious, with twitching of eye-balls and
tendency to convulsion. Antipyretics and antibiotics were prescribed for the
illness whose etiology was not yet determined. The following day, the mother
consulted me and told me that he had still fever with vomitting at times, so I
told her to continue with the medicines. The third day, that was February 1st, I
again saw the patient still feverish, 39.5 C. So, I made another prescription in
addition to the first one. It was at this instance that I made the
certificate.

Later on I understand that on February 3rd, he was examined by the Marildna
Health Officer on destruction of this Honorable Court, and the findings on that
day was that his. fever was only slight. This does not contradict my findings;
it simply shows that the fever had gone probably as an effect of the treatment I
had prescribed to the patient. It was also stated that the patient was walking
which can be explained by the fact that children, once their fever has gone
down, stay out of bed, and it is almost impossible to keep them in bed.

I hope this explanation is satisfactory to his Honorable Court, inasmuch as
the examination of the Marikina Health Officer was not made at the date that I
issued my medical certificate; hence the discrepancy in our findings.

	Respectfully yours,
	CELSO DE LOS ANGELES, M.D. (Annex E).

On 22 February 1958 counsel for the petitioners verbally withdrew the motion
for reconsideration filed on 11 February 1958. On 25 February the same counsel
withdrew his appearance as attorney for the petitioners and was substituted by a
new attorney who, on the same date, filed an amended motion for reconsideration
of the order of dismissal entered on 3 February 1958 substantially upon the same
grounds of the first motion for reconsideration. On 1 March the Court approved
the withdrawal of the motion for reconsideration. The Court denied the amended
motion for reconsideration in an order entered on 4 September, a copy of which
was received by the petitioners on 25 September 1958. On 14 October the
petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order entered on 4 September (Annex
I). In an order dated 31 October the Court denied the last motion for
reconsideration (Annex J). On 13 November 1958 the petitioners perfected their
appeal but the Court disallowed it for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period in an order entered on 18 December (Annex K). The present petition is the
aftermath of the proceedings just recounted.

The respondents contend that the petition filed by the petitioners does not
comply with the requirements of section 1 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court in
that it fails to state that the Court had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Such omission is not fatal. In
Velez vs. Varela, 93 Phil., 282, this Court ruled that—

Though generally found in petitions of tliis kind, the missing allegations
are in reality mere conclusions of law which may be deduced from averred facts
oven when not specifically pleaded. The petition is, therefore, sufficient if it
gives enough facts from which those conclusions can be drawn. And such, we think
is the case here.

The same conclusion may be drawn from the ultimate facts pleaded in the
petition filed in this case.

It was a grievous and crass error to dismiss with prejudice a petition for
support upon the flimsy ground that the municipal health officer, directed by
the respondent Court to ascertain whether the minor petitioner was really sick,
as represented to the respondent Court and verified by the attending physician’s
certificate, found out that he was suffering only from slight fever, especially
because the presence of the minor was not necessary, other witnesses were
present and counsel for the petitioners was ready to present them to
substantiate their allegations in their petition, the only point to be
determined by the respondent Court being the amount of support, the marriage of
the petitioner mother and the respondent husband, the legitimacy and filiation
of the child petitioner as one born of lawful wedlock having been admitted. The
condition of the child petitioner on the 3rd day of February 1958 when the
municipal health officer went to see him could not be presumed to be the
condition of the child on 30, 31 January when his condition was serious with
40-degrees fever as certified under oath by the attending physician and his
condition on the later date may have been brought about by the treatment or
prescription ministered to the child by the physician.

The respondent Court disallowed the appeal taken by the petitioners from its
order dismissing with prejudice the petition for support, for the reason that it
was taken beyond the reglementary period. Although the computation or counting
made by the respondent Court of the period that had elapsed from the date when
the period started to run to the date when appeal was perfected appears
mistaken, yet there is no need to pass upon this point, because the petition is
not for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Court to allow the appeal or
to approve the record on appeal but for a writ of certiorari for dismissing with
prejudice a petition for support without any lawful ground or reason for so
doing which amounted to an excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondent Court.

Furthermore, the petitioners’ right to support from the respondent husband,
which under article 301 of the Civil Code cannot be renounced, already had been
recognized when on 28 January 1958 the respondent Court ordered the respondent
Arsenio Samson to give the petitioners a monthly support of P120 pendente
lite. If the order of dismissal with prejudice of tlie petition for support
were to stand, the petitioners would be deprived of their right to present and
future support.

The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted. The orders of 3 February, 4
September, 31 October and 18 December 1958 dismissing with prejudice the
petition for support, denying motions for reconsideration and disallowing the
appeal from the first order are annulled, with costs against the respondent
Arsenio Samson.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.