G. R. No. L-9789. May 25, 1957

Fernando E. Ricafort instituted  these certiorari proceedings for the purpose of securing judgment from this Court annulling the  order  of the  respondent  Judge  of September  23, 1955, dismissing  the  information filed  in Criminal  Case No. 2980 of the Court of First Instance  of Davao charging respondent Juanito Espero with  the crime of qualified theft allegedly committed in the City  of Davao while in the employ of the petitioner.   Said information substantially  avers  that during the  period  comprised between October, 1952, and  July 31,  1953,  the  defendant did wilfully, maliciously and criminally,  with grave abuse of confidence  and intent of  gain and without the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the  owner thereof, take, steal  and carry away medicines  and money  belonging to  the petitioner, of the total  value of P1,426.17, to the damage and prejudice of  the latter.  In his pleading, petitioner  further  prays  that  the  respondent  Judge,  Wenceslao   L. Fernan, be ordered to reinstate said  criminal case for its trial  on  the merits.

The facts of the  case may be briefly stated as follows: upon the filing of said information by the Provincial Fiscal, counsel for the defendant moved for a bill of particulars on the ground that the information  did  not  allege the definite time in which the  crime  of qualified theft  was executed.   The motion,  however, was denied by the respondent  court because a  copy  of the balance  sheets showing the different dates when the various amounts were allegedly misappropriated by the accused, was served upon the  attorneys  for  the defendant.  Those  balance sheets (Annexes A and A-1 attached to the motion to quash later submitted), showed that the defendant was a sales representative  or agent receiving  a commission  of 5  per  cent of all sales made and that in the course of the performance of his duties  as such he was found short in the sum of P1,013.09.
 
Based on these balance sheets counsel for  the defendant, now respondent Juanito Espero, filed a motion and a supplemental motion to quash on the following grounds:  (1) that the information charged more  than one offense;  (2) that  the  Court  had  no jurisdiction  over some of  the separate offenses;  and (3) that the information  charged the  wrong  offense.  Defendant’s counsel  then asked  the Court for  permission  to present  evidence in  order  to support the allegations in the motions to quash, which the court granted.  At the hearing  of  the motions  to quash, defendant presented Exhibits  1, 1-A and 1-B.  In Exhibit 1  the offended party, petitioner Fernando E.  Ricafort, recognized  the accused  as  his sales  representative,  to which exhibit  a certified  statement of accountability  of the  accused was attached, wherein the sales, collections and  commissions covering the period from October,  1952, to July, 1953,  were stated.  At said hearing  it was  also disclosed that the accused, as  petitioner’s sales representative, was  authorized to sell different articles  on commission basis, which articles the  offended party Fernando  E. Ricafort had turned over to  his agent for sale.  As  the delivery of  the drugs or  merchandise to be sold on commission by petitioner to the defendant involved a transfer of the juridical possession thereof from the former to the latter, the lower Court believed that the  crime resulting from the  alleged misappropriation of the goods  or of  the proceeds thereof, would be, at most, estafa  and  not theft, simple or qualified, so the Court acting on  the motion to quash, dismissed the case with costs de oficio.

From this  order,  and  without first  praying the  Court for its  reconsideration, or causing the  intervention of the Provincial Fiscal of Davao who filed the information, the purported victim  of the  crime—the  petitioner  herein—instituted the present case in this Court seeking  to obtain the remedy  applied for  in  his petition. In  this  instance  respondents submit  the  following questions at issue, to  wit:

1. Do  the petitioner  and Ms attorney have legal representation in this ease?;
2. Does certiorari lie in  the present instance?;  and
3. If certiorari  is the proper legal remedy  to contest the correctness of an order  sustaining a motion to quash in a criminal case, did the respondent Judge  of  the Court of First Instance of Davao act without or in  excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse  of discretion, in issuing  the order dated September 23, 1955, dismissing. the information in Criminal Case No. 2819 on the ground that the “facts do  not constitute the crime  of qualified theft”  for which offense the accused is charged under the information?

I.  As stated by  counsel for the respondents, the petition herein  is an offshoot,  an incident of  said  criminal case for qualified  theft.  For all  purposes, therefore, it is  a continuation of that case and partakes of the nature of a criminal  proceeding.   This being so,  the party  defeated by the  order of the respondent Judge dismissing the information in Criminal  Case No. 2819 of the Court of First Instance  of Davao must  be the People of the  Philippines and  not the petitioner,  the complaining witness.  Consequently, the  proper party to  bring this petition  is the State and the  proper  legal representation  should  be the Solicitor General and not the attorney for the complaining witness  who was  the private prosecutor  in said  Criminal Case  No. 2819.   It is  true that under  the” Rules  of Court the offended  party may  take  part in  the  prosecution of criminal cases and even appeal in certain instances from the order or judgment of the courts, but this “is only so in cases where the party injured has to protest his pecuniary interest in connection with the civil liability of the accused.

