G. R. No. L-8520. June 29, 1957

Respondent Engracio Santos was charged in the Court of First Instance  of Rizal with the  crime  of rape.   After trial, said respondent was  convicted  and  sentenced to the maximum period  of reclusion temporal, from  17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years, and to pay  the costs.  Appealing to the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a  motion to quash and for  discharge,  on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction, there having been no valid complaint subscribed and sworn to by the offended party as required by Article  344 of  the Revised Penal Code.  Said motion was granted.   Hence  this appeal by the petitioners.

It  is  contended  that  the  “salaysay”  executed  and signed by petitioner Policarpia Bansuelo  on January  12, 1954, before  and in  the presence  of Fiscal  Nicanor  P. Nicolas of Rizal and Capt. Hermogenes Marco of the PCAC, is sufficient in form and substance to serve as the complaint required by Article  344 of  the Revised Penal Code.  That the law  requiring that the  crime of rape, among others, shall be commenced by  a complaint  filed by the offended party is merely “designed for the protection of the offended party and her family who may prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than  go through with the  scandal of a public  trial”  (Samilin  vs.  Court of  First Instance of Pangasinan,  57 Phil.  298,  304) ; that  when  petitioner Bansuelo executed  said “Salaysay”,  she had manifested her desire to prosecute the maniacal abuse committed against her;  that  said  “salaysay”  has  conformed  substantially to the  requisites of a, valid complaint;  that it  cannot be considered  as her  testimony during the  preliminary  investigation because,  if  it were  so,  the  other  witnesses should  have also signed it.

After  a  thorough examination  of the “salaysay” in question, we agree with the  appealed decision that it  is a narration of how the crime of rape was committed against petitioner Bansuelo.  Aa correctly  pointed out by the Solicitor General  in  his comment on the motion  for recon- sideration,  such sworn  statement  “salaysay” is not  the complaint contemplated in and required by  sections 1, 2 and 5 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court and Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.”

The complaint is  the process which begins the criminal  action, and no other pleading on the part of the government is necessary. So, if a criminal  action, had been commenced by complaint  in appropriate cases, it would he error for the court to dismiss  it, because  it was not  presented through the mediation of the prosecution officer.”  (Moran’s  Comments on  the  Rules of Court,  3d ed. [1950], Vol. II, p. 548).

The complaint contemplated by the law  and the rules is necessarily that one  filed  in court.  The  “salaysay”  was filed with the Fiscal and  not with the court;  it did not start the criminal proceedings.   The  Court  of Appeals dwelt  lengthily on  this point when it said:

“Counsel for  the complainant vigorously states in the motion for reconsideration, as well as in his  reply to the comment  of  the Solicitor General, that in the instant ease there has been substantial compliance with the law requiring the filing of a complaint  by the offended party  in  order to confer jurisdiction to the  trial court, for  it  is  alleged,  on January 13,  1954, the offended party has subscribed and sworn to before the provincial fiscal a written statement  “salaysay”  wherein   she   narrated  how   she  was  raped by  the  accused.

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“Section 1 of Rule 106 provides that:

‘All criminal actions  must  be commenced either by complaint or information in the  name  of the  People  of the  Philippines against all persons “who appear to be responsible therefor.’

“Section 2  of  Rule 106  defines a  complaint  as a:

‘. . . sworn statement  charging a person with an offense,  subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other employee of the government or governmental institution in  charge of  the enforcement  or execution of the law violated.’

“And pursuant to Section 5 of  Rule 106, a complaint or information is sufficient:

 ‘. . . if it states the name of the  defendant;  the designation of the offense by the  statute;  the  acts or omissions  complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time  of the commission of the offense;  and the place “wherein the offense was committed.’

“Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: ‘The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts  of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as  the case may be.’

“In front of these provisions of law, it cannot be certainly pretended  that  the  aforementioned  ‘salaysay’  or  written statement  of the offended party, Exhibit  1,  could  be considered  as  the  complaint  required by  law  for  the proper initiation of  the present case  of  rape.

