ANDRES R. CAMASURA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE PROVOST MARSHAL, MPC., DAVAO, ETC., RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

The petition in this case was filed after petitioner had appealed against an
order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, denying his petition to be
released from confinement in a case of habeas corpus instituted in June, 1946.
(Camasura vs. Provost Marshal, p. 131, ante.)

Two questions are raised in this case: first, whether or not the pardon
granted to petitioner on September 4, 1944, by the Japanese Imperial Government
through the Vice-Admiral in command of the Davao base is valid and should be
given effect; and second, whether, notwithstanding the existence of the appealed
case coming from the Court of First Instance of Davao, petitioner can still file
and proceed with the petition in this case.

But in view of the result we have arrived at in the first case (the one
proceeding from Davao, Camasura vs. Provost Marshal, supra,
wherein we have ordered the immediate release from confinement of petitioner,
which is the same remedy he is seeking in this case), there is no need of
passing upon said questions.

This case having become a moot one, the petition is dismissed.

Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
Moran, C.J., and Paras, J., concur in the result.

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result for the reasons set
forth in my dissent in the case of Camasura vs. Provost Marshal (p. 131,
ante).

---

FERIA, J.:

I concur in the dismissal of the petition filed in this case, but I dissent
from the reason given by the majority for said dismissal. The majority opinion
or reason is that, the petitioner having been released by this court in the case
of habeas corpus No. 874 appealed to this court, there is no need of passing
upon the merits of the petition, that is, “this case has become a moot
case.”

The undersigned is of the opinion that whatever may have been the outcome of
the appeal above referred to, the original petition for habeas corpus filed by
the petitioner in this case must be dismissed, because a previous petition for
habeas corpus having been filed by the petitioner in the Court of First Instance
of Davao in the case of G. R. No. L-874, which was pending appeal in this
Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
habeas corpus on the same ground filed in the present case G. R. No. L-1164.

Under section 2, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court, a Court of First Instance
as well as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court may grant a writ of habeas
corpus, that is, said courts have concurrent jurisdiction to grant a petition
for habeas corpus. It is a familiar principle that when two or more courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over a case, the first acquiring jurisdiction will
acquire it exclusively or with the exclusion of others; and, therefore, a
petition for habeas corpus on one and the same ground cannot originally be filed
with, considered and acted on by, all cf them, that is a Court of First
Instance, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. Otherwise, conflicting decisions
may be obtained from said courts, and the petitioner would be free to abide by
the resolution which is favorable to him and disregard what is unfavorable; and
the provision of section 18, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court which provides for
appeal in habeas corpus cases would be a superfluity, because, instead of taking
an appeal from the judgment of a Court of First Instance denying his petition,
to this Court, the petitioner may file a new petition on the same ground with
this Court, disregarding completely the judgment of the Court of First Instance,
notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine of jus judicata is applicable
also to habeas corpus proceeding (25 American Jurisprudence, par. 156).

It
is, therefore, evident that a petition for habeas corpus having been filed by
the petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Davao, said court had
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding instituted by
the petitioner; and during the pendency of that case in the said Court of Davao
or of the appeal in this Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to
entertain another petition on the same ground for the reason above stated, and
because this Court cannot exercise original and appellate jurisdiction at one
and the same time over one and the same case, although instituted in different
proceedings.