G. R. No. L-11583. July 19, 1957

This is  a petition for  review of  a  decision  of the Court of Appeals rendered  on October  12,  1956, as well as  its resolution  entered on  October 30, 1956, denying the motion for   reconsideration  filed by  petitioners  seeking  the modification of said decision.  The decision adverted to contain  an  injunction restraining the   Provincial   Fiscal  of iloilo from proceeding with the investigation of a criminal complaint filed  by Jose  C.  Zulueta against respondents Mariano B. Peñaflorida  and Ricardo Y. Ladrido.

Zulueta and Peñaflorida  were candidates for the position of Provincial Governor of Iloilo in the elections held on  November 8, 1955.  Penaflorida  was declared elected by the Board of Canvassers with a plurality of 4,687 votes on  November 25, 1955.   Zulueta filed  with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a protest contesting the election of Peñaflorida on the grounds of errors, irregularities, frauds and corrupt practices.   On January 6,  1956, Ceferino de los  Santos, Jr.,  a defeated candidate for board member, filed a criminal complaint in said court against Peñaflorida and Ladrido charging the latter with a violation of Section 49 of the Revised Election  Code relative to corrupt practices.  This complaint was  dismissed on the ground that, the violation charged being a public  offense, the same can only be prosecuted by a government prosecutor and not by  a private individual.   And taking cue of this suggestion, Zulueta lodged a complaint with the fiscal involving the same  charged against Peñaflorida  and Ladrido.

The fiscal set  the complaint for investigation on February  14, 1956  at which the complainant presented his evidence, but  after the  same  was presented,  Peñaflorida and Ladrido,  through . their  counsel, asked for  the  suspension  of  the  investigation on  the  ground  that, the violation being one of the grounds on  which the election protest then pending  in  court is based, the same constitutes a prejudicial question which must first be decided before the criminal complaint could  be  given  due course. This  motion having been denied on the ground  that the point raised does not constitute  a  prejudicial question, Peñaflorida  and Ladrido, through  counsel, filed a petition for-prohibition  with  injunction  on  April  18,  1956 with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo  praying that the provincial fiscal  be  enjoined from proceeding with the  investigation of the criminal case until after the election contest shall have been finally determined, and on April  20, the court issued  a preliminary injunction after petitioner had filed a bond  in the amount of P1,000.  In the prohibition case, the court allowed Attys. Ceferino de Ios  Santos, Sr., Ceferino de Ios Santos, Jr. and Vicente Custodio to appear as amici curiae in its  order entered on July 6, 1956.

In the  meantime, Zulueta  filed  in the  election  protest an amended  petition,  which  was further amended later, seeking to strike out  from the original protest the averment relative to  corrupt practices which  are  involved in the  criminal case then under investigation by the fiscal, which was strongly resisted by Peñaflorida.  But, over his  opposition, the  court admitted the amended  petition on July 6, 1956.   Peñaflorida on his part asked leave to file an amended answer containing  a counterclaim wherein he not only  denied  the imputation made  against  him in the  original protest  concerning corrupt  practices  committed by him and  his henchmen,  but prayed: for moral damages and attorney’s fees in  the aggregate  amount of P150,000.   This motion was denied on  April 24, 1956, whereupon Peñaflorida and Ladrido brought the  case by way of certiorari to the Court  of  Appeals wherein they sought to set aside the following orders: one dated July 6, 1956 admitting the  amended petition of  protestant; one dated April 24, 1956 denying the admission of protestee’s amended answer, and  another dated July 6, 1956 granting leave to Attys. Ceferino de Ios Santos, Sr., Ceferino de Ios Santos, Jr. and Vicente Custodio to appear as amid euriae in the certiorari ease.  On  October 12,  1956, the Court of Appeals  denied the petition  but  enjoined forever the fiscal from proceeding with the investigation of the criminal  complaint filed  by  Zulueta  against  Peñaflorida  and Ladrido.

The question to be determined in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred in enjoining the provincial fiscal from proceeding with the  investigation of the criminal charge filed  by Zulueta against Peñaflorida and  Ladrido  on  the sole  ground  that, the  charge involving as  it  does a disqualification to hold  office, the same  is tantamount to  a petition for quo  warranto which can only be  filed within one week from the proclamation of the one declared elected.  Since the criminal complaint was lodged with the fiscal  after  the  lapse of one week  from proclamation, the Court of Appeals expressed the view that Peñaflorida can no longer be  prosecuted for the offense and so  the fiscal should be perpetually enjoined.

The ratio  decidendi  on which the foregoing  conclusion of  the Court of Appeals, is predicated  is contained  in the following portion of its  decaion:

“* * * The purpose,  therefore, of the  protestant in filing  a  criminal complaint against Peñaflorida and Ladrido for  the alleged violation of  Sec. 49 is  to have  them imprisoned and disqualified to hold office  to which  they have been elected.  If Sec.  173 prohibits the filing of a petition for quo  warranto for the purpose of disqualifying the respondent after the lapse  of one week  from the time of the proclamation of petitioner  Peñaflorida, the same purpose cannot be accomplished after the lapse of one week  from the time of his proclamation by the filing of a criminal complaint and hence the protestant and respondent herein Zulueta and the fiscal should  he  enjoined forever from proceeding with the investigation of the criminal complaint filed by the former and  the filing thereof  by the latter.”

The  theory of the Court of  Appeals  would  appear to be as follows: the action of quo warranto allowed by Section 173 of the  Revised Election Code has  for its purpose the disqualification of the winning candidate.  A criminal action  for  violation  of  Section  49  of  the  same Code  on corrupt practices aims likewise  at  the  disqualification of the winning candidate which may  be  imposed  upon  him as a punishment.  Since both actions have  the same  purpose, both must be  governed by the same  rule prescribed by Section  173  which requires that the  action be  filed within  one week from proclamation of the winning  candidate.   If the criminal action is taken  beyond that period, its prosecution  against the candidate should be  forever barred.

