G.R. No. L-6327. July 29, 1954

Petitioner, Benjamin Buyco, seeks a review, by certiorari, of a
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, convicting him of the crime of homicide and
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of
Luis Gonzales, deceased, in the sum of four thousand (P4,000) pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

Petitioner contends that:

I

“The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was
necessary for herein petitioner to admit or to have admitted having
taken part in the killing of the deceased Luis Gonzales in order to be
entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, and in refusing
to consider and determine whether under the facts of the case, as
proven by herein petitioner, the latter was entitled to the benefits
thereof, because the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and the Court of
Appeals disregarded the more recent doctrine laid down by this
Honorable Supreme Court.

II

“The Court of Appeals further erred in not applying
the doctrine laid down by this Honorable Supreme Court in the cases of
People vs. Loreto Barrioquinto et al., G. R. Nos. L-2011 and L-2267,
promulgated on July 30, 1951, wherein it is held that the accused need
not openly and expressly admit having committed the act imputed to said
accused, and in not holding that in spite of the fact that herein
petitioner denied the responsibility of having committed the criminal
act did not preclude the application of the amnesty proclamation to
him, if and when the evidence showed that herein petitioner was
included within its terms, because said petitioner committed the act in
support of the resistance government.

III

The respondent Court of Appeals furthermore erred in
holding that said petitioner was ‘in a maze in his desire to be
forgiven by the courts of justice by alleging now what he learned from
his erroneous omission before the tenth amnesty commission/ and that
said respondent court of appeals ‘cannot countenance the tactical move
of the accused, that is, by switching to another avenue which he
learned from his error.’

IV

The respondent Court of Appeals finally erred in not
granting to herein petitioner the benefits of the amnesty proclamation
by permitting and allowing him to present evidence before the tenth
amnesty commission to prove the collaboration activities of the
deceased, so that said commission could decide whether or not herein
petitioner was entitled to the benefits of said proclamation, in spite
of the fact that herein petitioner did not admit having taken part in
the actual killing of the deceased, for, as pointed out in the above
mentioned cases decided by this Honorable Supreme Court, it was not
necessary for accused petitioner to do so, and even where ALIBI was the
defense of the accused, the latter was permitted to invoke and was
granted the benefits of said amnesty proclamation.”

On February 10, 1949, petitioner was charged with murder in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo. It was alleged in the information:

“That on or about the 12th day of July, 1942, in the
municipality of Anilao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, confederating and working
together with Jose Buenavista, Jose Ledesma and Emiliano Cabangal who
are now all dead, Benjamin Buyco being armed with a revolver and his
confederates with daggers and canes (baji), with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with their revolver, stab
with their daggers and strike with their canes one Luis Gonzales,
hitting and wounding the latter in the different parts of his body, and
as a result of his bullet, dagger and cane wounds said Luis Gonzales
died instantaneously.”

On motion of the petitioner, who claimed to be entitled to the
benefits of Proclaimation No. 8 of the President of the Philippines,
dated September 7, 1946, “granting amnesty to all persons who committed
acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy,” said court referred the case to the Tenth
Amnesty Commission, which had jurisdiction over the place in which the
crime had been allegedly committed. Inasmuch as, prior thereto, the
court of first instance had already began to receive the evidence in
said criminal case, the record thereof was, on March 4, 1950, returned
thereto by said amnesty commission, with the conformity of the parties,
for completion of said evidence. After accomplishing this task, the
court of first instance, upon the request of herein petitioner,
forwarded said record to the amnesty commission for determination of
petitioner’s claim to the benefits of said Proclamation No. 8. By an
order dated July 3, 1951, the amnesty commission rejected said claim
and again returned the record, for judgment on the merits, to the court
of first instance, which, subsequently, rendered the decision of
conviction already adverted to.

