G. R. No. L-9683. May 30, 1957

Petitioner Quezon Ong Tan  alias Wellington Tan  was born  in  Cebu  City,  Philippines, on June 10, 1922 (Exh/ A—Alien Certificate of Registration;  Exh,  B—Immigrant Certificate of Residence,  and Exh. G—-Birth  Certificate), of Chinese parents.  He married Emiliana  Go  (Exh.  B—marriage contract) who before her marriage to petitioner was a  Filipino  citizen.   As  a result of  their  wedlock petitioner had three  children  Wellington  Tan,  Jr., Richard  Tan and  Samuel  Tan—the eldest of whom is  G years and the youngest 4 years old.   Petitioner has been residing  in this  country  since  birth, or for the  last 30 odd years,  never having  gone out of the  Philippines to any foreign land and intending to  remain for the  rest of  his  natural life in this country,  he  having no  more relatives  in China because his  6  brothers  and 2  sisters, as  well as  his parents, are already  living in  the Philippines.   He speaks and writes English and Visayan Cebuaro dialect  and is  actually engaged in business as owner of the  Lam  Chan  Trading Co.  of  Cebu  City  (Exh.  Q), with an  annual  income  of P5,000.00, more or less.  In short,  the record shows that  he has  all the qualifications prescribed by law and none of the  disqualifications enumerated  in  the  Revised Naturalization  Act  for being a  Filipino citizen.

As stated in  the  petition,  the  applicant did  not file the declaration  of intention  prescribed  in  Section  5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,  for he  claims  to be  exempt from such requisite for  having been born in the  Philippines and received his primary and secondary education in  schools recognized by the Government and  not limited to  any race or  nationality and resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more  than 30 years before filing his application  herein.

After the usual court proceedings the case was heard in the Court of First Instance of Cebu where the petition for naturalization was filed on September 30,  1952, after which the  Court rendered  decision  the dispositive part of  which  is as  follows:

“In View Thereof, and  it appearing that notwithstanding the publication  of this petition  in the  Official  Gazette  (Exh. E— Certificate  of publication) as well as in the  local newspaper ‘La Prensa’, of general circulation in  the City of Cebu and  elsewhere.  (Exh. F-affidavit of publication; Exhs. F-1 to F-3, corresponding newspaper  clipping’s), nobody has  appeared  to  contest the same, except the Provincial Fiscal on behalf of the Solicitor General, this Court hereby declares petitioner Quezon  Ong Tan alias Wellington Tan a citizen of the Philippines.   This order or pronouncement, however,  shall not be executory until  after the (lapse of)  two  (2) years  from its promulgation, and the Court, on proper hearing, with attendance of the  Solicitor General or his representative,  shall  have satisfied and  so finds that  during  said intervening  time said applicant  (1)   has  not left the  Philippines;  (2)  has  dedicated  himself  continuously  to a lawful calling  or profession; (3)   has  not been convicted  of any offense  or violation  of Government promulgated  rules; nor (4)  committed an  act prejudicial to  the interests  of the nation   or contrary to any  Government announced policies.”

From this decision the Solicitor General appealed, maintaining that the  lower Court  erred:

1. In  not  finding that  the  petitioner-appellee  has  failed   to comply with the  prerequisite of filing a declaration of intention to become a citizen  of the Philippines in accordance with  Section 5  of  the Revised  Naturalization  Law  (Commonwealth Act No. 47S);  and
2.   In granting  Philippine citizenship to  the herein petitioner- appellee.

After  counsel for petitioner-appellee had submitted his brief  in  this case, he  filed on  August 29, 1956,  a motion to dismiss the appeal  and for affirmance of the  judgment of  the lower Court, alleging  that  on August  18,  1956, petitioner filed  a  declaration of intention with  the office of  the  Solicitor  General  (Annex A), thus  causing the ground of the  appeal to  become  purely academic.   This motion  was  opposed  by the   Solicitor  General on the ground that according to law said  declaration  of  intention should have  been filed  “one  year prior  to the  filing of his petition  for admission  to  Philippine  citizenship”, and  that the belated filing  of said  declaration  of  intention could not cure the defect of his petition for naturalization.   By  resolution of September 17,  1956, this  Court resolved to defer  action on this point  until consideration of the case  upon  the  merits.

