G.R. No. L-6538. May 10, 1954

The petitioner, Pablo Burguete, is the municipal mayor of Badajoz,
Province of Romblon, and was elected for that position in November,
1951; the respondent, Jovencio Q. Mayor, is the provincial governor of
Romblon; and Esteban B. Montesa, the acting municipal mayor of Badajoz,
Province of Romblon.

On August 21, 1952, a criminal complaint for serious slander was
filed against Burguete in the justice of the peace court of Badajoz.

On October 7, 1952, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Romblon.

On November 13, 1952, Jovencio Q. Mayor suspended the petitioner as
mayor on the ground that a criminal case against him was pending, and
that it was the “standing policy of the Administration to place under
suspension any elective official against whom a criminal action
involving moral turpitude is pending adjudication before the competent
court.”

The Governor directed Esteban B. Montesa, the vice-mayor, to act as mayor.

Burguete now files in this Court a petition for mandamus and quo warranto against Mayor and Montesa.

The case for serious slander against Burguete is still pending in the Court of First Instance.

Burguete has filed a motion to quash, but it was denied. The case
could not be tried on the merits on account of the non-appearance of
the witnesses for the prosecution.

No administrative investigation by the provincial board has been conducted under section 2188 of the Administrative Code.

The questions raised in this case are not new, as they have already
been decided in the case of Lacson vs. Roque,^[*] (49 Off: Gaz., 93).
There it was held that the mere filing of an information for libel
against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for suspending
him. The same may be said with regard to serious slander, which is
another form of libel. Libel does not necessarily involve moral
turpitude. Furthermore, it would be an easy expedient to file a
criminal complaint or information against a municipal mayor for the
purpose of suspending him, and the suspension would last almost
indefinitely, according to the time that would elapse before the
criminal case is finally terminated by conviction or acquittal. It is
unnecessary to elaborate here on the reasons given for the principle,
as they are set forth extensively in said decision.

Our conclusion is that the suspension of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

In view of the foregoing, the respondent Jovencio Q. Mayor is
ordered to reinstate the petitioner Pablo Burguete in his office as
municipal mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, and to oust the respondent Esteban
B. Montesa, as such officer, with cost against the respondents. It is
so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

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^[*] 92 Phil., 456.