G.R. No. L-1159. January 30, 1947
CECILIO M. LINO, PETITIONER, VS. VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, AND JOHN DOE, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS MAYOR, CHIEF OF POLICE AND OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, ALL O…
MORAN, C.J.:
persons alleged to be unlawfully detained by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso,
Lamberto Javalera and John Doe in their capacity as mayor, chief of police and
officer in charge of the municipal jail of the City of Manila, respectively. It
is alleged in respondents’ return that ten of the petitioners had already been
released, no sufficient evidence having been found to warrant their prosecution
for inciting to sedition, but that the remaining two, Pascual Montaniel and
Pacifico Deoduco, are being held in custody because of charges filed against
them in the municipal court for unjust vexation and disobedience to police
orders, respectively.
After hearing, by minute-resolution we dismissed the case with respect to the
ten petitioners already released and we ordered the release of the remaining
two, Montaniel and Deoduco, without prejudice to a reasoned decision which we
now proceed to render.
The case of the ten petitioners has become academic by their release. The
purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is only to set them free. After they are
freed, the writ is purposeless. If they have been tljie victims of illegal
arrest or detention, they can have recourse to criminal actions in the proper
courts.
As regards the remaining two petitioners, the pertinent facts as admitted at
the hearing by respondents, are as follows: Pascual Montaniel was arrested
without warrant by the police officers of Manila on November 8, 1946, for
inciting to sedition, and Pacifico Deoduco, on November 7, 1946, for resisting
arrest and disobedience to police orders. On November 11 when this petition for
habeas corpus was filed, these two petitioners were still under arrest. They
were thus held in confinement for three and four days, respectively, without
warrants and without charges formally filed in court. The papers of their cases
were not transmitted to the City Fiscal’s office until late in the afternoon of
November 11. Upon investigation by that office, no sufficient evidence was found
to warrant the prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to sedition and of
Pacifico Deoduco for resisting arrest, but both remained under custody because
of informations filed with the municipal court charging Montaniel with unjust
vexation and Deoduco with disobedience to an agent of a person in authority
under the second paragraph of article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. These
informations were filed on the same day when this case was heard before this
Court, that is, on November 12, 1946. And so far, no warrants of arrest or
orders of commitment are shown to have been issued by the municipal court
pursuant to the informations thus filed.
Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is
illegal. Even assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant on
November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively, their continued detention became illegal
upon the expiration of six hours without their having been delivered to the
corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125, Rev. Pen. Code, as amended by
Act No. 3940.) Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal late in the
afternoon of November 11, 1946, that is, four and three days, respectively,
after they were arrested. The illegality of their detention was not cured by the
filing of information against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of
commitment have been issued by the municipal court up to the hearing of this
case before this Court.
It must be observed, in this connection, that in said informations, the two
petitioners1 are charged with light offenses punishable by law with arresto
menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both, according to the second
paragraphs of articles 151 and 287, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Rule 108, section 10, when the offense charged is of that character, “the
judge with whom the complaint or information is filed, shall not issue any
warrant or order for the arrest of the defendant, but shall order the latter to
appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer to the complaint or
information,” although in particular instances he may also “order that a
defendant charged with such offense be arrested and not released except upon
furnishing bail.” The general rule, therefore, is that when the offense charged
is light the accused should not be arrested, except in particular instances when
the court expressly so orders in the exercise of its discretion. In the instant
case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the informations nor exercised
its discretion to order the arrest of the two petitioners and, therefore, they
are still detained not because of the informations filed against them but as a
continuance of their illegal detention by the police officers. While an arrest
may be made without warrant when there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule
109, section 6, Rules of Court), the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the
period provided by law, unless a warrant is procured from a competent court. (4
Am. Jur., p. 49; Diers vs. Mallon, 46 Neb., 121; 50 Am. St. Rep., 598;
Burk vs. Howley, 179 Penn., 539; 57 Am. St. Rep., 607; Karner vs.
Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App., 460; 34 S. W., 656; Johnson vs. Americus, 46
Ga., 80; Leger vs. Warren, L. R. A., 216-218 [Bk. 51.] It is obvious in
the instant case that the City Fiscal had no authority to issue warrants of
arrest (vide authorities cited above, and Hashim vs. Boncan and
City of Manila, 71 Phil., 216) and was powerless to validate such illegal
detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own, either
express or implied.
