MARCELO CAGUIOA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE BACOLOD-MURCIA FARMERS’ CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY HIEROTEO R. VILLAROSA, RESPONDENTS.

PAREDES, J.:

On November 16, 1957, Hieroteo R. Villarosa and others, members of
the Bacolod-Murcia Sugar Farmers’ Corporation, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for a writ of Mandamus
(Special Civil Action No. 4607), to compel the Permit Agent of the
Sugar Quota Administration, detailed with the Bacolod-Murcia Mill
District, to sign their quedan-permits for the sugar milled and stored
with the Central (Bacolod- Murcia Milling). Judge Eduardo E. Enriquez
directed that the same will be heard three (3) days later and required
Salvador Pacis, the Permit Agent then detailed in the District, to
Answer within the 3 day period. Pacis asked for an extension of time
within which to file an Answer, and for the postponement of the
scheduled hearing. Both were denied and on November 22, 1957, three
days after he was served with summons, hearing was held. In his Answer,
after the usual admissions and denials, Pacis interposed as affirmative
defense, among others, the following—

“1. That the action taken by the respondent in
refusing to sign the permit portions of the said quedans belonging to
the petitioners or to some of them is in obedience to instructions, oral and written, from the Secretary of Commerce and Industry, thru the Sugar Quota Administrator, in which instructions the said Secretary of Commerce and Industry enjoin
the respondent that, pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 4486,
wherein tlie matter regarding the activities of the Bacolod-Murcia
Farmers’ Corporation which, in effect, are a duplication of the
activities of the Bacolod-Murcia Planters’ Association, Inc., is
involved, the latter, for purposes of the issuance of the permit
portions of the said quedans, should be recognized. * * *”.

Under date of November 29, 1957, judgment was rendered by the court a quo, the pertinent portion of which reads:—

“En su virtud, y no existiendo posibilidad alguna de
perjuicio al recurrido, y en vista de la extrema urgencia del caso,
causado por el incumplimiento de sus deberes ministeriales, el Juzgado
falla esta causa ordenando perentoriamente al recurrido ‘Permit Agent’
para que, inmediatamente de ser servido de copia de esta decision,
firme los ‘permit-portions’ de los ‘quedan-permits’ de los recurrentes
a que se refiere esta decision, y que acto seguido entregue dichos
‘quedan-permits’ a la “The Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.,’ y a fin
de que este fallo y decreto sea efiscaz para remediar el caso extremo
en que los actos y conducta del recurrido objeto de queja han dejado a
los recurrentes, y con arreglo al Articulo 9 de la Regla 67, en
relacion con el Articulo 6 de la Eegla 124 de los Reglamentos
Judiciales, se advierte al recurrido que cualquiera desobediencia de su
parte sera castigada como un acto de desacato al Tribunal. Se condena
al recurrido con las costas del juico.”

A copy of the decision was served at the office of Atty. Arboleda,
counsel for Pads on December 4, 1957. On this date the petitioners
filed a motion for immediate execution of the decision and
notwithstanding a petition for a one-day postponement until December 7,
for the consideration of said motion for immediate execution, presented
by counsel, on the ground that on that date (Dec. 6), he would be
attending a case in Iloilo; the trial judge granted on December 6, in
the absence of Pacis or counsel, the motion for immediate execution in
an Order of the following tenor—

“Not finding the reasons in support of the said motion well founded, the same is hereby denied.

As to the motion for immediate execution, considering the reasons in support thereof well founded, the same is hereby granted.

And
consequently, the Court hereby orders the issuance of a subpoena
addressed to the District Sugar Supervisor, Bacolod City, to appear and
testify in this case tomorrow morning, December 7, 1957, at 8:30
o’clock A.M., at an inquiry as to the circumstances under which the
respondent Permit Agent absented himself from the jurisdiction of this
Court before he could be served with a copy of the judgment rendered in
this case; the said District Sugar Supervisor is hereby ordered to sign
the permit-portions of the quedan-permits referred to in the decision
of this Court dated Nov. 29, 1957, in behalf or in lieu of the said
respondent Permit Agent, said signature to be affixed immediately upon
service of a copy of this order on the said District Sugar Supervisor.

It
is likewise ordered an immediate execution of the judgment aforesaid in
accordance with Rule 39, Sees. 2, 9 and 10 of the Rules of Court, be
issued.”

Marcelo Caguioa the Acting Sugar Supervisor, representing the Sugar
Quota Administrator in Negros Occidental, appeared before the trial
Judge on December 7, where he was subjected to an ex-parte
examination. Caguioa attempted to have the order requiring him to sign
the quedan permits in question, set aside or that he be granted
sufficient time to consult his superiors and main office, as to what
steps he should take in the premises. On December 11, 1957, for failure
of Caguioa to sign the quedan permits, the trial judge handed an Order,
the dispositive portion of which reads—

“(a) That the Sugar Quota Administration
Office in Bacolod City and each and all the personnel therein, deliver
immediately upon service of this order, to the Sheriff all the
quedan-permits of the petitioners which are presently found in said
office, with the warning that for their failure immediately to do so
upon such service they will be proceeded against as for contempt of
court;
(b) That all the other quedan-permits of the
petitioners which may be in possession of the Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co., Inc. or of any other person or entity be likewise immediately
delivered to the Sheriff upon service to them the copy of this order;
(c) That the Sheriff immediately turn over all of the said quedan-permits to the Clerk of this Court;
(d) That the Clerk of this Court thereupon immediately sign the quedan-portions of the said quedan-permits thus:

‘By attached court order:
‘JOSE AZCONA
‘Clerk of Court
‘For authorized Permit Agent’.

