G. R. No. L-10333. July 25, 1957

This action  of certiorari seeks  to  set aside a  writ of preliminary injunction issued  by  the  Court  of First Instance of Manila,  Hon.  Riginio B.  Macadaeg, presiding, restraining the petitioner herein (a)  from impeding, obrstructing,  hampering  or   interfering  with   plaintiffs’ (respondents  herein)  shipping  business;  (6)  from  intimidating, insulting,  threatening, coercing and  preventing persons desiring and intending to enter the pier gates and  render service on  plaintiffs’  vessels; and  (c)   from picketing plaintiffs’ vessels  at the  piers of the Manila South Harbor.

The above  order was issued  upon a complaint filed  by the respondents, alleging that  on  February 18, 19S6, the petitioner labor union commenced picketing  respondents’  vessels docked  at  the  various piers of the Manila  South Harbor for the purpose of intimidating and coercing them to accede to their unlawful demands; that respondents are the shipping agents in the Philippines of various foreign and  domestic shipowners and  vessels that regularly  call at the  Port of Manila,  and that as such agents they  are in charge of provisioning, representing and attending  to the needs of said vessels while at this  port; that since 1951 respondents  have  individually  contracted  with several watchmen agencies, as  independent contractors, to perform the work of guarding and protecting said vessels; that the watchmen are  employed  by the said agencies,  and that their salaries are paid by said agencies and  not by the respondents; that respondents have no authority to hire or dismiss said watchmen;  that  petitioners  demanded that the respondents enter  into  a collective bargaining  agreement with it, with regard to the employment of watchmen; that respondents refused to accede to said demands because they are not the  employers of said watchmen.  The respondents,  therefore, prayed that  a writ  of preliminary injunction issued against the petitioner upon their filing a bond.  Upon the  filing of a  bond  of  P10,000  the  Court of First Instance issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

It is the claim and  contention of the petitioners  before this Court that the refusal of the respondents to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with it is a labor dispute within the purview of Section 9, Republic  Act 875,  otherwise known  as the Magna Charta of Labor,  and that, therefore, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction without the requisites established by Section 9 thereof is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent judge and that the writ is  a complete nullity.

In answer to the above contention, respondents  allege that the  jurisdiction of the respondent judge to issue the writ of preliminary injunction is  based on the allegations of the complaint; that there is no  labor dispute between the petitioners and the  respondent companies;  that petitioners’ picketing was not peaceful but was accompanied and characterized by violence, coercion, threats, intimidation and fraud; that there were no “amicable negotiations” between respondent  and  petitioner with  respect  to  the terms, tenure or conditions of employment, etc., that there is  no  labor dispute  between  petitioner and  respondents because  there is no  employer-employee  relationship  between them.

A cursory examination of  the  original  petition filed in the court a quo discloses that the watchmen are employed by the respondents herein thru the watchmen agencies, and in order to justify the granting of the writ of preliminary injunction,  care was  made in the framing of  the original petition  in  the  court a  quo, to allege that the watchmen were not employees of the respondents because  of the existence of an agreement between respondents and the  watchmen agencies that the watchmen should be employees  of the latter and not the former.  But no matter how studiously  the  complaint avoids  stating that  the watchmen employed by the steamship agencies are not their employees, because they are employees of the watchmen agencies, the stubborn fact remains that the said watchmen are ultimately working for the steamship  agencies and ultimately paid for by the latter.   It may have been true that these watchmen  were contracted for by the watchmen agencies, but the fact remains that their services were availed  of and their  compensation paid by  the  steamship agencies, even if such were done thru the agencies and  without  the direct  intervention of the steamship agencies.

The law expressly provides  that a labor  dispute exists “regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of  employer and employee.”  This  is the express provision of  Section  2  of Republic Act No. 875, which  is as follows:

“(j)  The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure  or conditions of employment,  or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, “inamtaining,  changing, or  seeking to arrange  terms  or conditions of employment,  regardless of whether  the disputants  stand  in the proximate  relation of employer and employee.   “*   *  *.”

It  is  evident that  a “labor  dispute”  existed between  the watchmen,  members  of  the petitioning  union,  and  the steamship agencies, the respondents  herein.   The allegations  in the original complaint filed in the court below that there is no relationship of employer and employee is a conclusion  of law.   As the watchmen  were actually employed in  watching  and  guarding  the steamers, no amount of reasoning can deny the  fact that they  necessarily  and actually work for the  respondent  steamship agencies.   If their  services were contracted for and are paid  thru  the watchmen agencies, the relationship  may not  have  been proximate,  but  this  fact can not belie  the  existence of the relationship  of  employer  and employee, nor  argue against the existence of a labor dispute.