It is not necessary now to determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial
authority within the purview of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 3940, for even if he were, the petitioners’ case was referred
to him long after the expiration of the six hours provided by law. And since the
City Fiscal, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order either the
commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses (Adm.
Code, section 2460), the petitioners’ further confinement after their case had
been referred to the City Fiscal was but a mere continuation of their illegal
detention by the police officers. In the eyes of the law, therefore, these
prisoners should have been out of prison long before the informations were filed
with the municipal court, and they should not be retained therein merely because
of the filing of such informations it appearing particularly that the offenses
charged are light and are not, as a general rule, grounds for arrest, under Rule
108, section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order of commitment could
legalize the prisoner’s continued confinement, and no such order has ever been
issued. Indeed, the municipal court could acquire jurisdiction over said
prisoners only by the issuance of a warrant of arrest, an order of commitment or
a writ of summons as provided in the aforementioned rule.
We reiterate the minute-resolution above mentioned.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, and Hilado, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C. J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla
concurred in this decision.
CONCURRING
PERFECTO, J.:
The facts in this case can better be gathered from the pleadings. Copies of
the petition and of the return, the latter with the annexes, accompany this
opinion as appendices A and B.[1]
At the hearing of this case, counsel of both parties disclosed the additional
fact that the twelve detainees in whose behalf these proceedings have been
initiated after their arrest, were required to post a bail bond for their
provisional release of P12,000 each.
The petition was filed in the morning of November 11, 1946. The case was
heard the next morning, and in the evening of November 12, it was possible for
this Court to obtain the necessary majority for the early disposal of this case,
with the result that the two remaining detainees were then immediately released.
The first ten were released by respondents in the very afternoon of the day when
the petition was filed.
If we could only have our own way, we would have the case heard and disposed
of in the very day the petition was filed, by expediting the procedure in the
same way as we did when we ordered the release on habeas corpus of Special
Prosecutor Liwag, in Tañada vs. Quirino (42 Off. Gaz., 934). The Rules of
Court, which provide that the writ of habeas corpus may be issued at any hour in
the day or at night, and the very nature of the writ, make imperative the
immediate disposal of cases like the present one, if the remedy is to be
effective and there is an earnest desire to avoid a failure of justice,
especially as respondents are bent on exerting all the power and ability at
their command to mock at the action of the courts, as exemplified by the case of
Villavicencio vs. Lukban (39 Phil., 778-812).
At the hearing of this case, our attention was called at the significant fact
that petitioner himself, the ten released detainees, and other persons who came
to attend the hearing in this Court, were refused entrance in the Malacañan
compound where the building of the Supreme Court is located. They were allowed
to come in after we asserted that all the people are free to come to the Supreme
Court which is an institution that belongs to them.
The present case offers one of the most shocking examples of official
disregard for fundamental human rights, as guaranteed in our Constitution, and
as is intended to be promoted and encouraged by the Charter of the United
Nations.
While Carlos P. Romulo, the eloquent spokesman of the Republic of the
Philippines in the General Assembly of the United Nations, is making world
history with his courageous sponsorship of the independence of all subjugated
peoples and countries and is making for our Republic the proud record as one of
the staunchest champions of fundamental human rights, always placed in the
forefront whenever there is a battle for freedom, it seems paradoxical that
here, in Manila, in the very heart of our country, in the nucleus of our
national culture, twelve humble, peaceful and law-abiding citizens, while in the
peaceful exercise of their constitutional rights of freedom of expression and to
peaceably assemble, the right to enlist public support in the pursuit of their
right to a decent living wage, and the right to petition their own Government
for the redress of their grievances, are abruptly interrupted in the exercise of
their rights and violently hauled into prison as dangerous criminals.
Counsel for respondents tried to justify the unwarranted official invasion of
private civil liberties by the ignorance of erring officials of the
constitutional Bill of Rights. Such ignorance does not justify anything. It only
aggravates the situation. It shows unpardonable dereliction of duty and
recklessness of responsible high authorities.
It is a universal rule that ignorance of the law does not exempt anyone from
any responsibility for violating it. Peace officers are duty bound to know the
law. They are also known as law officers, because it is their essential function
to enforce the laws. They form part of the Executive Department of our
Government, the department whose primary function is to execute the laws. No
peace officers should be allowed to enter in the actual performance of his
functions without first acquiring the indispensable knowledge of the laws they
are called upon to enforce. At least they ought to know the Constitution, a copy
of which they should always carry in their pockets for immediate consultation,
with the same fidelity as the priests stick to their breviary of prayers. They
should be compelled to learn by heart the Bill of Rights, if possible, commit to
memory all its provisions. Peace officers are supposed, not only to enforce the
laws, but also to protect the citizens in their rights, and in order that they
may perform this duty, they should first know what these rights are. Without
that knowledge, they become a menace to social order. If it is dangerous to Jet
a person drive an automobile when that person does not know how to drive it, it
is no less dangerous to entrust the enforcement of laws to armed individuals who
are ignorant of them.
It has been alleged that the twelve detainees were not deprived of their
personal liberty absolutely, because they were allowed to enjoy provisional
release upon a bail of P12,000 each. If they choose not to post said bail, they
cannot complain for having to remain in prison.
If the detention was illegal, and there is no doubt about it, respondents
themselves admitting the illegality as to the ten detainees they released before
the hearing of this case, the fact that respondents required them to post bail
does not legalize their illegal detention. The bail requirement tends only to
show respondents’ stubbornness in insisting to enforce an illegal power to have
the detainees under an involuntary control.
But even in the false hypothesis that respondents could require the detainees
to post bail for their provisional release, the fact that respondents fixed the
large amount of P12,000 for each, seems an unbelievable sarcasm.
It is a fact that the twelve detainees joined the workers’ strike in a
desperate endeavor to secure a decent living wage. They went into strike because
with what they were being paid for their daily labor they had not enough to make
both ends meet. At the time of their arrest, they were not even earning the
insufficient salary or wage against which they were protesting by means of
strike. If those persons were not earning enough to live as decent human beings,
and at the time of their detention they were not receiving even the miserable
pittance they were complaining of, is it not an insulting joke to require them
to raise each P12,000 for bail, an amount, which even we, the members of the
Supreme Court, occupying the highest ranks in our judicial system, and receiving
the highest salary allowed by law to a judicial officer, could not raise with
the urgency required by the situation of a man who is deprived of his personal
freedom?
It is also alleged that the officers who arrested the detainees believe that
the latter committed sedition. Respondents themselves confess that the detainees
did not commit such crime. Sedition is the crime usually resorted to by tyrants
as a pretext to silence or suppress those persons who have the firmness of
character to oppose them and expose their abuses. Socrates was sentenced to
drink hemlock for the sedition of giving freedom and wings to the Greek thought
in his painstaking philosophical search for truth. Because he preached the
gospel of human brotherhood, Jesus was crucified for sedition.
The tyrants of one-fourth of a century ago, who controlled the situation in
the Philippines—tyrants are wild animals that may appear in any
country—following the foot-steps of their predecessors in other places, tried to
smash the crusade for clean government, which was our lot to wage in one of the
newspapers of Manila, by prosecuting us for the crime of sedition. (United
States vs. Perfecto and Mendoza, 43 Phil., 58, 62-64.) The following
paragraphs in the decision of the Supreme Court in that case, seem to us to ring
with trenchant actuality:
“When the citizens of a state become convinced that the administration of the
affairs of their government is not carried on in accordance with the law, or is
not conducted for the best interest of all concerned, they have not only a right
but it is their duty to present the cause of their grievances to the public, and
the free press of the state usually affords the best avenue for that purpose. To
that end, the organic laws of all modern free states have wisely provided that
‘no law shall be passed, abridging the freedom of the press’ and that no person
shall be punished except for an abuse of that freedom. The interest of civilized
society and the maintenance of good government demand a full and free discussion
of all affairs of public interest. Complete liberty to comment upon the
administration of the Government, as well as the conduct of public men, is
necessary for free speech. The people are not obliged, under modern civilized
governments, to speak of the conduct of their officials, of their servants, in
whispers or with bated breath. (United States vs. Bustos, 37 Phil.,
731.)“The right to assemble and petition the Government, and to make requests and
demands upon public officials, is a necessary consequence of republican and
democratic institutions, and the complement of the right of free speech. (United
States vs. Bustos, supra.)“The freedom of the press comsists in the right to publish the truth, with
good motives and for justifiable ends, although said publication may be
offensive to the Government, to the courts, or to individuals.“Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
discussing the freedom of the press, said: ‘The spirit of the constitution and
the opinion of the people cannot be curbed by those who administer the
Government. Among those principles which are held most sacred by the people of
America, there is none more deeply rooted in the public mind than that of the
liberty of the press.’“Mr. Daniel Webster had occasion to discuss the same question. He said: ‘It
is important to safeguard to the utmost the right to free speech and the free
press. It is the ancient and constitutional right of our people to judge public
matters and public men. It is such a self-evident right as the right to breathe
the air and to walk on the surface of the earth. I will defend this high
constitutional prerogative in time of war, in time of peace, and all the time.
