G. R. No. L-10807. May 30, 1957

Vitaliano M. Cruz was a member of the Police Department of the City of  Manila and way back  in  August, 1941, a criminal information for extortion was filed against him in the Court of  First Instance  of Manila,  entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vitaliano M. Cruz—No. 65940 of said Court.   On August 28, 1941, this  defendant deposited with Sgt.  Narciso Cabrera   (now deceased)  of Precinct No. 1 of the Manila Police Department, a  cash bail bond in the sum  of P500 for his provisional liberty (Official  Receipt No. M-181276-Annex A).   World  War II broke out without the case having  ever been heard or tried.  After liberation  it appeared  that  the  records of the case had been destroyed and an attempt to reconstitute said criminal case proved to be fruitless, as the records of both the Office  of  the City Fiscal and  of the Clerk of the Court  of First Instance of Manila had nothing to show about the  same.   So the  reconstitution proceedings  had to be, as they were, dismissed on July 9, 1946, by former Judge Emilio Pefia (now Justice of the Court of Appeals), as having been  abandoned.  After that dismissal Vitaliano M. Cruz sought the aid of several persons and officers of the government to secure the refund to him of said amount of  P500,  and  his efforts  being  in  vain,  he filed on September 22,  1952,  in the Municipal Court of Manila against the City of Manila et  al.  Civil Case  No. 22632 to recover the  amount of said bail  of P500.  The  case was assigned to Branch IV thereof, presided over by Hon. Crisanto Aragon, who dismissed it on October 6,  1952.

Then on February 2,  1953,  the  same complaint  was refiled in said court (docketed as  Civil Case No.  24704), which  was again  assigned to the same Branch presided over by said Judge Crisanto Aragon,  who dismissed  the second complaint on June 30,  1953.

On November 29, 1954, again plaintiff filed for the third time the same  complaint in the same court (docketed as Civil Case No. 34983), this time assigned  to Branch III presided over  by  Judge Estrella Abad   Santos.  Upon written  motion to dismiss filed by defendants therein, on the proposition that the complaint  stated no  cause of action,  supplemented by oral argument  at the  hearing thereof,  which counsel for the plaintiff failed to answer, on January 19, 1955, the Court dismissed the third complaint in  the following language:

“On January 12, 1955, the counsel for tile plaintiff was given until January 17th of this year within which  to submit his written reply to the motion to dismiss filed by the counsel for the defendant. However,  until the present  time, he has failed to do so.
After a careful consideration  of the  said motion to dismiss as well as the oral argument advanced by Assistant  Fiscal Abelardo M,  Dayrit in support  of said motion, the  Court finds  the  motion to dismiss to be  well  founded.
Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this case be, as it is hereby, dismissed.  Without pronouncement as to costs.”

Plaintiff  did  not appeal from this order of  dismissal, but instead he filed  on March 4, 1955, with  the Municipal Court of Manila, Branch I, the same complaint against the same defendants to  attain the same purpose of recovering said cash bond he  alleges to have deposited with Sgt. Narciso  Cabrera in  the  sum of P500 for his provisional liberty in  said  Criminal Case No.  65940 of the  Court of First Instance of Manila.  In his complaint he prays the Court to sentence the defendants  to pay him  said sum of P500  with legal  interests until  fully paid, plus P300 as plaintiff’s damages and P100 for attorney’s  fees, and the costs of the suit.

On March 24, 1955, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that (1) the  complaint stated no  cause of action  against the defendants; and (2) that the action had been barred by a prior  judgment.  After due consideration of the  reasons,  pro and  con, of the motion to dismiss as submitted by both parties,  Judge Ramon A. Icasiano, presiding over said Branch 1, held that the action had been already barred by a prior judgment which constituted res adjudicata and dismissed the case without pronouncement as  to  costs.  After the  motion for  reconsideration was denied plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance where the defendants-appellees again submitted  a  motion to dismiss based  on the ground that the  Court had  no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, the decision  of the Municipal  Court of Manila, Branch III,  in the identical Civil Case  No. 34983,  dated January 19, 1955,  having already become final, constituted in effect a prior judgment which barred the institution of the  action now here  on appeal.  After hearing of the motion the  Court of First Instance of Manila  held that none of  the reasons  alleged by  the Fiscal in the motion to dismiss the appeal from the order of the Municipal Court are the grounds provided by  law for dismissing, the appeal; consequently, the Court overruled the motion to dismiss the appeal but  gave the parties time to be their respective memoranda in support of the question raised  in the appeal, to wit: whether  or not  the  case  was  correctly dismissed  by the  Municipal Court  of Manila by order of March 30, 1955, which was then before the Court ad quem for review in accordance with Section 10, Rule 40, of the Rules of  Court.