In an effort to establish his alleged innocence and obtain an
acquittal, petitioner disclaimed any participation whatsoever in the
killing of Luis Gonzales, and testified that he did not go to the scene
thereof until sometime after the occurrence; that, as Deputy Governor
of Iloilo for the resistance government therein, he had done nothing
except to order that Luis Gonzales, who had been reported engaged in
some pro-Japanese activities, be brought before him for investigation;
and that he merely learned, thereafter, that Gonzales had been killed
by persons employed as provincial guards under the resistance movement.
Under this version, if true, it would appear that petitioner had
committed no crime whatsoever, and, hence, there would be no room,
either for his conviction or for the application of the provisions of
the aforementioned amnesty proclamation. Unfortunately, however,
appellant’s testimony merited no credence from either the Court of
Appeals or the court of first instance or the Tenth Amnesty Commission.
What is more, said courts accepted the theory of the prosecution,
which, in the language of the decision of said appellate court, was as
follows:

“* * * on July 12, 1942, and prior to that date, a cockpit had been operated in sitio Loawan, barrio
of San Carlos, Anilao, lloilo. Among the several persons present in the
cockpit on said date were accused Benjamin Buyco and Luis Gonzales, now
deceased. At about 3 o’clock on the afternoon of July 12, two whistles
alarms were heard. A commotion among the people then ensued. Later on,
some provincial guards (Emergency Provincial Guards) armed with
firearms and canes approached Luis Gonzales. On seeing this, he
retreated. The accused, who was armed with a revolver, was with the
provincial guards. Moments later, Jose Buenavista, one of the
provincial guards, hit Luis Gonzales on the left shoulder with a cane.
The provincial guards then surrounded Luis Gonzales who said, “are you
going to kill me?” Upon hearing this, the accused directed his men to
move away. Immediately then, Benjamin Buyco drew his revolver and shot
Luis Gonzales who was not far from him, hitting his left breast. The
bullet entered into his breast and found its way out thru the back,
causing Gonzales to fall on the ground, with face downward He died
instantly. Not yet contented, some provincial guards kicked the
deceased and committed other abuses upon him. The people in the cockpit
went away when the accused instructed the provincial guards to pick up
those from Banate. On the same afternoon, the deceased was buried in
the municipal cemetery of Anilao. The following day, the cadaver of
Luis Gonzales was exhumed and after having been autopsied on July 14,
1942, by Dr. Nemesio Badilla whose findings are stated in Exhibit ‘A’,
it was transferred to the catholic cemetery of Banate for internment.”

Commenting on appellant’s alleged right to the benefits of said
amnesty proclamation, the Court of Appeals had the following to say:

“Another question with which we are confronted is
whether or not we can extend to the accused the benefits of the amnesty
proclamation. The purpose of the amnesty proclamation is undoubtedly to
free guerrillas from criminal liability in “certain crimes committed
under certain conditions. And wherever there is any doubt as to whether
or not a guerrilla had committed a crime in furtherance of his activity
in the resistance movement, such doubt should be resolved in his favor.
Indeed, such, provision is wise and laudable, for if there is any body
who merits amnesty from the sovereign, that would be the true guerrilla
who heroically battled the enemies under tremendous odds. However, in
the instant case the accused has failed to convince us that he killed
Luis Gonzales because the latter was an enemy collaborator. The accused vehemently denied
that he was the author of the death of Luis Gonzales, and for that
reason, the Tenth Amnesty Commission had correctly ruled that it is
rank inconsistency on the part of the appellant to justify an act, or
seek forgiveness for something which according to his own defense, he
had not committed. As a matter of fact, we really doubt whether
the deceased Luis Gonzales was in his lifetime an enemy collaborator.
The accused himself, when questioned in 1947 by N.B.I. Agents
Nos. 5 and 9 regarding the death of said Luis Gonzales, stated under
oath that he had not received any report that he was a fifth columnist
or that he was collaborating with the Japanese (Exhibit ‘B’).” (Italics ours.)

In other words, the Court of Appeals did not believe the evidence
for the defense to the effect that Luis Gonzales had collaborated with
the enemy and that his death was due to his activities as such or
otherwise connected with the resistance Movement. Considering that the
findings of the Court of Appeals on the credibility of testimonial
evidence are not subject to our review, on appeal by certiorari, we
cannot hold that said court erred in denying to petitioner the benefits
of the amnesty proclamation.

