JULIAN LEMOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MANUEL E. CASTANEDA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Julian de Lemos appeals directly to this Court from the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing his complaint in Civil
Case No. 34736 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

It is alleged that since 1938, Julian de Lemos has been a bona fide
occupant of a lot forming part of the Nuestra Senora de Guia Estate in
Tondo. Pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 539, said Estate was acquired
by the Government for subdivision and resale to its bona fide
tenants, or occupants and to other qualified persons. Successively. it
fell under the administration of the Rural Progress Administration (by
Eexecutive Order No. 191, March 2, 1939), the Landed Estate Division of
the Bureau of Lands (by Executive Order No. 376, November 28, 1950),
and finally, the Land Tenure Administration, pursuant to Republic Act
1400 which took effect on September 9, 1955. It appears that in the
subdivision survey plan, Lot 40, Block 2, Pcs-2558 (the lot occupied
and claimed by plaintiff appellant) did not include the contested
portion covering an area of 12 square meters. Instead, this piece had
been included in Lot 42 occupied by Hermogenes Pagsisihan. Following a
dispute as to the possession of this small plot of land, and upon
complaint duly investigated by the Land Tenure Administration, the
latter issued an order on March 13, 1956, finding De Lemos without
right to said portion, and. ordering him to vacate it within 30 days
from receipt of the order. A motion for reconsideration filed by the De
Lemos was denied on April 27, 1956. On July 11, 1956, the Land Tenure
Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot 42 in favor of Hermogenes
Pagsisihan. Upon registration of the deed on May 29, 1957, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 47778 was issued to Pagsisihan. Subsequently,
or on October 18, 1957, De Lemos filed with the Land Tenure
Administration a complaint against Pagsisihan for a modification of the
award in favor of the latter; but the Land Tenure Administration, on
January 7, 1958, dismissed the complaint for failure to appear and
prosecute, and on the ground that it had already lost jurisdiction over
the case. De Lemos then brought the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.

Upon motion of the defendants in the court below, the amended
complaint was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had not
exhausted his administrative remedies, as he failed to appeal the
orders of the Land Tenure Administration to the Office of the
President. The plaintiff came to this Court.

The appeal must be sustained. It has been consistently held by this
Court in several decisions that the rule requiring previous exhaustion
of administrative remedies before resorting to the Courts does not
apply to disputes over land that was originally owned by private
parties and later was acquired by the Government for the purpose of
reselling them to bona fide tenants or occupants. This was
the ruling in the conflicts over lots in the Tambobong Estate acquired
from the Archbishop of Manila (Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil, 128;
Santiago vs. Cruz, 98 Phil, 168; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil., 706;
54 Off. Gaz., [15] 4494).

“It is interesting to note at this juncture that the
order of the lower Court dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 was
predicated on the ground that the sublessees failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to them, and, therefore, held that
said actions could hot be entertained by the courts, citing the case of
Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil., 542 . But in subsequent rulings in other
cases involving lots in said Tambobong Estate, this Court qualified its
stand by confining the application of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as a condition precedent to the filing of a
judicial action to controversies arising out of the disposition of disposable public lands and not to cases involving private lands acquired by the Government by purchase (See Marukot vs. Jacinto, supra; Santiago vs. Cruz, supra).”

In the present case, the lots were part of the Nuestra Senora de
Guia Estate acquired by the Government from the same private owner, and
no reason is seen why the doctrine adverted to should not be followed.

Wherefore, the appealed order of dismissal is reversed, and the
records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.