G.R. No. L-6294. June 28, 1954

On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga by Luis Santos-Yñigo and his wife for the
adoption of a minor named Marcial Eleuterio Resaba. It is alleged that
the legitimate parents of said minor have given their consent to the
adoption in a document which was duly signed by them on March 20, 1950,
and that since then petitioners had reared and cared for the minor as
if he were their own. It is likewise alleged that petitioners are
financially and morally able to bring up and educate the minor.

By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the
Solicitor General who, in due time, filed a written opposition on the
ground that petitioners have two legitimate children, a boy and a girl,
who are still minors, and as such they are disqualified to adopt under
the provisions of the new Civil Code.

The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have
two legitimate children of their own, yet said children were born after
the agreement for adoption was executed by petitioners and the parents
of the minor. The court found that said agreement was executed before
the new Civil Code went into effect and while the petition may not be
granted under this new Code, it may be sanctioned under the old because
it contains no provision which prohibits adoption in the form and
manner agreed upon by the parties. From this decision, the Solicitor
General took the present appeal.

The errors assigned by the Solicitor General are:

“I

“The lower court erred in granting the petition to
adopt in violation of the provisions of paragraph 1, article 335, new
Civil Code.

“II

“The lower court erred in giving Exhibit ‘A’, the agreement to adopt, a binding effect.”

There is merit in the contention that the petition should not be
granted in view of the prohibition contained in article 335, paragraph
1, of the new Civil Code. This article provides that persons who have
legitimate children cannot adopt, and there is no doubt about its
application because the petition was filed on June 24, 1952 and at that
time petitioners had two legitimate children, one a boy born on
November 12, 1950 and the other, a girl born on April 13, 1952. This
case therefore comes squarely within the prohibition. This prohibition
is founded on sound moral grounds. The purpose of adoption is to afford
to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one
by creating, through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and
filiation where none exists by blood relationship. This purpose rejects
the idea of adoption by persons who have children of their own, for,
otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences may arise resulting
from the infiltration of foreign element into a family which already
counts with children upon whom the parents can shower their paternal
love and affection (2 Manresa, 6th ed., 108-109). This moral
consideration must have influenced the framers of the new Civil Code
when they reiterated therein this salutary provision.

But it is contended, this prohibition in the new Civil Code cannot
have application to the present case because, to do so, as it is now
attempted, would impair the acquired right of petitioners over the
adopted child in violation of the transitory provisions of article 2252
of said Code. It is pointed out that petitioners reared and took care
of the child, since February 24, 1950, and on March 20, 1950 they and
the parents of the child executed the adoption agreement in accordance
with the Rules of Court, and since these rules do not forbid adoption
to. persons who have legitimate children, that agreement shall be given
full effect in the same manner as any other contract which is not
contrary to law, morals and public order.

We find no merit in this contention. While the adoption agreement
was executed at the time when the law applicable to adoption is Rule
100 of the Rules of Court and that rule does not prohibit persons who
have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to the
proposition that such agreement has the effect of establishing the
relation of paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the
sanction of court. The reason is simple. Rule 100 has taken the place
of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (sections 765-772,
inclusive), which in turn replaced the provisions of the Spanish Civil
Code on adoption. (Articles 173-180.) As was stated in one case, said
chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure “appears to be a complete
enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the
expression of the whole law thereof. So. viewed, that chapter must be
deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the
matter.” (In re adoption of Emiliano Guzman, 73 Phil., 51.)
Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring to adopt a
minor shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the
province where he resides (section 1). This means that the only valid
adoption in this jurisdiction is that one made through court, or in
pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule, which shows that the
agreement under consideration can not have the effect of adoption as
now pretended by petitioners.

Some members of the Court have advanced the opinion that,
notwithstanding the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure or the
adoption of the present Rules of Court concerning adoption, those
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in nature
cannot be considered as having been impliedly repealed, such as the one
providing that a person who has a legitimate child is prohibited to
adopt (article 74). But the majority is of the opinion that the repeal
is complete as declared by this Court in the case of In re adoption of Emiliano Guzman, supra.
At any rate, this matter is not now of any consequence considering the
fact that when the adoption agreement was executed the petitioners had
not yet any legitimate child. Their children were born subsequent to
that agreement.

We are sympathetic to the plea of equity of counsel considering the
fact that petitioners had taken custody of the child and had reared and
educated him as their own much prior to the approval of the new Civil
Code and that all this was done with the consent of the natural parents
to promote the welfare and happiness of the child, but the inexonerable
mandate of the law forbids us from adopting a different course of
action. Our duty is to interpret and apply the law as we see it in
accordance with sound rules of statutory construction.

The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur