G. R. No. L-8721. May 23, 1957

There is  no  dispute as  to the following facts: on  December 13,  1952, Atty.  Tranquilino F. Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxicab,  with plate No.  2159-52 driven by Gregorio  Mira Abinion  and   owned  by   the Manila  Yellow  Taxicab  Co.,  Inc.   On passing Oroquieta between Doroteo Jose  and  Lope de  Vega streets,  Gregorio  Mira Abinibn bumped said taxicab against a Meralco post,. No. 1-4/387, with  the result that the cab was badly  smashed and the plaintiff fell out  of the  vehicle to  the ground, suffering thereby physical injuries, slight in nature.

The chauffeur was subsequently prosecuted by the City Ifiscal and on  February 26, 1953, upon his plea of guilty the Municipal  Court of  Manila  sentenced  him to suffer 1 month and 1 day  of arresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

On  December  17,  1952,  Tranquilino  F.  Cachero  addressed a letter to  the  Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,  Inc., which was followed by another of January 6, 1953, which reads  as follows:

“Manila, January 6, 1953

The MANILA YELLOW TAXICAK CO., INC.
1338 Arlegui, Manila

Dear Sirs:

As you have been already advised* by the letter dated December 17,  1952, on December 13,  1952, while  I was a passenger of your taxieab bearing plate No. 2159 and driven by your chauffeur Gregorio Mira and through his  negligence and the bad condition of the said car, he bumped the same against   the pavement on the   street (Oroquieta—between Doroteo Jose and Lope de Vega streets, Manila) and hit the Meralco post on said street, resulting in the smashing of the  said taxicab,  and as  a result thereof I was gravely injured and suffered  and is  still   suffering physical,  mental  and  moral damages  and not being able to resume  any  daily calling.

For the said damages, I hereby make a demand for the payment of the sum of P79,245.65, covering  expenses for  transportation  to the hospital for  medical treatment,  medicines, doctors  bills, actual monetary loss, moral,  compensatory and  exemplary damages,  etc, within  5 days from date of receipt hereof.

I trust to hear from you on the matter within the period of 5 days above specified.  

(Sgd.)  TRANQUILINO F.  CACHERO
2256 Int. B, Misericordia St.
Sta. Cruz,  Manila” (Exhibit K)

The Taxicab Co. to avoid expenses and time of litigation offered to  settle the case amicably with plaintiff but the latter only agreed  to  reduce his  demand to the sum of P72.050.20 as his only basis for settlement which, of course, was not accepted by said  company.  So plaintiff instituted this action on February  2,  1953, in  the Court of First Instance  of Manila, praying in the  complaint  that the defendant  be condemned  to pay him: •

“(a) The  sum  of P72,050.20, the total sum of the itemized losses and/or damages  under paragraph 7 of the complaint,  with legal interest thereon from the  date of  the filing  of the complaint;
(b) The sum of P5,000 as  attorney’s fee; and the costa of  the suit; and
Plaintiff further  respectfully prays for such other and further reliefs as the facts and the law pertaining to  the case may  warrant.”

The  defendant answered  the complaint  setting forth affirmative  defenses;  and a  counterclaim  for  P930  as damages and praying for the dismissal of plaintiff’s action. After  hearing  the Court  rendered decision  only July 20, 1954, the dispositive part of  which is as follows:

“In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and  against the defendant, sentencing  the latter to pay the former the  following: (1)  For medicine, doctor’s fees for services rendered and  transportation, P700;  (2) professional fee as  attorney for the defendant in  Criminal Case  No. 364, ‘People vs. Manolo Maddela et  al. of  the Court  of First Instance of Nueva Vizeaya, P3,000;  (3)  professional  fees as attorney Tor the defendant in Civil Case No. 23891 of the Municipal Court of Manila, ‘Virginia Tangulan vs. Leonel  da Silva,’ and for the taking of the deposition of Gabina Angrepan in a case  against the Philippine National Bank, P200; and  (4) moral damages iri’idie amount of P2,000.

Defendant’s countercl4im. is hereby;  dismissed.
Defendant shall  also  pay the costs.”
From this decision both parties appealed to Us, plaintiff ¦ limiting his appeal to the part of the decision which refers to the moral damages awarded to ‘him which  he considered inadequate, and to. the failure of said  judgment  to grant the attorney’s fees asked for in the prayer of his complaint. Defendant in turn alleges that the trial  Court erred  in awarding to the plaintiff the following:

“(1) P700—for  medicine,  doctor’s  fees and  transportation expenses;
(2) P3,000—as supposedly unearned full professional fees as  attorney for the defendant in Criminal Case No. 364, ‘People  vs. Manob Maddela et al.;
(3) P200—as supposedly unearned professional fees as attorney for the defendant in Civil Case No. 23891 of the Manila Municipal Court, ‘Virginia  Tangrulan vs. Leonel  de Silva’,  and for failure to take the deposition  of a certain Gabina Angrepah in  an unnamed case; and
(4). P2,000—as moral damages,  amounting to the grand  total of P5,900, these amounts being very much greater  than what  plaintiff deserves.”

In  connection with his appeal,  plaintiff  calls  attention to  the  testimonies of Dr. Modesto S.  Purisima  and  of Dr. Francisco  Aguilar,   a member of  the staff  of the National Orthopedic Hospital, which he considers necessary as  a basis for ascertaining  not only  the physical sufferings undergone by him, but also for determining the  adequate compensation  for  moral damages that  he   should  be awarded  by reason of  said  accident.

The  exact nature  of  plaintiff’s injuries, their  degree of  seriousness and the period of  his involuntary disability  can be  determined by the medical certificate  (Exhibit D) issued by the  National  Orthopedic Hospital on  December 16,  1952,  and the testimonies  of Dr. Francisco Aguilar, physician  in said hospital, and of Dr. Modesto Purisima, a private practitioner.   The medical  certificate  (Exhibit D)  lists:  (a)  a  subluxation  of  the right shoulder joint; (b) a contusion on the right chest; and (c) a “suspicious fracture”  of the upper  end of  the  right humerus.  Dr. Aguilar who issued the  medical  certificate admitted, however, with regard to the  “suspicious fracture”, that in his opinion with (the  aid  of),  the x-ray there was  no fricttlre.  According to  this doctor plaintiff went to the’

National  Orthopedic Hospital  at  least  six  times during the period from December 16, 1952, to April 7, 1953; that he strapped  plaintiff’s  body  (see Exhibit K),  which  strap was not removed until after  a period of six weeks  had elapsed.   Dr, Modesto  Purisima,  a private  practitioner, testified  that he advised and  treated plaintiff  from  December  14, 1952, to  the end of March  (1953),   Plaintiff was never hospitalized for  treatment of  the injuries he received  in said accident.

Counsel for the  defendant  delves ‘quite  extensively on these  injuries.   He  says  in  his brief the following:

