G. R. No. L-10427. May 27, 1957

Executive Orders Nos. 400 and  58 issued by the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and made effective January 1, 1942, and August 1, 1945, respectively, created the City of Greater Manila1 whereby Quezon City was absorbed by and became a part of  the  City of Greater Manila.

On  August  8, 1946, an  information for murder  committed in  Quezon City, then a part of the City of Greater Manila, was filed  with  the Court of First Instance  of Manila  and docketed therein as Criminal  Case  No.  221, against petitioner Eulogio Mill,  which information  reads as follows:

“That on  or about the 8th day of June, 1946, in  the City of Manila, Philippines,  the said accused, with  intent to  kill and  by means  of treachery, did  then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Iluminada  Cabio by then and there stabbing  her with a knife on the breast  and  other  parts  of  her body, thereby  inflicting upon her mortal wounds which wore .the  direct and immediate cause of her instantaneous death.”

Upon being  arraigned on December 14, 1955, in Branch VIII of the Court of First  Instance  of Manila, defendant pleaded “not guilty” to this information.  The delay in the arraignment of  the defendant for  8 years  since the filing of the information  until his arraignment therefor,  was due to his success in  evading arrest.

On October 10, 1946, that is, before the arraignment of the  defendant in  the  aforementioned case, Republic Act No. 54 was enacted by Congress, expressly repealing said Executive Orders Nos. 400, and  58 and restoring Quezon City to its former status as .a distinct  and separate chartered  city.  On January 3, 1956, after  the  passage  of Republic Act No. 54, counsel  for  the  defendant Eulogio Mill riled  with the Court of  First Instance of  Manila  a motion to quash the  information in  said case and in an- other case in which the same defendant was charged  with the  crime  of  frustrated  murder  (not involved  in  these proceedings),  apparently  committed at the same occasion, on  the  ground that the Court had  no jurisdiction to  take cognizance thereof, which motion  was granted  by order of  the  Court  of  January 16, 1956,  worded as follows:

“Wherefore, these  two  eases are dismissed, with costs de oficio. The Clerk of Court is  directed  to forthwith  send a  copy  of this order to the Prison  Officer,  Manila  Police  Department, for his information, and another copy  to  the  City  Attorney  of  Quezon City, together with copies of the informations, for such action as he may deem proper to take in the premises.  If no new informations are  filed by him in the Court  of First 3instance, Quezon City, within five days from receipt of  a copy of this  order, the Prison  Officer, Manila  Police Department, shall forthwith release the.  defendant from custody.”  (Section 7, Rule 113, Rules of Court.)

This  motion was predicated on the  assumption that the Court “had lost jurisdiction to try these two cases as of the date  of the  approval  of  Republic  Act No.  54  and  the revival of Quezon  City on October  10, 1946.”

On January  21, 1956, the  City Attorney of Quezon  City filed an information with  the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City  Branch), docketed  as Criminal Case No. Q-1907, which  was  amended  on  January 26, 1956, accusing the petitioner Eulogio Mill of the same crime of murder for which he had  been  previously   charged  in Criminal Case No. 221 of the Court of First Instance of Manila., and to said amended information the defendant pleaded “not  guilty”  upon  arraignment.   Said  amended information was of the following tenor: “

The undersigned City Attorney of Quezon  City accuses Eulogio Mill alias “Oloy” of the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That  on  or about the 8th day of June, 1946, in  Quezon  City, Philippines, the above  named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, with evident premeditation and by taking- advantage of  superior strength,  attack,  assault and  stab one Iluminada  Cabio by then and there striking her with an open knife, hitting her  on the breast,  back and on different parts of her  body, thereby  inflicting upon her  serious  and mortal  stab wounds  on said parts of her body, which were the  direct and immediate cause of her death.  That by reason of the death of said Iluminada Cabio, her heirs suffered actual,  moral and other damages under the Civil Code.”