“It  is argued, however, that said  Exhibit  1 should  be considered  as the  complaint  required by law,  for on  the basis thereof the provincial  fiscal of Rizal conducted  the preliminary investigation  and then  filed the information at  bar.   It  is  further  argued that  since  under  Republic Act No. 732, provincial  fiscals have now the same  authority  as  the  Justice  of the  Peace to  conduct preliminary investigation,  said Exhibit 1  should be considered  as the complaint contemplated in  the  Rules  of   Court  and the Revised Penal Code.   We cannot concur  to  this  theory, for according to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 782,  after the provincial fiscal has conducted an  investigation of a case, he  has the duty  to  have prepared  an information or complaint.  The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 782 provides:

CA provincial fiscal shall have authority  to conduct investigation into the matter  of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the same.’

And the  complaint  mentioned  in this provision of law  is precisely  what is denned and mentioned’ in the Rules of Court and the Revised Penal Code.  Accordingly, we hold the view  that in the  case  at bar,  after the fiscal has investigated the case, he should  have procured the filing of a.  complaint by the offended party to properly initiate this case and  not file by himself an  information as  he did.”

It  is also argued that  in affixing  her signature and swearing to the allegations of  the  information together with the fiscal, petitioner Bansuelo had complied with the requirement of a valid complaint.  Respondent Santos has answered this argument by saying that such  fact is not borne out by the records; that such  assertion  has never been made before the Court of  Appeals; that, the opening paragraph of the  information  clearly  and unmistakably shows that the  fiscal  alone accuses respondent Santos of the crime of rape; that  the offended party has never been referred to in the body of the  information as having requested its filing.

We  cannot consider  the information,  although signed by petitioner Bansuelo together with the fiscal, as equivalent  to the  complaint  required  by law,  because  said information lacks the oath of the  complainant; the what contained therein is the  subscribed and sworn certification of the  fiscal that he  had  conducted the  preliminary investigation  in  which  obviously the  offended  party had taken no participation “whatsoever;  in very  unequivocal terms, the  information commences  with  the statement that “the undersigned fiscal accuse Engracio Santos of the crime of rape”, the offended party not  having been mentioned at all as one of the accusers.

It is  not  altogether  true  that to  require the  offended party to draft the complaint in legal form and terminology, —otherwise the complaint  will be insufficient,—would impose a penalty on  ignorance, and that a person with no legal-training will not be able to institute a criminal action for  private crimes;  because, as may be gathered from the provisions of Section 2  of Republic Act 732, it is the duty of the Provincial  Fiscal to prepare the necessary complaint after  having taken down  the  testimony  of the offended  party  and  his witnesses  during the preliminary investigation.   Indeed,  the  law required this, since the victims of crimes which cannot be prosecuted except upon their complaint may be ignorant of  the law,  to  say the least.

This Court has invariably  maintained strict compliance with the  jurisdictional  requirement of a complaint by the offended  party,  as defined  in Section 2 of  Rule 106 and Article 344  of  the  Revised Penal  Code.  In  the case  of People vs. Palabao (L-8027, August 31, 1954), we considered  insufficient an  information filed with the Provincial Fiscal, wherein  the offended party signed at the bottom thereof and above the signature of the prosecuting officer, the information even  reciting that the Provincial Fiscal charged defendant with the crime of seduction at the “instance of the offended  party.”  In the case of People vs. Martinez, (76 Phil. 559), this Court motu proprio dismissed the  case  for failure of the  aggrieved party  to  file the proper complaint  for the offense of  oral defamation, although the accused  never raised  the question  on appeal, thereby showing the necessity of  strict compliance with the legal  requirement even  at the  cost  of  nullifying all the proceedings  already  had in the lower court.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. So  ordered, without costs.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception, and Reyes, J.  B. L., JJ., concur.