“Just what is a subluxation?  Luxation is another term for dis- location (Dorland, W.A.N., The  American Illustrated Medical  Dictionary (13th ed.)3 P- 652), and hence, a subluxation is an incomplete or partial dislocation  (Ibid., p.  1115).   While a dislocation  is the displacement of a  bone  or bones from  its  or  their normal setting (and, therefore, applicable and  occurs only to joints  and not  to rigid or non-movable parts of the skeletal  system)  (Ibid., p.  358; Christopher, P., A Textbook- of Surgery (5th ed.),.p.  342), it should be distinguished from a fracture which,  is a  break  or  rupture  in a bone or cartilage, usually due  to external violence (Christopher, F., A Textbook of  Surgery (5th  ed.), p. 194; Dorland, W.A.N., The American  Illustrated Mediical Dictionary  (13th ed.), p.  459),  Because, unlike fractures which may be partial (a crack in the bone) or total (a complete break in  the bone),  there can be no halfway situations with regard  to  dislocations  of the shoulder  joint, (the head or ball of the humerus—the humerus is the bone from, the elbow  to  the  shoulder)  must  be either  inside the  socket of  the scapula or shoulder blade  (in which case there is no  dislocation) or put of  the latter  (in  which  event  there is  a dislocation),  to denote  a  condition where due to  external violence,  the muscles and ligaments  connecting the  Giunierus  to  the  scapula have subjected to strain  intense  enough  to  produce temporary distension or less sening of  their tautness and feonsequently resulting in the loosening’ or wrenching of the ball of the  humerus from its snug fit  in. the socket  of  the  scapula,  by  using the terms  subluxation or partial dislocation (as, used in the medical certificate), is  to fall into a misnomer—a term often used  by ‘chiropractors’ and by those who would  want to sound impressive, hut  generally unfavored by the medical profession. To describe  the above condition more aptly, the  medical ¦ profession  usually employs the  expression luxatio imperfecta, or, in simple language,  a sprain (Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical  Dictionary  (13th ed.)>  p. 652).  The condition we have  described is a paraphrase  of the definition of  a sprain.   Plaintiff suffered this very injury (a sprained or wrenched  . shoulder joint) and a cursory  scrutiny of  his x-ray plates  (Exhibits A and B)  by  a qualified orthopedic surgeon  or by a layman with a picture or x-ray plate of a normal  shoulder  joint  (found  in any standard textbook on human anatomy;  the one we used was Scheffer, J.P., Morris’ Human Anatomy (10 ed., p. 194)  far comparison will bear  out our  claim.

Treatment for  a  sprain in by  the use of  adhesive  or  elastic bandage, elevation of the joint, heat,  effteurage and!  later massage  , (Christopher, F.,  A Textbook of  Surgery  (5th- ed.,  p. 116).  The treatment  given to the plaintiff was just exactly that  Dr. Aguilar bandaged (strapped) plaintiff’s right  shoulder  and chest  (t.s.n,, p. 31)  in  an  elevated  position  (with the  forearm horizontal  to  the ‘ chest  (see  photograph,  Exhibit  E),  and certain  vitamins were prescribed  for  him  (t.s.n., p. 131).  He also  underwent massage for some time by  Drs. Aguilar and  Purisima.  The  medicines and appurtenances  to  treatment purchased by plaintiff from the Orthopedic Hospital, Botica  Boie and Metro Drug Store were, by his own admission, adhesive plaster, bandlage, gauze, oil and ‘tintura’ arnica’ (t.s,n.,  p.  3—continuation of  transcript),  and Dr.  Purisima also prescribed ‘Numotizin’, a heat generating  ointment  (t.s.n.,  p. 23), all of which are  indicated for a  sprain, and  by their nature,  can cure  nothing more serious than a sprain  anyway.   Fractures and true  dislocations  cannot  be  cured by the kind  of treatment and ” medicines which plaintiff received.  A true dislocation, for instance, is treated  by means of reduction  through traction of the arm until the  humeral head returns to the proper position  in the scapular’ socket  (pulling the arm at a 60 degree  angle  and  guiding the ball of the humerus into proper position, in its socket) while the patient is under deep  anaesthesia, and then, completely immobilizing the part  until  the  injured  capsule  has  healed   (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery, pp. 343  and 344).  No evidence was submitted that  plaintiff ever received the latter  kind of  treatment.   Dr. Purisima even declared that after the plaintiff’s first visit to  the Orthopedic Hospital  the  latter informed him that  there was no fracture or dislocation  (t.s.n., p. 26).  Dr. Purisima’s statement is the truth of the matter  as we have already explained—joints of the shoulder being only  subject  to total  dislocation  (due  to their  anatomical design), not to partial  ones, and any  injury approximating  dislocation but not  completely, it being classified  as  mere  aprains, slight or bad.

The second and last  injury plaintiff  sustained  was a  contusion. What is  a contusion?  It is  just a  high  flown  expression for a bruise  or the act of bruising   (Dorland,  W.A.N., The  American Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th ed., p. 290):  No further discussion need  be  made  on this particular injury  since the  nature of a bruise is of common knowledge  (it’s  a bit uncomfortable but not disabling  unless it  occurs on  movable parts  like the  finders or elbow, which is not the case herein having occurred in the right chest)  and the kind of medical  treatment or  help  it deserves  is also well known.”  (pp.  10-14, defendant-appellant’s brief).

