SANTIAGO DEGALA, PETITIONER, VS. PATRICIO C. CENIZA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS SUR, AND VALENTIN UMIPIG, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF PLACIDA MINA, RESPONDE…

The respondent Valentin Umipig was appointed special administrator of the
estate of the deceased Placida Mina in civil case No. 3689 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur. In this original action for certiorari, the petitioner
Santiago Degala complains of, and seeks relief from, the failure or refusal of
the respondent Judge, Honorable Patricio C. Ceniza, to remove said special
administrator. The grounds upon which the petitioner based his various motions
for removal in the Court of First Instance, may be summed up as follows: (1)
That Valentin Umipig has an interest adverse to the estate under administration.
(2) That he is a stranger to the estate, not being in any way a beneficiary
under the alleged will of Placida Mina. (3) That he has failed to include in his
inventory some properties belonging to the estate. (4) That he has failed to pay
certain taxes due from the estate. (5) That he has failed to render an
accounting in spite of orders of the court.

The petitioner invokes section 2 of Rule of Court No. 83, which provides that
“if an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a
duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove
him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign.”

Under the very rule invoked by the petitioner, the removal of an
administrator lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. The
sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by said court,
whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on
the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or
the orders of the court. We cannot merely substitute our way of thinking for
that of a lower court in matters under its discretionary power. And in the case
at bar, we cannot hold that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion,
particularly in view of the circumstance that the alleged grounds for removal
are not in fact weighty.

We cannot agree to petitioner’s contention that simply because Jesus Q.
Quintillan, former administrator removed by the court on the ground of adverse
interest, is the attorney for the respondent administrator, the latter is
necessarily disqualified on the same ground. Any interest which said attorney
may have is exclusively personal to him, in which the respondent Valentin Umipig
can have nothing to do.

With respect to the second ground relied upon by the petitioner, he admits
that the respondent administrator, as a son of the deceased Crisanto Umipig, can
represent his father as a trustee under section 3 of the will in question,
although it is contended that the provision of said will regarding the creation
of a trust, was declared null and void in the order of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur of July 7, 1947. Upon examining said order, however, we
find that petitioner’s contention is not correct, since it recites that “el
Juzgado no resuelve por ahora con ocasion de esta mocion de sobreseimiento, si
las disposiciones testamentarias en cuestion son nulas o validas.”

Whether the respondent administrator failed to include in his inventory some
properties belonging to the estate, is a question of fact to be determined by
the respondent Judge after the reception of necessary evidence. Indeed, in the
order of the Court of First Instance of April 4, 1946, the clerk of said court
was commissioned to receive evidence which the oppositors, one of whom is the
petitioner, may have regarding the point.

It may be true that the respondent administrator failed to pay all the taxes
due from the estate, but said failure may be due to lack of funds, and not to a
wilful omission.

Regarding the alleged failure of the respondent administrator to render an
accounting, it appears that he did so on January 28, 1947. Whether the statement
of accounts was filed on time and whether the same is complete and correct, are
matters addressed to the judgment and discretion of the respondent Judge. It may
not be amiss to add that the latter will of course know when to resort to the
bond filed by the respondent administrator who, by the way, is not alone in the
trust, it appearing that Attorney Antonio Directo, counsel for the petitioner,
has been appointed special co-administrator.

The petition is hereby dismissed, and it is so ordered with costs against the
petitioner.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Hontiveros,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

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PERFECTO, J.:

The granting of an extension of 10 days of the time within which special
administrator Valentin Umipig should file the accounts of his administration
appears to be so unreasonable to justify that, as prayed by petitioner, it be
disturbed.

The facts alleged in the petition are not ground enough why lower court
should be compelled to order the removal of said special administrator. There is
enough ground for the lower court to exercise his discretion to the effect of
ordering said removal, but its action in not ordering it does not appear to be
arbitrary, abusive, or even unwise. The fact that the lower court had to issue
warnings in order to compel said special administrator to perform its official
duties offers basis enough to believe that said official is negligent, and
negligence in the performance of official duty should not be countenanced, but
rather should be dealt with sternly. It justifies removal from office.
Negligence is always objectionable. When committed in public office, it is
highly detrimental to public interest. The guilty ones should always be made to
feel the weight of their responsibility and suffer the deserved sanction.

In
our opinion, the petition must be denied.