Petitioner did not institute the  case at bar for the purpose  of  protecting  his pecuniary interest as  supposed offended  party of the crime  charged in the information that  was dismissed, but to  cause the restoration of the case  and to  have it tried as if  nothing  had  happened.  This, certainly, falls within the province of the representative of the  People who in this case has  not appealed nor joined the private prosecutor in  bringing this case before Us.

Besides,  and as to  certiorari  proceedings, Rule  67 of the  Rules of  Court prescribes:

“Sec.  5. DEFENDANTS AND COST IN CERTAIN CASES.—When the petition  filed  relates to the acts or omissions  of  a court or of a judge, the petitioner shall join as parties defendant with such court or judge the person or  persons  interested in sustaining the proceedings of the court; and it  shall he the duty of such person or persons  to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of  the court or judge affected  by  the  proceedings, and costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the  person or persons  in  interest only and  not against the court or  judge.”

It  cannot be  denied  that  one  of  the parties  in said Criminal Case No. 2819, the name  of  which appears in the caption of the information, was the People of the Philippines which yielded  to the  order of the Court  objected to by the private prosecutor, and  the People should have been made a party  to these proceedings,  in  the  same manner as  the defendant Juanito  Espero whom the petitioner had to include as respondent in his amended petition.

Moreover, in People to. Velez, 77 Phil.  1026, We have- already held  that the  offended party cannot appeal  from the order of the Court dismissing  criminal  case.  In that case the attorney for the offended party  appealed from the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis  Occidental that dismissed the information against  the accused,  upon motion of the latter’s counsel, on the ground that  the supposed libelous document was a privileged document.  The Provincial Fiscal did not oppose the motion for dismissal filed by the defendant in the  Court  of First Instance because he was  also of the opinion that the latter which was the subject matter of the case was a privileged communication, and when the  appeal  of the  offended party reached this Court  the Solicitor General filed a motion to  dismiss the appeal.

“Held: it appearing from the record that there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged libelous document filed by the offended  party against  the same defendant, the offended party has no right  to intervene in  the prosecution of this ease, and consequently cannot appeal from the order of the court dismissing  the information. The reason of the  law in not permitting the  offended party to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal  case, if he has waived his  right to  institute  a  civil action arising  from a  criminal act or  has   reserved or,  a fortiori, already instituted  the said civil action, is that he has no  special interest in  the prosecution of the criminal  action.   Besides,  even if the offended  party has not instituted a  separate civil action nor reserved his right to do so,  and has  intervened  in the  prosecution of the criminal  action, as his intervention is  subject  to  the  direction  and control  of  the  fiscal, that is,  the Provincial Fiscal or the Solicitor General,  the latter in the  exercise  of  his  authority to  control the prosecution  has  the right to  move  for  the  dismissal of the appeal interposed  by the offended  ‘party if such  dismissal would not affect  the  right of the offended  party  to civil  indemnity.” Padilla’s Criminal Procedure, 1955 Ed., p. 697-698).

In the  present case  the dismissal of  the information or the  criminal action does not affect the right of the offended party to institute or  continue the civil action already instituted arising  from the offense, because such  dismissal or extinction of  the penal action does not carry  with  it the extinction of  the civil  one  under section 1-(d), Rule 107 of  the  Rules  of  Court.
 
 II. Rule _ 67   of  the  Rules of Court  provides:

“Section 1. Petition  for  certiorari.—When any tribunal,  hoard or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or  his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, not any  plain,  speedy and adequate remedy  in  the ordinary  course  of  law,  a person  aggrieved thereby may file a Verified petition in the proper court  alleging the facts with certainty and  praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board, or officer as the law requires, with costs.”    

So that where  an appeal  is  in itself  a sufficient and adequate remedy  that  would promptly  relieve  the petitioner from the injurious effects of the order or  judgment complained of, the existence of that appeal would bar  the institution of the  remedy  of certiorari.   In  the case  of Arches vs. Beldia  et al., G.  R.  No. L-2414, promulgated on May 27, 1949,  this  Court held “that neither  certiorari nor  prohibition lie against  an order of the court granting or denying  a  motion  to  quash  an  information.   If  the courts  have  jurisdiction to take  cognizance  of the case and to decide the  motion to quash, appeal in due time is the  obvious and only remedy for the public prosecutor or the  accused,  as the case may  be.”