“An action may involve a ‘labor dispute’  within sections 101-115 of this title,  notwithstanding  that the  dispute is not between  employer  and his  own employees.   Brown  vs.  Coumanis, CCA. Ala. .1943, 135 F. ad. 163, .146 A. L. R. 1241.)”  (29  USCA 65.)

“The definitions  of  ‘labor disputes’ in this chapter must “be con- fined to  the cases involving that  exercise of freedom of  action of employees  dealt with  by declared public policy of protecting1  employees in  freedom of association and in designation of bargaining representatives.  Donnelly Garment Co. vs. International Ladies Garment Workers’  Union, D.C. Mo. 1938, 21 F. Supp.  807, vacated on other grounds 58  S.Ct. 875, 304 U.S. 243, 82 L.  Ed. 1316, mandate conformed  to 23  F. Supp. 998,  reversed  99 F.2d  309,  certiorari denied 59 S.Ct.  364, 305 U.S.  662, 83 L.Ed.  430.’”  (Id. pp. 84-85.)

“The inclusion,  in definition of  term  ‘labor dispute’ contained in this section of disputes between employers and employees and between labor unions and  employers in addition to other controversies concerning terms or conditions of employment, indicated that this chapter was intended to  embrace  controversies  other than  those between employers and employees and those between labor unions and!  employers.  New Negro  Alliance vs. Sanitary Grocery ‘Co.,  1988, 58 S.Ct. 703, 303 U.S. 552, 82 L.Ed. 1012.” (Id. p. 85.)

“This  chapter was  intended to  remove  the  barriers  raised in former decisions of the Supreme  Court  of the United States which required  the  relationship of  employer  and employee in  order to constitute a labor dispute and to  provide that  only  an  indirect interest was,necessary in order to include a party within the meaning of a labor dispute. Houston and North Texas Motor Freight Lines vs. Local Union No. 886 of International  Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs.  Stablemen, and  Helpers of  America,  D.C. Old. 1938, 24  F.  Supp. 619.” (Id., p. 86.)

“A  ‘labor dispute’,  within this,  chapter,  retains its character  as such if it involves any question that refers  to any of the terms and conditions of. employment  or  that  might  involve  the betterment of any terms or conditions, and existence  of  labor dispute is not negatived by  fact that plaintiffs  and  defendants  do not  stand  in relation of  employer  and  employee, or by  the fact employees are altogether satisfied with  conditions of  employment. Petrucci  vs. Hogan, 1941, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 718,  176  Misc. 140.”  (Id. p. 86.)

We find,  therefore,  that  the court should have found that  a labor dispute exists  and should have  proceeded in accordance with Section  9  of the  Republic  Act No. 875 before issuing  an  injuncton.   In issuing  the injunction without following the  procedure  outlined in  said section, the court  exceeded its  jurisdiction.

Assuming, however,  that  it entertained  doubt as  ‘to whether or not the relation of employer and employee exists between the petitioning union and the respondent  steamship agencies, it was also an  abuse of  discretion on its  part to have issued  the injunction without hearing the parties and receiving evidence  on the main issue.   The necessity of a hearing is demanded by the fact  that the existence or non-existence of a  labor dispute determines the nature of the proceedings that must be followed  in the issuance of an injunction.   If  a labor dispute  exists then the provisions of the Magna Charta of Labor  (R, A. No. 875)  should be strictly followed, as ruled by  Us  in various decisions (PAFLU, et al. vs. Tan, et al.¹ L-9115,  prom. Aug. 31,1956; paplu, et al. .vs.  Barot, et al., L-9281, prom.  Sept. 28, 1956) ; and  on the other hand, if no labor dispute exists then the court may issue an ordinary injunction in accordance with  the Rules of  Court.   The  policy of  social justice guaranteed by  the  Constitution demands that when cases appear to involve labor  disputes  courts should take  care in the exercise of their prerogatives and discretion.   Only in that way  can the policy enunciated in the Constitution be carried out.   We hold that it is evident that the trial judge abused its discretion when  it granted  the writ of preliminary  injunction without previous investigation as to whether or not a labor dispute exists within the meaning of the Magna Charta of Labor.

The order of the trial  court granting the writ of pre- liminary injunction having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and  with grave abuse, of  discretion, the same  is hereby set aside, and the writ of preliminary  injunction issued in favor of the petitioners in this Court  is hereby declared permanent.  With costs against respondent steamship  agencies.

Paras,  C.  J.,  Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Conception., Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, J.J., concur.

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¹ 99 Phil. , 854, 52 Off. Gaz., [13] 5836
² 99 Phil., 1008.