ANDRES R. CAMASURA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE PROVOST MARSHAL, MILITARY POLICE COMMAND, DAVAO, ETC., RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

Petitioner Andres R. Camasura, was arrested in the City of Davao on June 17,
1946.

On June 28, 1946, he filed with the lower court a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus which in an order dated June 29, was registered free from court
fees, granting petitioner’s prayer that he be allowed to institute the case as a
pauper.

This case happens not to be an ordinary one. On July 1, the corresponding
writ of habeas corpus was issued, and on July 2, the respondent filed his
return. After trial, the lower court denied on July 20, 1946, the petition for
release of petitioner. The order of denial was promulgated only on July 29. On
the same day petitioner appealed to this court.

For purposes of said appeal, the stenographic notes taken at the trial,
consisting of eighteen pages, were delivered on August 12 to court stenographer
Antonio Baz, for him to transcribe, with instructions to forward the transcript
to this court. Said Stenographer’s delays in complying with the instructions
resulted in disagreeable consequences to petitioner.

The clerk of the lower court notified the parties that the records on appeal
were to be forwarded to the Supreme Court on August 12, 1946. The record is
silent as to why, notwithstanding the fact that the notice of appeal was
received by the lower court at 11.30 a. m. on July 31, 1946, no steps were taken
to give due course to the appeal until after twelve days.

On August 29, 1946, stenographer Baz was required by our clerk to forward to
this court, within ten days from notice, the transcript of the stenographic
notes taken in the case, with the warning that his failure will be reported to
the court for appropriate action.

The stenographer failed to comply with the requirement, and on October 21,
1946, we resolved to warn said stenographer that disciplinary action will be
taken against him unless he submit said transcript within ten days from
notice.

On December 2, 1946, the stenographer sent a letter to our clerk, informing
that the transcript that he had intended to forward to this court on the morning
of said day, was burned the previous night in the fire that destroyed the
building occupied by the Court of First Instance of Davao. He keeps silent as to
the stenographic notes themselves and as to whether he can transcribe them
again.

On December 9, 1946, we adopted a resolution requiring the parties to move in
the premises within five days from notice. Petitioner, after doubting the
veracity of the alleged destruction, suspecting it as another move of his
adversaries to keep him longer in confinement, ended with a general petition for
justice. Considering that the questions involved are generally, if not entirely,
of law and that the controversial points of facts can be proved and supported by
original or authentic copies of documentary evidence, in justice to the
petitioner, the Solicitor General moved that the appeal be given due course,
provided petitioner can prepare and present his brief without availing himself
of the transcript. Accordingly, the parties filed their briefs.

It may not be amiss that, impatient as to the outcome of his appeal,
petitioner filed with this court on November 11, 1946, a new petition for a writ
of habeas corpus sworn on the seventh of said month, and the case has been
pending for our decision since November 27, 1946, the date of the filing of the
Solicitor General’s memorandum.

From the evidence in the record it appears that respondent’s authority to
arrest petitioner and keep him in confinement is based on the following
communication of the Director of Prisons:

“June 14, 1946

“Sir:

“Confidential report has been received by this office to the effect that
Andres Camasura y Relacion, alias Benjamin Gelbolingo who is one of the
‘missing’ prisoners, is now residing in the City of Davao.

“This prisoner has yet a long prison term to serve. Your cooperation in
having him captured and re-committed to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa,
Rizal, is requested. A copy of his picture and descriptive record are
enclosed.

	“Respectfully,
		“ERIBERTO B. MISA
			“Director of Prisons

“The Provost Marshal
“Philippine Army
“Davao City,
Davao”

No commitment and no judicial decision or order was produced to justify
petitioner’s imprisonment. In view of respondent’s failure to present evidence
showing that petitioner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance
of law, as mentioned in sections 13 and 14 of Rule 102, it is evident that
petitioner would be entitled to be forthwith discharged from confinement in
accordance with section 15 of the same rule.