(e)
That a certified true copy of this order be attached by the Clerk of
this Court to each and every one of said quedan-permita thus signed by
him under the seal of this Court; and
(f) That the
respondent Permit Agent and the District Sugar Supervisor above named
are hereby ordered to appear before this Court on January 11, 1958, at
8:30 o’clock A.M. to show cause why each of them should not be punished
for contempt of this Court.”

On December 28, 1957, Marcelo Caguioa and Salvador Pacis instituted
the proceedings at bar for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, directed against the trial judge and the Bacolod-Murcia
Fanners’ Corporation. Caguioa et al.t vs. Bacolod-Muraia Farmers’
Corporation Petitioners submit that the respondent Judge (1) committed
an abuse of discretion in issuing his orders, particularly those of
December 6, 1957 and December 11, 1957, as far as petitioner Salvador
Pacis is concerned; and (2) acted without jurisdiction and with abuse
of discretion in issuing the same orders, as far as petitioner Marcelo
Caguioa is concerned.

(1) It is alleged that when case No. 4607 was filed, the respondent
judge directed Pacis to answer the petition within 3 days and set the
hearing of the case 3 days after he was served of the petition; that
notwithstanding his motion for an extension of said periods, so as to
contact his superior officers in Manila and await from them the
corresponding instructions and to engage the services of a government
counsel, said judge compelled him to enter into trial, thereby
depriving him of his day in court and had to seek the services of an
attorney in private practice to defend him; that he was denied due
process when the respondent judge refused the inclusion of his
superiors (the Sugar Quota Administrator and the Secretary of Commerce
and Industry), as defendants in said case in order that the legality
and propriety of his actuations in the premises would be defined; and
in upholding the contention of the petitioners in said case No. 4607,
respondent committed abuse of discretion, as he was in effect
compelling the petitioner Pacis to disobey and defy the orders of his
superiors.

The aforesaid order of December 6, 1957, was entered, upon a motion
for execution of the petitioners in the special civil action for
mandamus, in accordance with sections 2, 9 and 10, Rule 39, Rules of
Court. There can be no question of the power and competence of the
court which rendered the decision aforesaid to enter said order. In
view of the extreme urgency of the case, as expressed in the court’s
decision, the respondent Judge had to exercise its power to expedite
the preceeding.

“Expediting proceedings.—Preliminary injunction.—The
court in which the petition is filed, or a judge thereof, may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant a preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
such proceedings.” (Section 7, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court)

And there is likewise no question that the trial court had
jurisdiction and authority to issue the special order of execution, and
had the power to employ means to carry its orders, even adopting any
suitable process or mode of proceeding not specifically pointed out by
the Rules, provided it is in conformity with the spirit thereof (Sec. 5
par. (c), and sec. 6 of Rule 124).

The said order of December 6, 1957, among other things, directed the
District Sugar Supervisor to sign the permit portions of the
quedan-permits referred to in the decision of the court dated November
29, 1957 “in behalf or in lieu of the said respondent permit agent”.
This directive is authorized by section 10, Rule 39 which states—

“Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.—If
a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land, or to
deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other specific act,
and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may
direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some
other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have
like effect as if done by the party. * * *”.

(2) It is claimed that respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction and with abuse of discretion in issuing the same orders (a)
because Marcelo Caguioa was not and has never been a party in case No.
4607, as the sole respondent therein was Salvador Pacis and could not
“properly assert a defense particularly approved by statutes and
precedents”; and (b) that in so requiring petitioner Caguioa
to act in lieu of Pacis, the respondent judge, in effect amended the
decision issued by him in Case No. 4607, without any motion or pleading
on the part of any parties to have said decision so amended.

It should be recalled that with the resolution of this Court of
March 12, 1958, ruling on the motion for clarification filed by
respondents on the scope and extent of the preliminary injunction
issued herein, there can no longer be any dispute as to the validity
and binding effect of the decision rendered by the lower court, the
said resolution having directed that the immediate execution of said
decision should be excluded from the writ of preliminary injunction. In
sanctioning the immediate execution of the decision of the lower court,
this tribunal necessarily considered such decision as rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, lawfully exercising its judicial
functions over the question and matters involved therein. In the
identical case of G. R. No. L-13702, filed by Talisay-Silay Milling
Co., Fernando Ereiieta and six other planters, vs. Adolfo M.
Santos, the Secretary of Commerce and Industry and others, one of the
issues raised was the validity of a requirement of said Secretary that
a planter should be a member of a planters’ association and one
approved by one before his quedan-permit could be signed by the Permit
Agent. Judge Jose F. Fernandez of Negros Occidental ordered the permit
agent to sign the quedan portions of the quedan permits, which order
was taken to this Court on Certiorari and Prohibition, with a prayer
for preliminary injunction. The petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. It should also be noted that the decision in question has now
become final as it was not appealed.

Has the court jurisdiction to order petitioner Caguioa to sign the
quedan-permits as a substitute of Pacis and if he disobeys, is he
amenable for contempt? The answer should be in the affirmative,
considering the fact that the duty to sign, according to the law,
rested upon the Sugar Quota Administrator, whose District Sugar
Supervisor in the milling district was Caguioa and whose Permit Agent
was Pacis, a party in the Mandamus case. And any other person could
have been ordered to do so, as in fact, the Clerk of Court was
ultimately directed to sign for the Permit Agent (Sec. 10, Rule 39, supra).

In view hereof, the petition is dismissed, the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved, with costs against
petitioners.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.