The trial Judge undoubtedly did  not give  much  value to the  testimonies of the doctors  when in  the statement of facts made  in his decision he referred to the  physical injuries received  by the plaintiff as  slight in  nature and the latter is estopped from discussing the same  in  order to make them  appear  as serious, because in the statement of  facts made in  his brief as appellant,  he says  the following:

“The facts of the case as found by. the lower court in its decision, with the  permission of this Honorable Court, we respectfully quote them hereunder as our  STATEMENT OF  FACTS for the purpose of this appeal.”

Before  entering into  a  discussion  of  the merits  of plaintiff’s  appeal,  We  will  say  a few  words as to  the nature of the  action  on  which his  demand for  damages is predicated.

“The nature of an action as in contract  or in tort is determined from the essential elements of the complaint, taken as a  whole,  in the ease  of doubt a construction  to sustain the action ‘being1 given to it,

While the prayer for  relief or measure  of damages sought does not necessarily determine  the character of the  action, it may be material  in the determination  the question and  therefore entitled to consideration  and in  cases of doubt will often determine the character of the action and indeed there are actions whose character is  necessarily determined thereby.”   (1  C.J.S.  1100)

A mere perusal of  plaintiff’s  complaint  will show that his action against the defendant is predicated on an alleged breach  of  contract  of carriage,  i.e., the  failure of  the defendant to  bring  him  “safely and without mishaps” to his destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of defendant’s taxicab that plaintiff used when he received the injuries involved herein,  Gregorio Mira, has  not even been  made a party  defendant to this case.

Considering,  therefore,  the nature  of  plaintiff’s action in  this  case,  is  he  entitled to  compensation  for  moral damages?  Article  2219  of  the  Civil   Code  says  the following:

“Art. 2219. Moral damages may  be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A  criminal offense  resulting in physical  injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, ¦ rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary  detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other  form  of defamation;
(8) Malicious  prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in  Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in- Articles  21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,  32, 34 and  35.

*      *      *       *      *        *           *        *           *
” Of the  cases enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219. only  the  first two may  have any bearing on the ease at bar.  We find, however, with regard to the first that the defendant herein has not committed  in  connection with this case  any  “criminal offense resulting in physical injuries”.   The one that  committed the offense against the plaintiff  is .Gregorio  Mira, and  that  is why he has been already prosecuted and  punished  therefor.  Although  (a) owners and  managers of  an establishment  or  enterprise are responsible for  damages caused by  their  employees in the  service  of the branches in which the  latter  are employed  or’ on  the occasion  of their  functions;   (b) employers are  likewise  liable  for  damages   caused by their  employees and  household helpers acting  within  the scope;  of  their  assigned task  (Article  2180 of the Civil Code) ;  and  (c)  employers  and  corporations  engaged m any  kind  of industry are  subsidiarily  civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees in the  discharge of their duties  (Art.  103,  Revised Penal  Code),  plaintiff herein does  not maintain this  action under the provisions of any  of the  articles  of the  codes just  mentioned  and against  all  the  persons who  might’  be  liable  for  the damages  caused,  but  as  a  result of an admitted  breach of contract  of  carriage   and against the  defendant  employer alone.  We,  therefore,  hold  that the  case  at  bar does not   come  within  the  exception  of  paragraph 1, Article  2219  of the Civil Code.

The present complaint  is  not based either on a “quasi-delict’ causing; physical injuries”  (Art. 2219, par. 2, of the Civil Code).  From the  report  of the  Code  Commission on the new Civil  Code We copy the following:

“A question of  nomenclature confronted the Commission,  After a  careful’ deliberation, it  was agreed to use the term ‘quasi-delict’ fo those obligations  which do not arise from law,.contracts, quasi-contracts, or  criminal  offenses. , They are   known in  Spanish legal treatises  as ‘culpa  aquiliana’,. ‘culpa-extra-contractual’  or  ‘cuasi-delitos’.  The  phrase  ‘culpa-extra-contractual’  or its translation ‘extra-rcontractual  fault* was  eliminated because it did not  exclude quasi-contractual or  penal obligations.  ‘Aquilian fault’ might have been selected, but  it  was thought inadvisable to refer to so  ancient a law as the  ‘Lex  Aquilia’.   So ‘quasi-delicts’ was chosen, which more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law classification of obliga tions, and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of  liability.”

