G.R. No. L-1605. September 13, 1949

IN THE MATTER OF INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARCELINO BELMONTE. APOLONIA JIMOGA-ON, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. JULITA AND ULPIANO, BOTH SURNAMED BELMONTE, MOVANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions September 13, 1949 PARAS, J.:


PARAS, J.:


This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental dated June 23, 1947, in relation to the order of July 12,
1947, appointing the herein petitioner-appellee, Apolonia Jimoga-on, as judicial
administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Belmonte, who died intestate, and
failing (a) to adjudge the herein movants-appellants, Julita and Ulpiano
Belmonte, to be acknowledged natural children of Marcelino Belmonte and
(b) to appoint Julita Belmonte as administratrix of the properties
acquired by the deceased Marcelino Belmonte before his marriage to Apolonia
Jimoga-on.

Under section 6 of Rule of Court No. 79, the surviving spouse
is the first in the order of preference for appointment as administrator; and
the appealed order, it goes without saying, is in consonance with this
reglementary provision. It is not pretended that Apolonia Jimoga-on is
unsuitable or otherwise disqualified.

Even having in view the rule that the order of preference is
based on the interest which the appointee has in the estate left by the
deceased, we are inclined to hold that the herein appellee is still to be
preferred because, according to the appealed order—and the appellants do not
contend otherwise,—the greater part of the estate left by the deceased Marcelino
Belmonte was acquired during his marriage to the appellee. This is not a case
where the whole of the estate to be under administration has been acquired
before marriage, nor a case where those opposing the appointment (as appellants
herein) have a greater Interest.

Even assuming that the properties acquired before the marriage
are more than those amassed during the period of the conjugal partnership, the
appealed judgment is still tenable, because the six legitimate children are
agreeable to the appointment of the appellee, as against only the two appellants
who claim to be acknowledged natural children. The interest of the legitimate
children is undoubtedly far greater than the participation that may accrue to
the alleged natural children.

The appellants also argue that the lower court erred in not
making an adjudication to the effect that they are acknowledged natural children
of the deceased Marcelino Belmonte. This argument is without merit. In the first
place, as pointed out in the appealed order of July 12, 1947, the matter so far
taken up by the lower court was limited to the appointment of the judicial
administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Belmonte. In other words, while no
adjudication was made on the status of the appellants, this fact does not
preclude future action on the point. In the second place, while the jurisdiction
of the probate court includes the power to entertain the question of whether or
not a person is a natural child acknowledged by the decedent (Conde vs. Abaya,
13 Phil., 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off.
Gaz., 3091), it is only aften, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral
charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax
shall have been effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of
such persons as are entitled by law to the residue. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49
Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.[1]) The adjudication sought to be obtained by
the appellants is therefore premature.

Wherefore, the appealed orders are affirmed, and it is so
ordered with costs against the appellants.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor,
and Reyes, JJ., concur.


[1] 68 Phil., p.227.