DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the special administrator of
the testate estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public
auction certain personal properties left by the deceased.

It
appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956,
by a petition presented by Dora Perkins Anderson for the probate of the
supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who
died in Manila on April 28, 1956 allegedly possessed of personal and
real properties with a probable value of P5,000,000. On the same date
of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins
Anderson also filed an urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso
Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same
day, the court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such
special administrator upon his posting of a bond in the amount of
P50,600. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the
deceased, entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented by
petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On September 28, 1956, the special
administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets, which have come
to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at
the time of his death.

About two yeans later, or on
September 4, 1958, the special administrator submitted to the court a
petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or
educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left
by the deceased, such as clones, books, gadgets, electrical appliances,
etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value,
in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever
value might be obtained in their disposition. When the motion was heard
on September 25, 1958, the court required the administration to submit
a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in compliance
therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted to
the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the
personal properties belonging to the estate with the items .sought to
be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said
items were too voluminous to enumerate.

On July 9, 1956,
Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale. Reasons
for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be
sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and
(2) that unauthorized removals of fine pieces of furniture belonging to
the estate had been made.

The opposition notwithstanding,
the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the proposed sale,
authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor Idonah
Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that
said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the
entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, sec. 2,
Rules of Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that
the goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to
Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty sought to
be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor;
(4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals
from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot
would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and
(5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor’s separate rights to
a substantial part of the personal estate.

On February 23,
1959, the lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration.
Whereupon oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to this court.

Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold
not being perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority
to sell them. This argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81,
of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special
administrator “may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold” which shows that the special administrator’s power to sell is not limited to “perishable” property only.

It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular
administrator is appointed (sec. 2, Rule 81; De Gala vs. Gonzales, 53 Phil., 104; Collins vs. Henry, 118 S. E. 729, 155 Ga. 886; Sqydelko vs.
Smith’s Estate, 244 M. W. 149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is not alone the
specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value
as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special
administrator of perishable property (Gao vs. Cascade Silver
Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 1092, 66 Mont. 488). It is in line
with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not
only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2,
Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell “other property as
the court ordered sold”.

There is, however, a serious
obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous opposition
presented thereto by the appellant, the surviving spouse of the
deceased, on the ground that she is allegedly entitled to a large
portion of the personal properties in question, either because they
were conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because they are
her own exclusive, personal property. Indeed the records show that up
to the time the proposed sale was asked for and judicially approved, no
proceedings had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the
alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of
the estate supposedly left by the deceased, or to liquidate the
conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the
deceased. Until, therefore, the issue of the ownership of the
properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal
partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with
appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would
not mind being sold to preserve their value, the proposed sale is
clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought to be
sold—pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical
appliances, various gadgets, and Books—can easily be protected and
preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of
the two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City) left by the
deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed
sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of
oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial
portion of the personal estate in question.

The special
administrator claims in his brief that the oppositor-appellant should
have indicated the alleged “fine furniture” which she did not want sold
and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious
claim. But it does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable
opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not want
sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion
for reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled by
the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her
opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even, show that an
inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

Wherefore, the lower courts order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the
special administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate
is set aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso
Ponce Enrile and petitioner-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.