In this connection it is  to be  stated  at this  juncture, that the petitioner did  not  pray the respondent Judge  for a  reconsideration  of his order of  dismissal, nor file any motion to that effect,  and  having failed  to  avail himself of this obvious remedy he cannot  thereafter  seek  relief by  by certiorari.  

Certiorari will not lie where  the relief sought is obtainable by application in the court  of the original proceeding and it has not there been applied for.  In this  connection, it has  been held that before filing a petition for certiorari,  the attention  of  lower court should first be called to its  supposed error  and its correction ask for,  and that if this is  not done, the right  shall be  denied.  *  *  *”

(II Moran, 1952 Ed., p. 169-170; Hen-era vs. Barreto, 25 Phil. 245; Uy Chu vs. Imperial, 44 Phil.  27; the  Manila  Post Publishing Co. vs. Sanchez, 81 Phil., 814, 46  Off.  Gaz.  Sup.  1, 412;  Alvarez vs. Ibanez, 83 Phil., 104, 46 Off.  Gaz., 42S8).

III.  Having  come to  the conclusion  (1) that the petitioner has no personality to institute the  present recourse in this Court  and (2)  that the  remedy of certiorari is not  available  to annul the  order  of dismissal of the  respondent judge in said Criminal  Case  No.  2819 of  the Court  of  First Instance  of Davao, it  would  seem unnecessary for Us to pass upon the third question at issue. Yet,  We prefer to  make  briefly a  few remarks  on this point.
 
The information filed in said  case No. 2819  really and in effect charged the  defendant Juanito Espero with  the crime of  qualified  theft.   It was   drafted  in  clear  and plain words  and contained all  the  requisites  prescribed in section 5,  Rule 106 of  the Rules of Court for a sufficient information.   The trouble  arose not  because  said information was  defective, but” because the  true facts of the case did  not conform  to the allegations  of  the indictment.  This  was  discovered  when  upon the filing of  a motion for a  bill of particulars counsel for  the offended party furnished the defense  with Exhibit 1, to which  a certified statement  of accountability of the  accused was attached.  It  was then disclosed that  the  defendant Juanito Espero did not take,  steal and carry away  medicines valued at P430.08 and  money amounting to P1,013.09,  but received medicines  for sale on commission,  the proceeds of which he  allegedly misappropriated during  the  lapse of time comprised between October,  1952 and July  31, 19-53.  Naturally, the  averments  of  the information had to be considered  modified and amplified in  accordance with  the very  admissions  of the offended party and  the Provincial Fiscal made  at the  hearing of the  motion  to quash.  In the case of People vs. Navarro et al.,*  42 Off. Gaz.,  497-499,  the  question was raised as to whether  or not the  trial court could  take  into  consideration  facts not appearing in the  information  but divulged at  the pre-trial.  In  deciding  in the  affirmative, this Court  held:

“It  must be noted that the  section of the Rule  (Sec. 2-A, Rule 113)  permitting a motion to quash on the ground  that ‘the facts charged do not constitute  an offense’ omits  reference to the facts detailed  in  the information.  Other  sections of  the   same  Rule would  imply that the . issue is restricted  to  those  alleged in  the information (see sections  9 and 10, Rule 113).  Prima facie,  the facts charged are those in the  complaint, but they may  be amplified or qualified by  others  appearing to  be  additional  circumstances,  upon admissions made by the People’s representative,  which admission could anyway be submitted by him as amendments to the same information.  It would seem, to be pure- technicality  to hold that in the  consideration of the motion the ‘parties and the Judge were  precluded  from considering fact which  the Fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the Fiscal are not required to go beyond  the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation  of his evidence, but we see no reason to prohibit the  Fiscal from making”, in all  candor,  admissions of  undeniable facts, because the principle  can never he sufficiently reiterated that such  official’s  role is to sec that justice  is  done;  not  that  all accused are convicted, but that the guilty  are  justly  punished.  Less  reason  can there be  to prohibit the court from considering  those admissions,  and  deciding accordingly, in the  interest of a speedy administration of Justice.”

