G.R. No. 15742. January 31, 1961
MIGUEL TOLENTINO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CIRILO P. BAYLOSIS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Case No. CA-G.R. No. 19432-R, an appeal taken to it from the decision
of April 19, 1956 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its
Civil Case No. 67, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for damages, with
costs, on the ground that the whole issue therein involved is one of
law.
Devoid of unessentials, the records disclose that in
Civil Case No. 79 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas entitled
Jose Ruiz, et al. vs. Cirilo J. Baylosis, et al., for the
annulment of certain certificates of title and recovery of damages,
herein appellant Miguel Tolentino appeared as counsel for the
plaintiffs, while appellee was the attorney of record for the
defendants. In a pleading captioned “Reply to Answer on Counterclaim”
and filed in that case, appellee made the following allegations:
“Paragraph 2—
subpar. (b)—That for the death of the said five plaintiffs, defendant
has nothing to do nor to answer or account for, but would rather state
that the cause of their death may be due to the will of God, or due to
the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader and
counsel, * * *.
subpar. (c)—That on the basis of
Atty. Miguel Tolentino (sic.), a deceased plaintiff is claiming from
defendant an amount of P28,591 and giving allowance of another 2 who
may die, so he is asking for P200,000.00. This amount is indeed too big
and must be a wealth to anyone who has it; that when Atty. Tolentino
made this allegation, he must be certainly not of his sual mind,
otherwise with his old age, and long practice of law, he would have not
dared to make such fictitious and malicious claim, and knowingly that
this Honorable Court is not the place for very exaggerated and
unreasonable demand in order to give troubles and worries to defendant;
subpar.
(d), sub-sec. (3)—That the defendant for being the victorious party in
the said case and Atty. Miguel Tolentino, one of the losing counsels in
said case, must be the one who is still liable for the damages
sustained by defendant;“Paragraph 4—
subpar.
(c)—Before the public, attorney Tolentino cannot be judged as a
prominent attorney or a bright attorney for his several failures in the
bar and his several losses of his cases are not in his favor.
subpar. (d)—Defendant had seen Atty. Tolentino appeared before the
Honorable Supreme Court on January 24, 1955 in a certain argument on
certiorari case, entitled Luis Baylosis, et al., petitioners, vs.
Agapito Alejar, et al., respondents, and in that argument Atty.
Tolentino was badly humiliated because of his lack of knowledge of law
and unpreparedness. On that same moment he perspired much despite the
fact that the chamber was cool because of air conditioning. Again in
the hearing of a certain injunction case at Batangas, Batangas, before
the Honorable Judge E. Soriano, Atty. Tolentino lost against the fiscal
and other lawyers. It is therefore the contention of the defendant,
that the caliber and standing of Atty. Miguel Tolentino is not the type
of attorney who can demand a professional service of ten thousand
pesos, and in the honest belief of defendant, Atty. Tolentino is a
counsel for just five hundred pesos in the event that plaintiff wins
this case, and that damages is allowed by the Honorable Court, which of
course is believed to be remote to happen before the Court.”
Urging that the statements aforequoted are libelous and derogatory to
his character and reputation as a known lawyer, as a former high
government official and employee, and as a citizen of good standing in
the community, appellant initiated these proceedings and seeks to
recover from the appellee the sum of P100,000.00 as actual and moral
damages.
Appellee does not deny having made the allegations
complained of, but advances the defense that said remarks were not
libelous, and granting that they were, the same were privileged
communications. In fact, appellee asserts a counterclaim for
P105,000.00, representing actual damages and attorney’s fees allegedly
caused to him by appellant’s own defamatory statements levelled against
his (appellee’s) person.
Both complaint and counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court. However, only the plaintiff appealed.
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the decisive issue calls
only for a determination of whether or not appellee’s statements as
above reproduced constitute a valid cause of action for damages. This
question was not in our opinion, properly solved in the negative by the
trial court.
It is the generally accepted rule that counsel,
parties, or witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander
for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial
proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with, or
relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of
inquiry (see 53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parreño, et al., G. R. No. L-12545, April 30, 1959, and authorities cited therein). For, as aptly observed in one case,[1]
“while the doctrine of privileged communications is liable to be
abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal
sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far
greater hardships.”
And the test of relevancy has been stated thus:
“*
* * As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make
alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule.