“The Commission also thought of the possibility of  adopting the word ‘tort-‘ from Anglo-Ameriean law.  But  tort’ under that system is  much broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept  of obligations arising from non-contractual  negligence.  ‘Tort’ in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes  not  only negligence,  but  also- intentional criminal acts, such’ as  assault “and battery,’ false imprisonment  and deceit. In  the general plan  of  the  Philippine legal system, ‘ intentional  and malicious acts  are  governed  by  the  Penal  Code, although certain exceptions are made in the Project.”  (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 161-162).

In the  case of  Cangeo vs. Manila Railroad,  38 Phil. 768,  We  established the distinction between obligation  derived  from negligence and  obligation as  a result of  a breach  of a contract.   Thus, We said:

“It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond  for  the damage which plaintiff  has suffered arises,  if at all, from the breach  of  that contract’ by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due  care in its performance.  That is  to say,

its liability is direct and immediate, differing  essentially. in the legal  viewipoint  from  that  presumptive  responsibility   for  the negligence  of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art.  2180  of  the  new), which can  be rebutted by proof of the exercise of  due  care in their selection or supervision.  Article 1903 is  not  applicable  to  obligatiovis a rising  EX  CONTRACTU,  hut only to extra-contractual obligations—or  to use  the technical  form  of expression,  that article relates only to culpa

AQUILIANA  and not fO CULPA  CONTRACTUAL,.

” The decisions  in the cases of Castro  vs.  Aero Taxicab ¦ (82 Phil.,  359, 46 Off.  Gaz., No. 5, p. 2023) ; Lilius et al. vs. Manila Railroad, (59 Phil. 758)  and others, wherein moral damages were awarded to the  plaintiffs, are  not  applicable to the case  at bar because  said decisions were rendered before the eft’ectivity  of the new Civil Code (August  30, 1950)  and for   the  further  reason that  the  complaints filed therein  were  based on  different  causes  of  action.

In  view of the  foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral damages  by  the trial Court has to be eliminated, for under the law it  is  not a compensation awardable  in a  case  like  the  one  at bar.

As to plaintiff’s demand for  P5,000  as  attorney’s fees, the Civil  Code  provides the  following:

“Art.  2208. In the absence of  stipulation,  attorney’s .fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary  damages are awarded;
(2) When  the  defendant’s act  or omission has compelled  the plaintiff  to litigate with third  persons  or to incur  expenses  to protect his  interest;
(3) In criminal  cases  of malicious  prosecution  against  the plaintiff;
(4) In case  of a clearly  unfounded civil action or proceeding against  the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant  acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to  satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly  valid, just and  demandable claim;
(6) In actions  for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled  workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability  laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil  liability arising from  a  crime;
(10) When  at least double  judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any  other  case where the  court  deems  it just and equitable that  attorney’s  fees and  expenses  of litigation  should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney’s fees  and expenses of litigation must be  reasonable.”

The present case does  not come under any  of the exceptions  enumerated  in the preceding  article,  specially of  paragraph  2  thereof,   because  defendant’s  failure  to ‘ meet its  responsibility was not  the  canse that compelled the plaintiff to litigate or to incur  expenses to  protect his interests.  The  present  action  was  instituted  because plaintiff demanded  an exorbitant  amount for  moral damages  (P60,000)   and  naturally the  defendant did not and  could not yield to such  demand.   This  is neither  a case  that comes under paragraph  11 of Article 2208 because the Lower Court did not deem it just  and equitable to award any amount for attorney’s  fees.   As We  agree with  the trial  Judge on,this point,  We cannot declare that he erred for  not  awarding  to plaintiff  any such fees  in this case.