Sometime thereafter, or on February 21, 1956, and upon learning that the offense with which he stands charged in Criminal Case No. Q-1907,  in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VII,  Quezon City, is  one for which’ he had  allegedly been in  jeopardy in  Criminal Case  No. 221 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which had been dismissed, defendant Eulogio Mill  filed  a motion to  with- draw  his plea of not  guilty and to allow him to submit a  motion to quash.   This motion was set for hearing and after the parties were  heard in oral argument, respondent Judge Nicasio Yatco issued in open  court the following order: “

For lack of sufficient merits, the motion to quash filed by counsel for the accused dated February 21, 1956, is hereby denied.”,

against which defendant filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground  that said order is contrary  to  law  and established jurisprudence.  But the respondent Judge  after hearing  anew the parties in oral argument on March 10, 1956, denied the motion for reconsideration in the following  language:

“There being no valid and convincing reasons alleged in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for the accused to disturb the order of this Court dated February 25, 1&56, the same is hereby denied.”

It is to be stated at this juncture that the  hearing of this  case had been set for  March  22,  1956, at  8:30 in the  morning, and alleging  that he has  no other  plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law for the protection of his fundamental right not to be put twice in  jeopardy for the same offense, on March 15, 1956, petitioner herein filed in this Court the present certiorari and  prohibition proceedings  with preliminary  injunction, praying  that:

1. Upon the filing of this petition  a writ of perliminary injunction  issue against the  respondent  Court from  hearing  Criminal Case  No.  Q-1907 which  it set for March 22, 1956.
2.   An  order issue  annulling’ and reversing the orders.  of  the respondent Court denying’ the motion to quash and the motion  for the reconsideration and ordering the respondent (Judge)  to desist from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. Q-1907.
3.   Petitioner further prays for  such other measures  or  reliefs that  this Honorable  Court may  deem just  and equitable  in  the premises.”

This petition was given due course by this Court  which provided by resolution  of March 19,  1956, to let the writ of preliminary injunction  prayed for  in the petition  be issued upon the filing by the  petitioner of  a bond  in the sum of  P200, and this  requisite having been fulfilled the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

On the facts just narrated, the main question that  comes up for Our determination is whether or not the  remedies of certiorari  and prohibition lie in this case.  Before engaging,  however, in this task,  it wiIl not be amiss to take up first  the  side issue  of whether an  accused  may, as a matter of right, withdraw his plea of  “not  guilty”  to file a  motion  to quash.   Rule  113  of the  Rules of Court, prescribes:

“Section 1. Time to move  to quash or plead.—Upon  being  arraigned the defendant shall immediately, unless the court grants him further time, either move  to quash the complaint  or information or plead thereto, or do both.   If he moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled he shall immediately plead.”

This section  provides  that  upon arraignment  the defendant  shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or information  or plead  thereto,  or to  do  both. Under the  old  procedure a  defendant who desired  to “demur” (a plea now substituted by the  “motion to quash”) to the  complaint or  information must do  so before  he pleads thereto,  and it  was held  that while  he  could demur as a matter of right before he entered  his plea, once he had pleaded not  guilty, his  withdrawal of such plea, in order to “demur”, became a matter of  judicial discretion. This  ruling  applies to a motion  to quash.   (2  Koran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952  ed.,..p. .780).

In U. S. vs.  Schneer, 7 Phil.  523,  a case of estafa, the  defendant, represented  by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the information.  He  afterwards asked permission of the court to  withdraw the  plea and demur to the complaint. The denial thereof was assigned as error by the defendant on his appeal from the judgment  of conviction.

“Held: In this ruling the court committed no error. The defendant has a right to demur to a complaint before he pleads thereto, but he has no right after  he has pleaded not guilty to  withdraw that pica  and  present  a  demurrer.  It is  within the discretion of the court below to grant or deny him permission to do so.”

The information in  the case at bar  appears to be on its face  a sufficient  information,  and  in the  case  of  U. S, vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385, permission  to withdraw  the plea of not guilty in order to interpose a  demurrer to the  information in a prosecution for murder was properly denied where the information appeared to be sufficient.  In that case  this Court reiterated its ruling that the withdrawal of a plea of not guilty in order to demur became a matter of judicial discretion.   In the  case  at  bar  there is  no showing  that the respondent  Judge  abuse  his  discretion in not allowing the petitioner  to withdraw his former plea  of not guilty.

