PILAR DOMINGO VDA. DE BUHAY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CARMEN COBARRUBIAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
ordering the defendant to vacate the upper part of the house located at 563
Legarda, Manila, and to pay to the plaintiff the rents, from February 1945 until
the premises are vacated, at the rate of P27.50 a month, and the costs.

For some years previous to 1945 the defendant had been occupying the premises
in question, paying a monthly rent therefor to the plaintiff and her
predecessors in interest. On February 8, 1945, the plaintiff, having lost her
residence on Soler street, notified the defendant to vacate the said premises.
The defendant not only failed and refused to do so but likewise failed to pay
the rents for the months of February and March 1945, for which reasons the
plaintiff commenced in the Municipal Court of Manila this action, which.in the
course of time was appealed to the Court of First Instance, with the result
already indicated above.

In her first assignment of error the appellant invokes article 1566 of the
Civil Code, which reads as follows:

“Art. 1566. If, on the expiration of the contract, the lessee, with the
acquiescence of the lessor, continues for fifteen days to enjoy the thing
leased, it shall be deemed that there has been an implied renewal for the time
mentioned in Articles 1577 and 1581, unless notice to vacate has previously been
given.”

Appellant’s argument is that she having been permitted by the appellee to
occupy the premises in question during the months of February and March, there
was an implied renewal of the contract under the article above quoted. This
contention is clearly untenable. Under article 1581 of the Civil Code, in the
absence of an agreement as to the duration of the lease it is understood as
being from month to month when the rent is on a monthly basis, and “the lease
shall terminate without necessity of a special notice, upon the expiration of
the term.” (Estrella vs. Sangalang, p. 108, ante.) Moreover,
the trial court found, and we find no basis in the record upon which to reverse
its finding, that on February 8 the plaintiff, “braving the perils incident to
the war,” went to the defendant and told her to pay the rent for that month and
vacate the premises. There is therefore the additional consideration in this
case that the plaintiff had given the defendant notice to vacate before
commencing the action. Furthermore, the defendant admits having failed to pay
the rents corresponding to February and March 1945. Hence plaintiff’s right to
eject the defendant is indisputable.

In her second assignment of error the defendant and appellant contends that
the trial court should have held that under the circumstances of emergency and
as a matter of equity she cannot be deprived of the possession of the leased
premises. A similar contention was advanced by the appellant and rejected by
this Court in the case of Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. vs.
Prudencio, (p. 111, ante). In the instant case the defendant has been
unlawfully withholding from the plaintiff the possession of the premises in
question for more than a year; and the plaintiff pleads before us that she was
compelled to bring the present action not so much to collect the rent as to
acquire a place where she and her nine children could live, “they being victims
of the general conflagration occasioned by the Japanese armed forces upon the
liberation of Manila,” and that “the said appellee is a widow who, but for the
accommodation extended to her by her sister-in-law, with her nine children would
be sleeping in the streets.”

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

De Joya, Perfecto, Hilado,
and Bengzon, JJ., concur.