MANUEL F. PORTILLO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LUIS B. REYES, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND CESAR RAMIREZ, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Manuel F. Portillo applies for a writ of prohibition with
this Court to enjoin respondent judge, Honorable Luis B. Reyes, of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, from further proceeding with Civil
Case No. 44181 on the ground of improper venue.

The records disclose that respondent Cesar Ramirez filed with the
lower court a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money, totalling
P5,250.00, exclusive of interest, against the petitioner Portillo. The
complaint stated plaintiff’s residence to be at No. 7 Atok Street,
Quezon City, but made no mention of defendant Portillo’s residence,
except that the latter might be served with summons at “c/o Boulevard
Theatre, Quezon Boulevard, Manila.”

Portillo filed a verified motion to dismiss the complaint, averring
that he has his domicile in Caloocan, Rizal, and that since neither he
nor the plaintiff resides in Manila, then venue was improperly laid
with the Manila court. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

In Courts of First Instance, the matter of venue in civil actions
is regulated by section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

“Civil actions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendant resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.” (Italics supplied)

Respondents argue that the phrase “or may be found” (referring to
the defendant or defendants) sufficiently authorizes the bringing of
the suit with the court of first instance of the place where the
defendant or any of the defendants may actually be found when the
complaint is filed. That same contention was made and rejected in
Evangelista, et al.f vs. Santos, 86 Phil., 387, wherein, among other
things, we said:

“Section 1 of Rule 5 may seem, at first blush, to
authorize the laying of the venue in the province where the defendant
‘may be found.’. But this phrase has already been held to have a
limited application. It is the same phrase used in section 377 of Act
190 from which section 1 of Rule 5 was taken, and as construed by this
Court it applies only to eases where defendant has no residence in the Philippine Islands.
This was the construction adopted in the case of Cohen vs. Benguet
Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil., 526, which was an action brought in
Manila by a nonresident against a corporation which had its residence
for legal purposes in Baguio but whose President was found in Manila
and there served with summons. * * *” (Italics supplied)

In effect, this Court in the cited case reiterated the rule that as
long as the defendant is a resident of the Philippines, the words
“residence” and “found” are synonymous terms, meaning “domicile” (see
also Cohen vs. Benguet Commercial Co. Ltd., 34 Phil., 526; Casilan vs.
Tomassi, et al., 90 Phil., 765; 52 Off. Gaz., 806; Corre vs. Tan Corre,
100 Phil., 321; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 642).

Plaintiff’s argument that the foregoing rule should not apply where
defendant’s residence is unknown to the plaintiff, fails to consider
that even then the latter has an equally, if not more, convenient
remedy of filing the action with the court of his own residence. And
even as the regulation of venue is primarily for the convenience of the
plaintiff, as attested by the fact that the choice of venue is given to
him, it should not be construed to unduly deprive a resident defendant
of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.

Wherefore, the writ of prohibition is granted and the respondent
enjoined from the, further proceeding with Civil Case No. 44181. The
complaint in said case is, further more, ordered dismissed, without
prejudice on the part of plaintiff to file another action with the
proper court. Costs against respondent Cesar Ramirez.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.