Coming now to  the  appeal of the defendant,  the Court, after  due  consideration  of  the  evidence  appearing  on record:

(1) Approves the award of P700 for medicine, doctors’ fees and transportation  expenses;
(2) Reduces  the  award of P3,000  as  attorney’s fees to the  sum of P2,000,  as Manolo  Maddela, defendant in Criminal  Case  No.  364  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance of Nueva  Vizcaya  testified  that, he has  already  paid to plaintiff  part of  the latter’a  fees  of P3,000,  the  amount of  which  was  not  disclosed,  though  it  was. incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish how  much he had been paid of said  fees;
(3) Approves the  award of P200 as  unearned professional fees as attorney for  the  defendant in  Civil Case No.  238191 of the Municipal  Court of Manila whom plaintiff  was  unable to  represent, and  for  the  latter’s failure to take  the deposition  of one Agripina  Angrepah due to the  automobile  accident referred to  in this case. Before  closing  this decision We  deem  it convenient to quote the  following  passage  of  defendant’s brief  as appellant:

“Realizing its obligation under  its contract of carriage with the plaintiff,  and because  the  facts  of the  case,  as have been shown, mark it as more proper for the Municipal Court only, the defendant, to avoid  the expense  and time of litigation, offered to  settle the case  amicably with  plaintiff, but the  latter  refused  and insisted on his demand  for.  P72,050.20. (Exhibit  K)  as  the  only  basis for settlement, thus adding  a clearly petty ease to the  already overflowing  desk of the Honorable Members of  this  Court.

We admire and respect at all times a man for standing  up and fighting’ for his rights,  and when said  right consists in injuries sustained due to a breach of a contract  of carriage with us, sympathy and understanding are’ added  thereto.  But when  a person starts demanding  P72,050.20  for  a solitary. bruise and sprain, injuries  for  which  the  trial  court, even  at  its generous  although erroneous best, could only grant P5,900,  then respect  and  sympathy give way to something else.  It is time to fight, for  in our humble opinion, there is nothing more loathsome nor truly worthy of condemnation than one who uses his injuries for  other purposes than just  rectification.  If plaintiff’s  claim is  granted, it would be  a blessing,  not a  misfortune, to be injured.”  (p. 34-35).

This case was. instituted by a  lawyer who, as an  officer of the courts, should be the first in helping Us in the administration of justice,  and  after going over the record of this case, we do  not  hesitate to  say that  the  demand of P72,050.20 for a subluxation of the right humerus bone and an insignificant contusion  in  the chest, has not even the semblance  of  reasonableness.  As  a matter  of  fact, Dr. Aguilar himself  said  that  the x-ray  plates  (Ex- hibits A,  B and C)  “did not show anything significant except that it  shows  a slight subluxation of the right shoulder, and that there is a suspicious fracture”, which ultimately he  admitted not to exist.  The plaintiff  himself must have  felt embarrassed by his own attitude when after  receiving defendant’s brief  as appellant, he makes in his brief as appellee the categorical  statement  that he “does not now insist not pretend in the least to collect from  the  defendant all the damages he had  claimed in his complaint,  but instead  he is submitting his case to the sound discretion  of the Honorable Court  for the award of  a reasonable and equitable damages allowable by law, to compensate the  plaintiff of the suffering  and losses he  had  undergone  and  incurred because   of  the accident oftentimes mentioned in this brief in which plaintiff was injured” (p.  17-18).  This acknowledgment comes too late,  for plaintiff has  already deprived the Court of Appeals of  the occasion  to exercise its appellate  jurisdiction over this case which he recklessly  dumped to this Court.  We  certainly cannot look with  favor  at  this attitude of plaintiff.

Wherefore, the  decision appealed from is  hereby  modified by reducing the amount awarded  as unearned professional fees  from  P3,000  to  P2,000 and by  eliminating the moral damages of P2,000 awarded by the Lower Court to the plaintiff.  Said decision is  in  all other  respects affirmed, without  pronouncement as to  costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor,   Reyes, A.,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ.,  concur.