Coming now to the main question at issue, We may say the following:  Rule  67  of the Rules  of Court prescribes:

“Section 1. Petition  for  certiorari.—When  any  tribunal,  board, or  officer  exercising judicial  functions,  has acted  without  or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor  my plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a  verified petition in the  proper court alleging the facts “with certainty and praying  that  judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board, or officer, as the law  requires, with costs.”

In People  vs. Manuel, G.  Pv.  Nos.  L-6794 and  L-6795, promulgated  on  August  11, 1954, the  accused was  charged under two separate  informations, one for illegal possession  of  firearms  and  another  for  frustrated   murder.

Subscribed before the District Judge, both informations certified that the corresponding  preliminary investigation and examination of witnesses had been  conducted.  Accused submitted a motion to quash in both  cases contending that the Fiscal had no authority to  formulate the charges nor to conduct  preliminary investigation.  Upon denial  of  said  motion to  quash accused appealed:

“Held: Under section 1  (Rule 118), in order that a judgment may be appealed from, it is necessary that it be final in the sense that  it completely disposes of  the cause,  so that no further questions affecting the merits remain  for adjudication.  An  order overruling a motion to dismiss presented by the defendant against the information does not dispose of the cause upon its merits and is thus merely interlocutory and not a final order within the meaning  of the above section.”  (Moran’s  Comments  on the Rules  of Court—1952 Ed., Vol. 2 p. 880, citing Fuster vs.  Johnson, 1 Phil.  670).

In line with the above view, the Rules specifically direct that if  the defendant moves to quash before pleading, and the motion is  overruled,   “he  shall  immediately  plead” (section 1, Rule 113); which means,  obviously, that trial should  go  on.  As stated in Collins vs. Wolfe, 4 Phil. 534, the appellant Domingo Manuel, after the denial of his motion, “should have proceeded with the trial of the causes in  the  court below, and  if final  judgment is  rendered against him,  he  can then  appeal, and  upon such appeal present the question which he  is now  seeking to  have decided.”   (Padilla’s Criminal Procedure, 1955 ed., p. 396).

In People vs. Aragon* G. R.  No. L-5930,  February 17, 1954, the Supreme Court, among others, said: “There is no reason  for dismissing the  appeal.  The order  appealed from is one  denying a  motion  to dismiss and  is  not  a final judgment.   It  is,  therefore,  not  appealable.   (Rule 118, sections 1 and 2).”

Although in the light of the foregoing decisions an order denying a motion to quash is not appealable because the order is merely interlocutory, yet, that does not mean that the final judgment that may be rendered in the case could not be appealed, and that is why in the case of Arches vs.

Beldia, et al.,  G.  R. No. L-2414, promulgated on May  27, 1949, this Court held “that neither certiorari nor prohibition lie against an order of the court granting or denying a motion to  quash  an information.  If the courts  have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases and to decide the motion to quash, appeal in due time is the obvious and only remedy for the public prosecutor or the accused,  as the case may be.”   (See the case of Fernando E.  Ricafort, petitioner, vs.  Hon. Wenceslao  L.  Fenian,  etc.,  et al., supra, p.-  575).

In view of the foregoing, we  hold that  in the case  at bar the writs of certiorari and prohibition applied for  do not lie, for the order objected to  is only interlocutory, and petitioner can  in due time  appeal from the final judgment that the Court of First Instance of Rizal may render  in the case  if it were adverse to  him.

Wherefore,  this case is dismissed and the writ  of preliminary injunction issued herein is set aside and left without force  and  effect.   With costs against petitioner.   So it is ordered.

Bengzon, Actg.  C. J., Padilla,  Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception,  Reyes, J.  B. L., and Endencia,  JJ., concur.
 

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 • 94 Phil., 364.