The  solution  of this  case depends  on  Our  determination of the  only  question  at  issue  in this  appeal, i.e., of whether,  under  the circumstances appearing of  record, petitioner is or is  not exempt  from filing the  declaration of intention prescribed  in  Section  5.  of Commonwealth Act  No. 473.   Section 6 of this Act reads  as follows:

“Sec.  6. PERSONS EXEMPT FROM REQUIREMENT TO MAKE A DECLARATION OF  INTENTION.—Persons  born in  the Philippines and have  received their  primary  and secondary education  in  public schools  or those  recognized by  the  Government  and not  limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in  the  Philippines for  a period of  thirty years or more before filing their application, may  be naturalised without having  to make,  a  declaration of intention upon  complying with the other  requirements of this Act.   To such requirements  shall  be added  that which establishes  that the applicant has given primary and secondary  education to all his  children in the public schools or  in private schools  recognized by  the   Government and  not limited  to any race or nationality.  The  same children of an alien who has declaied his intention to become a citizen  of the Philippines and dies before he  is actually naturalized.  (As  amended by  Commonwealth. Act No. 535)”

The  petitioner himself states  in his  petition  that  he has filed no  declaration of  intention because  he is exempt therefrom.   The Solicitor General, however,  submits:

“That he is not among  those  exempted from filing a declaration of intention, for it is  obvious  that there was no compliance with the additional  requirement of school  enrollment of all his children, as stated above.  It may be argued, however, how  can petitioner- appellee enroll his  children  when  they are not yet  of school age? One answer  is that the law does not  concede any  exception and, therefore, petitioner-appellee is not exempted to make a declaration of  intention  (Sec. 6).

In  other words,  it  is  the  contention of the oppositor that  petitioner  is  duty  bound to  file the declaration  of intention because he  cannot  state  in the application  that he  has  given  primary  and  secondary  education  to all his children  in the  public schools  or in  private  schools recognized  by  the  Government  and  not  limited  to  any

race or nationality,  for that is  not the case with him. This contention is far from being tenable,  for  counsel for the oppositor forgets  that the additional requirement of said Section 6 of the Revised Naturalization Act, “which establishes that  the applicant  has  given  primary  and secondary  education  to all  his  children in  the  public schools, etc.”   refers only to children  of school age, as made clear in  Section 2,  paragraph 6  of said Act.  The Solicitor General cites  numerous decisions of this Court to strengthen his arguments, but  all  said decisions  lay down general principles that are to be followed in naturalization cases, but none of them is in  point to the facts under  consideration.

During the deliberation of this ease one of the members     of the  Court noted  that  the petitioner identifies  himself as Quezon Ong Tan alias Wellington Tan, and remarked that under  the law  the  unauthorized use of aliases is forbidden  and  penalized.  Section  1  of Commonwealth Act  No. 142 prescribes:

“Section 1.  Except  as  pseudonyms  for literary  purposes,  no person shall  use  any name  different from the one  with which  he  was  christened or by which he  has been known since his childhood; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court.  The name  shall comprise  the  patronymic  name  and one  or two surnames.” The Civil Code also provides:

“Art. 379. The employment  of  pen  names or  stage names  is permitted, provided it is done in  good faith and there is  no injury to  third  persons.   Pen  names and stage names cannot be usurped.”

“Art. 380. Except as provided in the preceding article, no person shall use  different names and surnames.” The  Solicitor General has not objected to  the use by petitioner of his aforementioned  alias and the record does not  shed any  light  as to whether  the use  of said  alias was duly  authorized  or  not; so  We  cannot under the circumstances  declare that the  use  by  petitioner of the alias  “Wellington. Tan” is proper  or improper.

Considering  the conclusion  arrived at in this  case, We do not need to pass  upon petitioner’s  motion to  dismiss the appeal.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. We order, however,  that  when letters  of citizenship be issued to the petitioner, the same  should be in the name of  Quezon  Ong  Tan only, which  is considered sufficient to identify him.  No  costs.   It is  so  ordered.

Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor,  Reyes,  A.  Bautista Angelo,  Labrador,  Conception, Reyes,  J. B.  L.,  and Endencia,  JJ.,  concur.