Dead or alive I shall maintain it.’“It is the particular duty of the people of the state to zealously maintain
the right to express freely, either verbally or by publication, their honest
convictions regarding the acts of public officials and the governing class. If
the people of a free state should give up the right of free speech; if they are
daunted by fear and threats, and abdicate their convictions; if the governing
body of the state could silence all the voices except those that extol their
acts; if nothing relating to the conduct of the governing class can reach the
people except that which will uphold the men in power, then we may well say
‘Good-bye’ to our liberties forever. While under such circumstances free
governments may still be maintained, their life, their soul, and their
essentials will be gone. If the publication of the conduct of public officials
annoys them, let them examine their own act and determine the fundamental cause
of the complaint. Even during the time of the illustrious Voltaire, he expressed
the opinion that ‘tolerance was never the cause of internal strife in the state,
but, on the contrary, the pursuit of intolerance has covered the world with
blood. The tyrants of our thoughts have caused the greater part of the
misfortunes of the world.’“Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson in discussing the question before us, said: ‘If
there were a country where knowledge could not be spread without incurring the
penalty of the law; where there is no free speech, where correspondence and
publicity are violated, that country would not be civilized, but it would be
barbarous.’“Mr. Henry Ward Beecher on one occasion said: ‘The term “free” is akin to the
wind that blows over the regions infected with malaria and exposes to the light
the germs of the disease. When the freedom of speech is curtailed, infection
sets in and death quickly follows.”
Our schoolboys are no more compelled to count “Ichi, ni, san, si,” to sing
“Hamabe No Uta,” to salute “ohayoo,” or “kombanwa,” or to intersperse their talk
with “arigatoo” or “sayoonara.” No more lecturer is teaching us the “tyu no yu”
and flower arrangement as the highest expressions of culture. The political
philosophy of “Daitoa Kyoeiken” (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, under
the Japanese hegemony) has banished as unwanted nightmare. The voice of the
Nippon geo-politicians preaching “Hakko Ichiu,” the Emperor’s way, the universal
brotherhood under the benevolent guidance of the direct descendant of Amaterasu
Omikami, we do not hear any more. The bowlegged and be-sworded samurai
successors, indoctrinated in the traditions of Bushido knighthood, ceased to
plunder, to rape, and to cut throats in our midst. Our sleep is no more
disturbed by the hobnail terror stalking in our sidewalks at midnight. The
public bowings to brutal sentries, and by high officials and employees of the
government towards the Imperial Palace at Tokyo, are no more. But it seems, as
exemplified in this case, that the feudalistic ideology behind all occupation
facts and acts has left its pernicious virus in our soil.
The wanton disregard shown by those responsible for the arrest to the rights
of the twelve detainees, those rights being among the fundamental ones
guaranteed by the constitution, cannot be explained otherwise.
There was absolutely no legal ground to disturb or obstruct the twelve
detainees in their absolutely lawful and peaceful activities, and much less to
deprive them of their personal freedom and then keep them in jail for an
indefinite period of time, only interrupted upon the filing of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in this case.
It is our opinion that those government officers who are responsible for the
detention and confinement of the twelve detainees, depriving them of personal
liberty without due process of law, as guaranteed by the Constitution, are
liable for prosecution under article 124 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides as follows:
“Arbitrary detention.—Any public officer or employee who, without
legal grounds, detains a person, shall suffer:“1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three
days;“2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the detention has continued more than three but not more than
fifteen days;“3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for
more than fifteen days but not more than six months; and“4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded
six months.“The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment
requiring the compulsory confinement ofc the patient in a hospital, shall be
considered legal grounds for the detention of any person.”