We find this reasoning erroneous.   To begin with, one should not confuse an  action of quo  warranto with the complaint  for a violation  of the  Election Code even if the same may have  the effect of  disqualifying a  candidate to hold the  office to  which he  is elected.   One  partakes of the nature of  a civil case wherein the petitioner is the defeated candidate, while  the other is a  criminal action which is prosecuted in the name  of the People.  Both proceedings have different objectives and are predicated on different grounds. The purpose  of quo warranto is merely to prevent an elective official from assuming office on the ground  of  ineligibility.  To be eligible, one must  have the qualifications  required by law with  regard to citizenship, residence,  age,   loyalty,  etc.¹  On   the  other  hand, the principal purpose of  the  criminal action is  the imprisonment of the  offender, be he  a candidate or  not,  and the grounds of the action vary depending upon  the acts committed.   Here the acts involved are those  prohibited by Section 49 of the Election Cade relative to  corrupt  practices.  The fact  that the  present offense  carries  with it the accessory penalty of disqualification from holding office does not convert it into an action of quo warranto.  Lastly, there is a  difference as regards  the  prescriptibility of the action.  While an action of quo warranto should be filed within  one week from proclamation,  an  election offense prescribes after two years, from the date  of its commission, and if the discovery is made on  the occasion of  an election contest, the period shall commence on the date the  judgment becomes final (Section  188, Revised  Election Code). Indeed, this provision would  be rendered nugatory if the theory of  the Court of Appeals  is entertained.

Another  point to be  considered is that,  “as a  general rule,  an  injunction  will  not  be granted  to  restrain  a criminal  prosecution”  (Kwong Sing  vs.  City of  Manila, 41  Phil., 1.03).   The reason  is  obvious,   Public  interest requires  that  criminal  acts  be  immediately  investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.  This  is more so  in connection  with  a  violation  of the  Election Law. The only way to curb fraud,  terrorism and other  corrupt practices that are committed in the  elections is to  demand their immediate  investigation and  prosecution.   Only  in this way can we maintain a clean election and secure the free  expression  of the people’s will  at the  polls.

“The general  rule,  sometimes by virtue  of statutory provisions, is that an injunction will not be granted  to  stay criminal  or quasi criminal proceedings,  whether the  prosecution is for the  violation of the common law or the infraction of  statutes  or  municipal  ordinances,  or  to stay the enforcement of orders of  a  board or commission.  This general rule  is based, in addition to other considerations, on  the principle that equity  is  concerned  only  with the protection of  civil  and property rights, and is intended to supplement, and not usurp, the functions of the courts of law, and on the fact that the party has an adequate remedy  at  law by establishing as a defense to  the prosecution that he did not commit the act charged, or that the statute  or ordinance on which the prosecution is  based is invalid, and,  in case of conviction,  by  taking an  appeal.”  (43 C. J. S.,  pp. 768-770).

It  is contended  that this rule admits of exceptions, one. of them being that “injunctions may be issued to restrain vexatious and oppressive  criminal prosecutions” (Yellowstone Kit vs. Wood, 43  S. W. 1068,  19 Tex. C. App. 683). This may be true, but  we are not  prepared  to hold that Zulueta  filed the criminaf. charge with  the intent to harass and oppress respondents,  there being no  clear findings to that  effect by the Court of  Appeals.  The fact  remains that the injunction is predicated not on that ground but on another  which we  have found to be legally untenable.

The counter assignment of  errors made by  respondents-appellees in their brief,  which seeks  to set aside the orders of  the court  a quo which were  maintained by the Court of Appeals, cannot  be entertained it appearing  that respondents-appellees did not appeal from the decision.

“* * * While an  appellee  may  on  appeal be permitted to  make counter assignment of errors when the purpose is merely to defend himself against the errors imputed by appellant to the court a quo, such is allowed merely to sustain the judgment in his favor but not to seek a modification or reversal of  said judgment, for  in such a case there  is need for  him  to  appeal from  the judgment.  This  is what we  said in a recent case.  For us to change the ratio decidendi of the  decision to suit the theory of respondents would be to infringe this  ruling’, and this are not  prepared to do.”   (Pineda  & Ampil Manufacturing Co.,  et  al. vs.  Arsenio Bartolome, et  al.,  95  Phil., 980).

“Appellee, who  is not appellant, may assign errors in  his brief where  his  purpose is to  maintain the judgment  on other grounds, but he may not do so if his purpose is to have the  judgment modified or reversed, for, in such case, he must appeal.  (Saenz vs. Mitchell, 60 Phil., 69, 80; Mendoza vs. Mendiola, 63 Phil.,  267; Villavert vs. Lim, 62 Phil., 178; Balajadia vs. Eusala, G. R. No. 42579.)’  (Bunge Corporation and Universal  Agencies  vs. Elena Camenforte & Co., 91 Phil,  861, 48 Off. Gaz., p. S377.)”

Wherefore, the  decision  appealed  from is) hereby modi- fied by deleting  from  its dispositive part that portion which enjoins the provincial fiscal from proceeding with the investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Zulueta against respondents  Penaflorida  and  Ladrido.   No costs.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,  concur.

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¹Section  2071,  Revised Administrative  Code,  as.  amended  by Commonwealth Act 233; Sections  2174 and  2175, Revised Administrative Code; Section 2440, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 233; As regards the ineligibility of members of municipal  board of chartered cities, they are covered by their different charters.