The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably
wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that
matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every
case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must,
however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the
subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in
the course of the trial. * * *” (Ruling Case Law, vol. 17, p. 336,
quoted with approval in Smith Bell & Co. vs. Ellis, 48 Phil., 475, 581-582)“In
the earliest of the leading cases on the subject the words used in
determining the extent of matter that may be absolutely privileged were
‘relevant’ or ‘pertinent’, but these words have in a measure a
technical meaning, and perhaps they are not the best words that could
be used. So some courts have preferred the use of the words ‘have in
reference’, ‘having relation to the cause or subject matter’, or ‘made
with reference’; and strict legal materiality or relevancy is not
required to confer the privileges. There is difficulty in determining
in some cases what is relevant or pertinent and in deciding the
question the courts are liberal, and the privilege embraces anything
that may possibly be pertinent or which has enough appearance of
connection with the case so that a reasonable man might think it
relevant. All doubt should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or
pertinency, and for the purposes of relevancy the court will assume the
alleged slanderous charges to be true, however, false they may have
been in fact.” (53 C. J. S., pp. 171-172)
Applying the above rule to the case at bar, there is little doubt but
that the alleged defamatory remarks of counsel herein complained of, in
paragraph 4 of his reply (already quoted), can not be the basis of an
action for damages. It appears that, among the issues involved in Civil
Case No. 79 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, was the
propriety of recovering damages allegedly caused by herein appellee,
among others, to the plaintiffs therein, including, but not limited to,
herein appellant’s claim for attorney’s fees. Thus, appellant himself
had laid open the pertinency not only of the amount of damages
supposedly due to the plaintiffs, but, likewise, appellant’s own
standing as a lawyer by reason of his claim for attorney’s fees in the
amount of P10,000.00. Although the language used by the appellee in the
paragraph referred to was undoubtedly strong, it was made in legitimate
defense of his own and his client’s interests, and we can not say that
the statements in his pleadings concerning appellant’s standing and1
ability as counsel were irrelevant or impertinent. Hence, such remarks
must be deemed absolutely privileged.
However, the relevancy
(and, therefore, the privileged character) of appellee’s statements
made in paragraph 3, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), of his “Reply to
Answer on Counterclaim” is not as apparent as those made by him in
paragraph 4, heretofore discussed. The averments in subparagraph (b)
that the cause of death of plaintiffs’ decedents—
“may be due to the will of God or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader and counsel”
were evidently a conjecture that had no place in a pleading, which is well understood to be limited to statements of fact.
Equally irrelevant are the allegations complained of in subparagraph
(c) of paragraph 2 of the reply of appellee, in response to the
counterclaim for damages. The averment that attorney Tolentino
(appellant) was “not of his usual mind” in making the claim, “otherwise
with his old age and long practice of law, he would have not dared to
make such fictitious and malicious claim” is certainly not relevant or
pertinent to the issue whether the damages asked were true or untrue.
These damages were asked for not by the appellant, but by his clients;
hence their counsel’s state of mind is not, and could not be a proper
subject of inquiry.
As pointed out by the Court in Anonymous vs. Trenkman, et al., 48 Fed. (2d) 571, 574—
“The
pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of the
material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. * *
* If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and
alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege.”
Without this limitation to the immunity enjoyed by pleadings, the same
could be easily diverted from their original aim to succinctly inform
the court of the issues in litigation, and perverted into a vehicle for
airing charges motivated by personal rancour. That such misuse of
judicial proceedings must be firmly and resolutely discouraged and
curbed by Courts needs no demonstration.
It appears,
however, that the appellant herein was libeled by way of retaliation,
because three days previously, appellant Tolentino, in a counterclaim
filed against appellee Baylosis, had personally attacked the latter in
the following passage (Rec. App., p. 46-47)—
“Defendant
Baylosis has been the Vice-President of the “Samahang Magbubukid.” The
prevailing and tempting “motto” of this organization is that the tenant
must not leave the lands tilled by them because the same belong to them
in their own right. It is highly inconceivable now how could the
defendant trample upon the only chance of the plaintiffs to own the
lands in question, in gross violation of the “motto” of his own
organization on which a Huk or PKM organization at that, according to
this Honorable Court in Crim. Case No. 10898, People vs. Ceferino Inciong, Cirilo P. Baylosis et al., for inciting to sedition and in Criminal Case No. 510, People vs. F. Buhay for libel.”
Considering that it was appellant here who first libeled appellee,
although the latter did not appeal the dismissal of his own claim for
damages; that appellant, therefore, did not really come to court with
clean hands; that no adequate evidence exists that appellant suffered
material damage; and that indulging in offensive personalities in the
course of judicial proceedings constitutes highly unprofessional
conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof
be privileged, we find no reversible error in the dismissal of
appellant’s damage claim by the Court below.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
[1] Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil., 919 quoting from Abbot vs. National Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409.