CRESENCIA VDA. DE BAKIT, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. VERONICO ASPERIN AND FELIX T. JAMERO, AS JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF LORETO, SURIGAO, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Surigao, the
dispositive part of which is as follows:

“Wherefore, based on all the foregoing consideration, and in the light of the
law and authorities quoted above, the petition is granted and the Court holds
and declares that the respondent justice of the peace of Loreto lacked ol
jurisdiction when it heard and decided said Civil Case No. 14 of his court, and
that all the proceedings taken by it, including the decision, Annex B are null
and void and without force and effect, with costs against the respondents. Said
respondent justice of the peace is hereby ordered to dismiss the case. As prayed
for in the petition, all the monthly deposits made by the petitioner pursuant to
the decision rendered by the respondent justice of the peace in said civil case
No. 14, are ordered returned to the petitioner by the person who has the same,
upon proper receipt to be signed by her. The preliminary writ of injunction
already issued in this case is made final and permanent.”

The pertinent facts are: On November 21, 1955, Veronico Asperin filed, with
the Justice of the Peace Court of Loreto, Surigao, a complaint, against
Cresencia Vda. de Bakit, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 14 of said court,
alleging that Asperin is the owner of a parcel of land described in said
pleading, with the improvements thereon; that Mrs. Ealdt sold it to him on
December 23, 19S2, subject to redemption; that on August 7, 1953, she agreed to
work on said land as his tenant, subject to the terms and conditions specified
in the complaint; that, since February, 1955, Mrs. Bakit had violated said terms
and conditions of their tenancy contract, by failing to deliver his share in
three (3) harvests and by failing to take good care of said land; that despite
Asperin’s repeated demands. Mrs. Bakit had failed to comply with the provisions
of their tenancy contract and to vacate the aforementioned land; and that due to
Mrs. Bakit’s wrongful acts, Asperin had suffered damages as set forth in the
complaint. Asperin prayed, therefore, that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued pendente lite and that judgment be rendered ordering Mrs. Bakit to
vacate the land in question and to deliver its possession to him, aside from
paying damages and costs.

In her answer, Mrs. Bakit denied most of the allegations of the complaint and
alleged that she owns the land in dispute and that, inasmuch as the same was
mortgaged to a bank and she was indebted to Asperin, he and she had agreed that
the land be mortgaged to him for the amount of his credit, plus a certain amount
in cash, or the total sum of P2,649, although the instrument incorporating the
agreement was entitled “Sale With Conventional Redemption”, which did not
reflect the true intent of the parties, who merely wanted a mortgage to secure
an indebtedness, which Mrs. Bakit had been paying on installment. Mrs. Bakit
prayed, therefore, that the complaint be dismissed, and that the reformation of
said instrument, in conformity with the intent of the parties thereto, be
ordered.

After appropriate proceedings, the justice of the peace court rendered
judgment, on March 21, 1956, sentencing Mrs. Bakit to vacate the land in
question and deliver its possession to Asperin, as well as to pay him P35.00 a
month, for the use and occupancy of the land, until the final disposition of the
case.

Mrs. Bakit appealed seasonably from this decision to the Court of First
Instance of Surigao, where the case was docketed as civil case No. 905 thereof.
Likewise, she deposited monthly in court the sum of P35.00. However, on
September 10, 1956, her Counsel, Atty. Senen C. Peñaranda, asked permission to
withdraw her appeal, which was granted on September 11, 1956. Subsequently, Mrs.
Bakit, through Attorneys Navarro and Navarre, filed a motion to revive the
appeal, upon the ground that her former counsel had acted without her knowledge
and consent in withdrawing said appeal, but this motion was denied on November
10, 1956. Subsequently, or on March 4, 1957, the new counsel for Mrs. Bakit
filed a petition. for relief from judgment, upon the ground that, when Atty,
Peñaranda withdrew her appeal, he labored under an honest mistake or
misapprehension of her instructions, and that she has a good and substantial
defense. Before it could be acted upon, or on June 18, 1957, this petition was
withdrawn.

On the same date, Mrs. Bakit instituted the present action, against Asperin
and the Justice of the Peace of Loreto, Surigao, in the Court of First Instance
of Surigao, in which it was docketed as special civil case No. 1032. It was
commenced with a pleading captioned “Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction.” Mrs. Bakit alleged therein that the justice of the
peace court of Loreto had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case
No. 14 thereof, because the same called for the determination of the ownership
or title to a real property, which is beyond the competence of said court, and
it involved the dispossession of a tenant by an alleged landholder, which is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Kelations, and that
the decision rendered in said case is, therefore, null and void ab
initio, and the execution thereof would cause grave and irreparable injury
to Mrs. Bakit, who, accordingly, prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the execution of said decision and that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered annulling the same, making injunction permanent, and directing the
refund to Mrs. Bakit of her monthly deposits in court. Seemingly, the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for was issued.

In their answer, respondents maintained that said Civil Case No. 14 was an
ordinary ejectment or unlawful detainer case, and that Mrs. Bakit had had
therein a plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, by
appealing from the decision rendered in said case, although she subsequently
withdrew her appeal, and by filing a petition for relief from judgment, which
her counsel, eventually, withdrew.

After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Surigao,
rendered judgment holding that the subject matter of said Civil Case No. 14 was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations and, hence,
beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court of Loreto, and that,
consequently, the relief prayed for by Mrs. Bakit was in order, for which reason
it nullified all of the proceedings in said Civil Case No. 14, including the
decision therein. Hence, this appeal by the respondents.

There is no merit in the appeal.

Respondents-appellants insist that civil case No. 14 was an ordinary action
for unlawful detainer, and, as such, Within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace court of Loreto. The cause of action set forth In
the complaint therein was, however, one for ejectment of a tenant of
agricultural land, based upon an alleged breach of a contract of tenancy between
the supposed landlord and the alleged tenant. Such action is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations (R.A. No.
1199, sec. 21; R.A. No. 1267, sec. 7, as amended).

Moreover, Asperin claimed to be entitled to hold said land and to eject Mrs.
Bakit therefrom upon the ground that Bhe had sold it to him, although subject to
redemption, and that, as such buyer, he had agreed to take Mrs. Bakit as his
tenant, who had violated the terms and conditions of their contract of tenancy.
Upon the other hand, Mrs. Bakit maintained that she was not his tenant; that the
land belonged to her, not to Asperin; that she had merely mortgaged it to him,
as security for the payment of a debt; and” that the instrument incorporating
their agreement, entitied “Sale With Conventional Redemption,” did not express
their true intent and should be reformed accordingly. The title to the land in
question was thereby put in issue, in a manner affecting necessarily the cause
of action of Asperin. In order to settle such issue, it was necessary to
determine which of the conflicting claims of the parties was true, and, hence,
to decide whether the alleged “sale with conventional redemption” was what it
purported to be, as claimed by Asperin, or merely a mortgage, as contended by
Mrs. Bakit. In other words, the title to a real property had to be settled and,
in fact, the justice of the peace of Loreto, endeavored to settle it in its
decision, by holding therein that it had been proven that Mrs. Bakit had sold
the land to Asperin subject to redemption, that she had agreed to be and had
become his tenant, that she had failed to comply with her obligations as such
tenant and had refused to deliver his share of the produce of the land, that,
instead, “she is withholding said land and asserting ownership * * *
thereof” despite repeated demands of Asperin, and that she had not sufficiently
established her contention. As stated in Teodoro vs. Balatbat, (94 Phil.,
247; 50 Off. Gaz., 601):

“* * *, it is evident that plaintiff’s pretended rigrht to the possession of
the property in dispute ultimately rests upon his claim of ownership, a claim
based upon a purported contract of riala with right of repurchase admittedly
signed by defendant but claimed by them to be mere simulation to cloak a
mortgage obligation tainted with usury. If this contract was really a sale
subject to repurchase and the repurchase has, as alleged by the plaintiff, not
been made within the time stipulated, plaintiff would already be the owner of
the property sold and, as such, entitled to its possession. On the other hand,
if the contract was, as defendants claim, in reality a more mortgage, then the
defendants would still be the owner of the property and could not, therefore, be
regarded as mere lessees. In the final analysis then, the case hinges on a
question of ownership and is for that reason not cognizable by the justice of
the peace court.” (See, also Nierras vs. Juson de Po, L-10878, Feb. 22,
1957.)

Thus, the cause of action set forth in the complaint in civil case No. 14 was
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
whereas the issue raised in the answer of Mrs. Bakit placed the case within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Surigao. In
either case, the justice of the peace Court of Loreto had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the litigation, and, as a corollary, all proceedings in
said court, including its decision therein, were null and void.

It is urged, however, that a writ of certiorari lies only when there is “no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law,” and that Mrs. Bakit had the right to appeal from said decision and did
actually appeal therefrom, although the appeal was subsequently withdrawn. There
are, however, sufficient allegations in the petition filed in this case to
permit the same to be considered as an ordinary action for the annulment of a
decision, and we do consider it as such.

Wherefore, subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against respondent-appellant Veronico Asperin. It is
so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.