But we are not to issue such an order without first passing upon petitioner’s
own allegations, wherein it appears that he has been convicted in three cases by
Commonwealth courts before the war, and in eight other cases in 1942 and 1943,
by courts under the Japanese regime, and that on September 4, 1944, he was
released by virtue of a pardon granted to him “by the Japanese Imperial
Government” and by the consequent order “by the Vice-Admiral, Japanese Imperial
Navy, Davao Base,” and upon the legal questions arising therein.

What evidence respondent failed to produce as to judicial orders for
commitment of petitioner has been made up by the numerous documentary evidence
submitted by petitioner in the lower court and in this court at the hearing that
took place on February 6, 1947. Among the documents presented by petitioner
there appears a list prepared by the Bureau of Prisons of all criminal cases by
virtue of which petitioner has been committed for confinement either as a
detainee or as a prisoner to serve final and executory sentence. Said list is
attached hereto as Appendix A.

Therein appears that on August 23, 1941, he fully served his sentences in
three cases, Nos. 56710, 55369, and 55579, and on August 24, 1941, commenced to
run the sentences in the first three cases of the last group of eleven appearing
in the appendix, i. e., Nos. 58719, 60060, 60061. The three cases were
decided in 1941 before the Japanese invasion. There can be no question that the
sentences in said three cases, where petitioner was sentenced to one year
imprisonment in only one of them, have been fully served.

The remaining eight cases were all decided by courts under the Japanese
regime, the first one on March 13, 1942, and the last one on September 23,
1943.

Petitioner impugns the validity of the sentences rendered against him in said
eight cases upon two main grounds:

1. That the courts which rendered the judgments were not constituted under the
   laws and authority of the Commonwealth and the judges presiding therein were not
   appointed according to the laws and Constitution of the Philippines;

2. That the procedures which petitioner was made to undergo in said cases were
   unconstitutional and illegal, he having been compelled to plead guilty by means
   of intimidation and by brutal tortures, including water cure, whipping and
   hanging by police officer Charles Strebel and other Japanese stooges, with the
   cooperation of the Nippon kempei.

The first ground finds no
support in the majority of this court. The legal question as to the validity of
judicial processes during and under the Japanese regime has been squarely
decided in the leading case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon
(75 Phil., 113), wherein the majority opinion and the dissenting opinions of Mr.
Justice Hilado and the writer of this decision fully expound the relative legal
positions of the members of this court.

The record offers ample basis in support of petitioner’s contention as to the
intimidation and tortures which compelled him to plead guilty in the eight
occupation cases, after he had previously been acquitted in several previous
other cases in which Judges Gervasio Diaz and Arsenio Locsin pronounced that the
several confessions upon which the prosecution has relied have been extracted
“through duress, intimidation and force” and that petitioner had to sign them to
avoid further maltreatments, although he knew that the facts which he was
pressed to admit were untrue, Judge Diaz concluding that “it would be shocking
to human conscience to inflict serious punishment upon a person, based on his
mere confession of doubtful reliability”, while Judge Locsin said that
“Camasura’s confessions were successfully repudiated by him because they were
extracted from him thrqugh torture, violence and intimidation.” It appears that
Camasura even had to plead guilty in cases which were burned and not
reconstituted and in several others he had to withdraw his appeals to avoid
further harm and torture from Strebel, one of the tools employed by the Japanese
kempei to make more effective their inhumane and terroristic
practices.

The facts proved by petitioner convince us that the sentences rendered in the
eight cases in question are null and void and should not be given any
effect.

Upon this conclusion, it seems unnecessary to introduce a discussion as to
the validity and beneficial effects to petitioner of the pardon granted to him
on September 4, 1944, by the Japanese Imperial Government through the
Vice-Admiral, the Commander in Chief of the naval base of Davao, although, upon
the authority of the pronouncements made in Sameth vs. Director of
Prisons (76 Phil., 613), and Caraos vs. Daza (76 Phil., 681),
petitioner’s contention may easily find support in view of the fact that at the
time the pardon in question was granted, the Japanese were still in full control
of the Davao area.

Petitioner has also contended that his arrest was partly motivated by
political reasons, and has endeavored to show that, due to his oratorical
ability, he became very popular and contributed “to the bad licking” of
political opponents in Davao. Petitioner also called our attention to the fact
that of the thousands of other prisoners who were released by the Japanese by
pardon or otherwise, no one except him has been re-arrested.