The balance sheets  show cash shortages in the total sum of P803.91, but this amount was  broken down into several other sums, the smallest of which are P30,  P15.95,  P22.61 and  P1,  and even assuming that the  crime  committed in said case was  qualified theft, the resulting offense for the taking  of  these  small  amounts would  not come  within the  jurisdiction of the  Court of First Instance,  for any of such  offenses would fall within the jurisdiction  of the Municipal  Court  of Davao  (section 87-b and c-3  of Re- public Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act  of 1948, and  Article 309, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.)   Unlike in cases for estafa in which the misappropriations of various separate amounts that are to be  accounted for in one single occasion may be considered and prosecuted  as  only one  offense, in the  crime of theft, simple or qualified,  each taking of  another’s property, coupled with the other circumstances prescribed in” Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,  constitutes  a  separate crime of  theft.

On the other hand, the acts committed by  the defendant in connection with the case at bar, if they  constitute any crime at all, that crime would be estafa, because unlike in the  case of People vs. Locson, 57 Phil.  325,  cited by  petitioner,  in which the  teller of a  bank only obtained the physical or material possession of the money taken by him, the defendant Juanito Espero obtained from the  offended party the juridical possession of the drags or medicines he received to sell on commission.
 
In the case  of  People us. Isaac, the  regular  driver of a jeepney  was  on vacation  and  the owner  of that vehicle hired Isaac on a temporary basis and entrusted the vehicle for a “pasada”, that is to say, for transporting passengers for a compensation  at the  rate of  P10  per day.  Appellant never  returned the vehicle  and  after a  search  the vehicle was found in Tarlac.  Appealing from a judgment of  conviction counsel de  oficio contends that appellant may have committed estafa but not theft,  on the theory, that the possession  of the  vehicle was obtained with consent of the owner, and therefore there  was no  illegal taking.  Held: To this we cannot agree.  In the case of U. S. vs. De Vera, 43  Phil.  1000, this Court  said that “when the  delivery of  a chattel has  not the effect of transferring the  juri- dical possession  thereof or  title  thereto, it is presumed that the  possession  of  and  title to, the thing so delivered remains  in  the owner; and the act of disposing thereof with intent of  gain  and  without the consent of the owner constitutes the crime of theft.”   (2 Padilla’s Criminal  Law, 1955 Ed.,  p.  531).
 
 ‘ESTAFA’ DISTINGUISHED FROM  THEFT.  In  general,  the  crime of estafa is  distinguished  from that of theft by the manner  in  which the  offender  in each case acquires possession  of the property.   The estafador receives the  possession of the property, while  the thief takes, without the  owner’s consent,  the possession of the latter’s property.

There are,  however,  instances where  even  if  the property mis- appropriated  was received by the offender,  the misappropriation will  constitute theft, and not  estafa.  In such  cases, distinction should be  made whether the offender, on receiving the  property, acquired:  (1) the material possession alone or (2) the material  and juridical possession,  or  (3)  the material  and juridical possession plus the ownership, of the property.  Where  only  the’ material possession is transferred, conversion of  the property gives rise to  the crime of theft; where  both  material and  juridical possessions  are transferred,  misappropriation  of  the  property  would constitute estafa; and where in addition to the material possession, the owner- ship of tho property is transferred, misappropriation would only give rise to a  civil obligation (People  vs. Aquino, 36 Off. Gaz.,  1886). For  example, an agent  of the public authorities who,  in  the performance  of his duties, and because of  the  lack of  registration papers, takes possession of cattle  in the presence of  the cattleman charged with the care thereof, without any opposition or protest on the part of  said cattleman  or  on  the  part of the possessor or owner of  the cattle seised,  does  not commit the crime of theft, inasmuch  as  said  cattle were seized with  the  knowledge of the person presumed  to be owner. But’ the defendant’s own act  of selling the cattle seized  and  appropriating the value  thereof to his own use,  without reporting  the case  to his superior officers or to the competent authorities, constitute the crime of estafa (U. S. vs. Dacaimy,  8 Phil.  617.)” (Book  Two,  Part II, Francisco’s Penal Code, p. 1098.) .

The  case of People vs. de  Leon, 49  Phil. 437, cited by the  petitioner has no bearing on the case at bar,  because the  “taking” in  that case  occurred on the same occasion, while the alleged “takings” .under consideration  took place on different days.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, We can by no means declare that the order objected to  by the petitioner  is erroneous.   On the contrary, it was  issued  in accordance  with law.

Wherefore, the  herein  petition  for  certiorari  is dismissed, with costs against  petitioner.  So  it is ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L., and  Endencia, .  JJ.,  concur.
             

---

•75 Phil., 516.