But even if the detention in question was made “for some legal ground,” a
conjecture in support of which no sufficient ground appears in this case, still
those who made the arrest are liable for prosecution under article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, because they failed to deliver the twelve detainees to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours after detention. Said
article is as follows:
“Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities.—The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours.” (As amended by Com. Act No.
3940.)
The idea of prosecuting them under the above cited articles of the Revised
Penal Code may appear to be hard, but we must not forget that “dura lex, sed
lex” and whatever may be the consequences the law must be given its way.
We can imagine how the erring officials will feel at the prospective
prosecution and how they might consider unbearable the idea of being sent to
jail, but was it sweet or delicious for the twelve detainees to be illegally
deprived of their freedom and confined in prison for so many days and nights,
without any fault on their part at all? If respondents are zealous in keeping
their own personal freedom, they cannot deny the victims of their recklessness
the same legitimate desire.
Everybody can imagine the indescribable physical, mental, and moral
sufferings endured by the twelve detainees and their respective families. The
indignation felt by one who is the victim of an unjustifiable onslaught upon his
individual dignity, the paralyzing anguish of the down-trodden who feels
overwhelmed by brutal superior force against which his weakness cannot offer but
the answer of futile despair, the excruciating thought of the alarm their
absence will produce in their humble little homes, where their unprotected wives
will try to drown their worries in bitter tears, while their little ones are
trying to understand in infantile amazement the absence of their father and the
tragedy entailed by that absence, are things that can hardly be attenuated by
the thought that, after all, the Nippon kempei has already banished as an
asphyxiating dream, and the unfortunate situation cannot be as bad as the
sadistic and bestial horrors that the very mention of Fort Santiago conjure in
our imagination, the mere memory of which produces thick sweat and blood
congelation. There is no treasure in the world that can adequately compensate
such sufferings. The only consolation that the situation may offer is the bereft
hope that such sufferings may have the effect of awakening the conscience of our
public officials so as to induce them to make the firm resolve to avoid the
repetition of such abuses as the ones depicted in this case, that the guilty
ones will earnestly repent of their misdeeds and will henceforth endeavor to
accord the proper regard to the rights and liberties of their fellow human
beings, thus contributing to diminish so many rampant manifestations of moral
misorientation, including attempts to degrade the highest tribunal of the
country, that now offend the good sense of the average citizen.
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by
government officers form part of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect
during the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule;
continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they
were not repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free
and sovereign Republic of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the
complaints often heard of violations of said provisions, it is very seldom that
prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact that the erring
individuals happened to belong to the same government to which the prosecuting
officers belong. It is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear
or favor, and that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold shrugging of
the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal
detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of
the Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton
trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible
officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees’ right to the
indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their
fundamental rights.
The question of economic rehabilitation of our country is an everyday topic
in the newspapers. We deem more important still the moral rehabilitation of our
people; especially that of the officialdom. The Constitution requires (section
5, Article 14) that “All schools shall aim to develop moral character, personal
discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency and to teach the duties
of citizenship,” and it will be highly desirable that this mandate should be
borne in mind by all officers of the government, and that the qualities the
Constitution ordains to be developed in all citizens should be, with more
emphasis, required from officials and employees of the government, thus
correcting the negative tropism shown in this case in regard to fundamental
civil liberties.
The filing of information for insignificant misdemeanors against Pascual
Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco appears to us as a poor face-saving device to
justify, in some way, their further detention, and should not be countenanced as
a means to defeat the release of said two detainees.
In explaining in this concurring opinion, our position in voting in favor of
the resolution of November 12, 1946, we wish to make it clear that we do not
interpret article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as legalizing detentions not
exceeding six hours. Said article does not legalize an illegal detention. It
only offers a justifying circumstance which exempts the erring official from
criminal prosecution, provided that the detention is made upon legal grounds and
do not last more than six hours, but it will, and cannot, defeat a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in hehalf of a person illegally detained although the
petition is filed before the termination of the six hours period mentioned in
the article, as the constitutional guarantee of personal freedom is not subject
to any time limit.