For all the foregoing, with the reversal of the lower court’s action, it is
ordered that petitioner Andres R. Camasura be immediately released from
confinement, this order being addressed to any officer who has the actual
custody of the person of petitioner.

Pablo, Hilado, and Briones,
JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., Paras, and Bengzon, JJ., concur
in the result.

---

TUASON, J.:

I concur in the result of the decision of this court on the authority of
Sameth vs. Director of Prisons (76 Phil., 613), and Caraos vs.
Daza (76 Phil., 681). I disagree in so far as the decision impliedly if not
expressly repudiates the sufficiency of the Director of Prisons’ letter to the
Provost Marshal of the Philippine Army in Davao City as authority for the arrest
of the petitioner. The Director of Prisons, personally or through his
subordinates or agents, is not only authorized but is duty bound to arrest
without arrest warrant a prisoner who, before the completion of his sentence,
evades it, or is found at large without lawful permission or authority.

I also dissent from that part of the decision which expressly or impliedly
holds that the petitioner is entitled to discharge on the ground that “sentences
rendered in the eight cases in questions are null and void and should not be
given any effect”, for the reason, according to the decision, that he had to
plead guilty in some of these cases and had to withdraw his appeals in others
because of maltreatment and fear of full her harm and torture. These premises,
granting their truth for the sake of argument, do not constitute legal basis for
habeas corpus. The legality and fairness of the trials is not challenged. Remedy
lies in a different direction in such case.

The court has gone out of its way
when it makes, apparently as one of the grounds of discharge, the findings that
petitioner’s “arrest was partly motivated by political reasons, and there is
evidence in record that, due to his oratorical ability, he became very popular
and contributed to the bad licking of political opponents in Davao” and “that of
the thousands of other prisoners who were released by the Japanese by pardon or
otherwise, no one except him (petitioner) has been re-arrested.” These facts are
not alleged in the pleadings and should be ignored.

---

PADILLA, J.:

I cannot agree with the majority “that the sentences rendered in the eight
cases in question are null and void and should not be given any effect.” This
conclusion is based on the claim that “confessions upon which the prosecution
has relied have been extracted ‘through duress, intimidation and force’ and that
petitioner had to sign them to avoid further maltreatments, * * *.”

In the first place the validity of a sentence imposed by a competent court
cannot be attacked collaterally; in the second place confessions wrung from the
petitioner “of doubtful reliability,” in the words of Judge Diaz, or “through
torture, violence and intimidation,” in the language of Judge Locsin, were
precisely the reason for petitioner’s acquittal in said cases. Besides, this
court cannot and should not rely on excerpts from decisions, which are not duly
certified to by the legal keeper of the original thereof, to draw the inference
that the proceedings in other cases in which the petitioner entered a plea of
guilty or was found guilty were tainted with illegality.

The crimes for which sentences were imposed upon the petitioner in the last
eight cases by the courts during the enemy occupation, had been committed by the
petitioner before the outbreak of the war, with the exception of the last. They
were crimes punished by the Revised Penal Code, and under the Commonwealth the
petitioner would have been punished just the same. I see no valid and legal
reason for invalidating the sentences imposed upon the petitioner in those cases
simply because they were imposed by the courts during the enemy occupation.

The pardon allegedly granted him by the Japanese Imperial Government on
September 4, 1944, is invalid, because only the President of the Republic could
have granted it for crimes committed against the laws of the Republic.

There is no evidence to substantiate the claim that he was pardoned by the
PCAU. Contrary to such claim, it appears that on August 22, 1945, the Acting
Governor of Davao, upon instruction of Major J. J. Mason, Civil Affairs Officer
of Davao City, requested the chief of police to apprehend the petitioner and
deliver his person to the governor’s office (Exhibit E).

If article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
217, is to be applied, petitioner has to undergo a long stretch of confinement
which does not warrant the granting of the writ prayed for.

Other reasons advanced by petitioner should be addressed to the proper
department of the Government, for they have no room in this proceeding.

For
the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court
should be affirmed.