It is next urged that the inconsistency in the stand taken by
petitioner herein does not warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom by
the Court of Appeals and that the latter should have, at least,
remanded the case to the court of first instance so that he could prove
that Luis Gonzales was killed under the conditions contemplated in said
proclamation. In support of this contention, petitioner cites our
decision in the cases of People vs. Barrioquinto (G. R. Nos. L-2011 and
L-2267, promulgated June 30, 1951). There is no merit in petitioner’s
pretense. To begin with, the contradiction in his defenses (alibi and
justification or exemption from liability) was merely one of the
factors that led the Court of Appeals to find that petitioner’s
testimony cannot be relied upon, a finding which, as already pointed
out, is conclusive to us.

Secondly, the Barrioquinto cases involved two defendants, namely,
Loreto Barrioquinto and Norberto Jimenez. The latter was tried before
the issuance of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8. When, subsequently
thereto, a judgment of conviction was rendered against him, Jimenez and
Barrioquinto, who, meanwhile, had been apprehended, requested the
corresponding amnesty commission to extend to them the benefits of said
amnesty proclamation. This request was turned down by the amnesty
commission, mainly upon the ground that both defendants had denied
their guilt. When said commission returned the record to the court of
first instance, Jimenez moved for a new trial and for an opportunity to
prove that the offense charged had been perpetrated in furtherance of
the resistance movement. Both requests having been denied, Jimenez
appealed, and so did Barrioquinto, who, after due trial, had, also,
been convicted.

Referring to the appeal taken by Jimenez, we held that the alibi set up by him before the date of the amnesty Proclamation, should not bar the opportunity he had sought thereafter,
to prove that his case came within the purview of said proclamation,
its existence being unknown when he was tried. Consequently, the record
was remanded to the lower court for a new trial, in order to afford him
a chance to establish his alleged right to the amnesty. As regards
Barrioquinto, we found that the evidence of record satisfactorily
showed that he had committed the crime in furtherance of the resistance
movement, and, accordingly, the decision appealed from was reversed and
Barrioquinto was exonerated. In disposing of said cases, we declared
that:

“* * * to enjoy the benefits of the above amnesty,
the accused need not openly and expressly admit having committed the
deed imputed to them, and the fact they at first denied Responsibility
or denied having committed the criminal act, does not prevent the
application of the amnesty to them, if and when the evidence shows they are included within its terms, because they did the act in support of guerrilla warfare.” (Italics supplied.)

In the case at bar, the Tenth Amnesty Commission, the court of first
instance and the Court of Appeals found, in effect, that the evidence
did not suffice to show that appellant had acted in the manner
contemplated in the amnesty proclamation. Moreover, unlike the
Barrioquinto cases, which were appealed directly to this
Court, which, accordingly, had authority to pass upon the validity of
the findings of fact of the court of first instance and of its
conclusions on the veracity of the witnesses, the case at bar is before
us on appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals, the findings and conclusions of which, on the aforementioned
subjects, are not subject to our review, except in cases of grave abuse
of discretion, which has not. been shown to exist. Again, petitioner
herein closed his evidence in the court of first instance, long after
he had invoked the benefits of the proclamation. In fact, the record
had already been referred to the amnesty commission, which, however,
returned it to the court of first instance for completion of the
evidence—the introduction of which had already began therein—without
prejudice to the right of petitioner to request, as he did, upon the
conclusion of the trial, that the matter be referred once more to said
commission for decision on his alleged right to the amnesty. In other
words, petitioner has already had ample opportunity to prove, and did
try to establish, that the crime charged was perpetrated in pursuance
of the resistance movement, but he has not made good use of this
opportunity. It is obvious, therefore, that our decision in the
Barrioquinto cases does not militate in favor of petitioner’s
contention. It is so ordered.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the herein petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.