We wish to emphasize that it is highly dangerous to make of the fundamental
rights of the citizens a kind of shuttlecock of passing moods or momentary whims
of persons wielding some kind of government power. When the oestrous of official
intolerance and braggadocio employed to cow into submission the twelve detainees
has subsided, everybody will recognize in the cool and serene recesses of their
conscience, that those who, under the pretext of subduing allegedly seditious
persons; committed the arbitrariness complained of in the petition, trod a
perilous path that, as shown by the experience of other countries, usually lead
to the implantation of a dictatorship, whose whole philosophy is built upon the
hateful slogan that everything, including the most cherished possessions and the
most blessed ideals of the people, should be sacrificed for the sake of the
state supremacy.
We are glad that two civic-minded groups of citizens, the Philippine Civil
Liberties Union and the Philippine Lawyers Guild, have taken pains to appear in
this Court in behalf of the twelve detainees, and we congratulate them for the
success of their endeavors.
By actual personal experience and upon conclusive evidence, we know that it
is not enough that the civil liberties and fundamental human rights be
guaranteed in express constitutional provisions in order that they should
effectively be protected. Eternal vigilance and constant willingness and
readiness to fight for them are necessary.
When World War I was nearing its end, in the exercise of the freedom of the
press, guaranteed by the Jones Law, as Editor of La Nacion, we made
exposures of many unsatisfactory aspects of public affairs as they were then
conducted. We made revelations regarding the scandals of the Philippine National
Bank which caused many millions of losses to our Government. The powerful wanted
us to be silenced. The Governor General, first through his Secretary, Mr. Irwin,
and later through General Crame, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, tried to
intimidate us with drastic action by the Government if we should not stop the
publication of the irregularities and illegalities we were denouncing then in
the columns of our paper. They reminded us that the war justified any
extraordinary measure by the Government, and that our denunciations, by tending
to destroy public confidence in the authorities, were highly seditious. Our
invariable answer to Mr. Irwin and General Crame was that the Governor General
and they themselves were free to do what it would please them, but nothing shall
deter us from doing what, according to our conscience, was our public duty. As
we did not allow ourselves to be intimidated, a series of criminal prosecutions
were instituted against us. Although the lower courts should invariably find us
guilty, the Supreme Court had always acquitted us, by upholding the freedom of
the press.
The existence of liberal elements, always watchful and ready to defend the
victims of violations of the Bill of Rights, is necessary to vitalize democracy
and to give tangible reality to the guarantees of the Constitution. The fight
for personal freedom must go on, over and over again, as the forces of reaction
are always ready to snatch any opportunity to set at naught the guarantees of
the fundamental law, as happened in the bail incident in People vs.
Jalandoni (G. R. No. L-777), and all liberal forces must always be ready to
answer the summons of endangered liberties.
The attainment of great ideals needs faith, passionate adherence to them, the
militant attitude manifested in the unflinching readiness to fight and face
hardships and sacrifices, unconquerable steadfastness and unbreakable per
severance in the face of obstacles and setbacks. These are the conditions and
qualities with which thinkers and philosophers were able to discover the truth
which have guided humanity as beacons in the path of progress; the founders of
great religions, to transmit to millions their message of hope and the gospel of
eternal moral principles: Columbus, to discover the New World, and Magellan to
traverse the two largest oceans and encircle the globe; astronomers, to pierce
the immensity of space to conquer new stars, parsees away; bacteriologists, to
scavenge dangerous microorganisms; scientists, to fossick in the mysteries of
matter to wrest new revelations which enhance the intellectual horizon of man
and increase his means for enjoyment of life and happiness. The same conditions
and qualities are among those needed by all liberal and progressive spirits to
keep lighted the torch of liberty, to squelch the hydra of reaction, to conserve
the moral heritage of advancement and conquests in the emporium of human rights
bequeathed by the champions and martyrs who waged the heroic battles for real
spiritual values and for the dignity of man as the image of God.