Once the parties had  submitted the memoranda required of them, the Court by order of September 22, 1955, affirmed the  order  of Judge Ramon A.  Icasiano  dismissing the present case with costs against the plaintiff.  From said ruling plaintiff  appealed to  the Court  of  Appeals which Tribunal certified the same  to  this Court for the  reason that the only question  raised in the appeal is purely  of law.

In this instance counsel for the appellant maintains that:

“The lower court erred in holding that the order of dismissal of Tudg’e Estrella  Abad Santos  of tile Municipal Court of  Manila, dated January 19, 1955, was adjudication upon the merits  and the same is a bar to the  filing  of a subsequent action for the same cause.”

It will be remembered that in the inferior court counsel for defendants based his motion to dismiss on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the complaint states  no cause of action against the defendants;  and (2)  that  the present action had been barred by a prior judgment, although in his order of dismissal Judge Icasiano relied only on the latter ground.

Although the first two complaints filed by appellant in the Municipal Court of Manila might be  considered as dismissed without  prejudice,  the third  complaint  (Civil Case No. 34983 of the Municipal Court of Manila, Branch III, presided  over  by Judge Estrella Abad Santos)  was dismissed after due consideration and adjudication of the issues raised in the case.   Such dismissal, therefore, cannot come  within the provisions  of Section  12, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court, but  of Sections 3 and  4, Rule 30, of the same  Rules of Court, which provide  the following:

“Sec.  3. Failure to Prosecute.—When plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the  trial or  to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length  of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the  court, the action may be dismissed upon motion  of the defendant or upon the court’s own  motion. The dismissal still have the  effect of an adjudication upon  the merits, unless  otherwise provided by the court,“

“Sec. 4. Effect of Dismissal on Other Grounds.—Unless otherwise ordered by the  court  any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack  of jurisdiction  operates as an adjudication upon  the merits”

As appeal’s  from the order of Judge Estrella Abad Santos, counsel for the plaintiff in said  case  No. 34983 of the Municipal Court failed to submit his written reply to the motion  to   dismiss  of  the  counsel  for  the  defendants, despite the  fact that he  was required and given a period within which  to do  so,  and that upon such failure said Judge proceeded to consider the motion to dismiss as well as the oral  arguments advanced by  Fiscal  Dayrit in support of said motion, and then dismissed  the case as prayed for by the defendants.  Consequently, in the light of these circumstances and  of the provisions of Sections 3 and  4  of Rule 30 just quoted, there can be no dispute that said third complaint was dismissed  after  due consideration of the issues raised therein  and, therefore,  said  dismissal must have the effect of an adjudication  upon the  merits of the case.
 
It may be said, as appellant does say,  that Rule 30  on “Dismissal of Actions”  refers  to  procedure in the  courts of first-instance, but this argument is of no  consequence, because Section 19, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court (regarding “Procedure  in Inferior Courts”)  prescribes  that certain rules, among  which Rule 30 is expressly indicated,  “are applicable in inferior courts in cases falling  within their jurisdiction and in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.”
 
The order of Judge Icasiano holding that  “the present action has already been barred  by a proper judgment and therefore  constitutes res adjudicata“, was affirmed by the Court a quo in the following language:

“This order of dismissal (referring to the order of  Judge TCstrella Abad Santos) constitutes, in tile opinion of the Court, an adjudication upon the merits.  The  same was not based  on default,  neither it is a dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to  appear under  Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. • • •.
 
“The failure of the plaintiff to answer the motion to dismiss does not constitute failure to appear in  answer to  the  summons and consequently the dismissal  of  the  case will  bar the  filing  oi  a subsequent action for the  same cause.  The order of dismissal  of Judge Estrella Abad Santos is different from the order of dismissal contemplated in  Section 12,  Rule 4,  of the Rules of Court, and her order operates as an adjudication’ of the case on the merits.”

We are in full accord with  these  findings  of  both the inferior and lower courts.
 
In view of  this conclusion We  do  not  need to discuss any more the other ground for dismissal of  the case as submitted by defendants’ counsel, to wit:  that the complaint states no cause of action against  them.   We  may briefly state,  however,  that said  ground was  also  well taken, because as contended by counsel for  the defendants:  (1)

according to General Rule No. 3,  dated January 25, 1930, the bail bond plaintiff furnished for his temporary release during the pendency  of said criminal case, became part of the insular  funds,  not funds  of  the City of  Manila; hence neither defendant City of Manila  nor its co-defendant officers can be  held liable to refund the same even after the’ alleged termination of his criminal case before  the Court  of First  Instance of Manila; and (2) the said cash bail  bond  being a pre-war deposit  which  remained  unsettled or  unliquidated  soon after the war  and until  the present, clearly and truly constituted part of a, government account declared frozen by  virtue of Executive Order  No. 25 of  the President of. the Philippines.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs in  all three instances against plaintiff. It  is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L., and  Endencia, JJ., concur. .