Appendix A
PETITION
Petitioner Cecilio M. Lino, through his undersigned counsel, respectfully
alleges:
- That the petitioner is of legal age and a resident of the City of Manila,
Philippines; the respondent Valeriano E. Fugoso is the Mayor of the City of
Manila; the respondent Lamberto T. Javalera is the Chief of Police of the said
City; and the respondent John Doe is the Officer in Charge of the Municipal Jail
of the same City; - That the petitioner is the President of the City Employees’ and Workers’
Union, Congress of Labor Organization (CLO), duly registered as a labor
organization under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 213; and he files this
petition on behalf of the following persons, members of the said labor
organization, who are imprisoned and deprived of their liberty, to wit:- Ricardo Suarez (Juarez)
- Gregorio Santiago
- Ismael de Jesus
- Serafin Pascual
- Amado Racanday
- Antonio Bulagda (Burlagada)
- Mauro Fernandez
- Jose Badeo
- Francisco Nevado (Lebado)
- Pascual Montaniel
- Pedro Martinez and
- Pacifico Deoduco;
- That, within the time comprised between November 5 and November 8, 1946, the
persons above named were arrested without warrant and without lawful cause, upon
order of the respondent Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, by
members of the Police Department of the said City, of which the respondent
Lamberto T. Javalera is the Chief, and, immediately thereafter, were taken to,
and detained at, the Municipal Jail of the aforementioned City, of which the
respondent John Doe is the Officer in Charge; - That since their arrest all the persons mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof have
been detained and deprived of their liberty by the respondents at the said
Municipal Jail, although no charges have been filed against any of the above
mentioned persons in any lawful court, nor has any judicial or other proper
authority issued any order authorizing their continued detention, and
notwithstanding the lapse of the period of six hours from the time of their
arrest and/or commitment; - That the aforementioned persons were arrested while in the peaceful exercise
of their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of the press and
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for the redress of their
grievances, specifically, while performing the following acts to enlist public
support in the pursuit of their right to a living wage, to wit:
(a) Ricardo Suarez (Juarez), Gregorio Santiago, Ismael de Jesus and
Serafin Pascual—arrested on November 5, 1946 at Pinkian Street, Tondo, Manila,
for no apparent reason, but for posting and distributing handbills explaining
the plight of the city laborers on strike, and appealing to and for the sympathy
and lawful support of the public;(b) Amado Racanday, Antonio Bulgada (Burlagada) and Mauro
Fernandez—arrested on November 6, 1946, while standing at the corner of Gral.
Luna and California streets, Paco, Manila, for no apparent reason, except that
they had joined the city laborers’ strike, and for having in their possession
some copies of the handbills above mentioned;(c) Jose Badeo and Francisco Nevado (Lebado)—arrested on November 6,
1946, while standing at the corner of Perez and California Streets, Paco,
Manila, for no apparent reason except that they had joined the city laborers’
strike and had in their possession a notice of a meeting of their labor
organization;(d) Pascual Montaniel—arrested on November 8, 1946, at Cristobal
Street, Paco, Manila, for no apparent reason, except that he made a friendly
greeting to a non-striker;(e) Pedro Martinez—arrested on November 8, 1946, at Juan Luna Street,
Gagalangin, Manila, for no apparent reason, except that he had joined the city
laborers’ strike and walked along the street with a paper band strung diagonally
from his shoulder around his body bearing the following words: “Damayan Kami!
Huag Mageskirol” (Help us! Do not be a scab); and(f) Pacifico Deoduco—arrested on November 7, 1946, at Cristobal
Street, Manila, for no apparent reason except that he had joined the city
laborers’ strike.
Wherefore, petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus be directed
forthwith to the respondents commanding them, or any of them, to have the bodies
of the above named persons who are restrained and deprived of their liberty
before this Honorable Court at a time and place to be designated by this Court;
and, after due hearing, forthwith to order their discharge from confinement,
with costs against the respondents.
| Manila, Philippines, November 11th, 1946. |
||
| Emmanuel Pelaez, | ||
| Francisco A. Rodrigo | ||
| Enrique M. Fernando | ||
| Manuel M. Crudo | ||
| Claudio Teehankee and | ||
| Jose W. Diokno | ||
|
By: (Sgd.) Emmanuel Pelaez Counsel for the Petitioner
c/o Philippine Civil Liberties Union 503 China Bank Building, Dasmariñas, Manila |
By: (Sgd.) Claudio Teehankee Counsel for the Petitioner
c/o Philippine Lawyers’ Guild, 319 Lardizabal Street, Manila |
VERIFICATION
Cecilio M. Lino, of legal age, after being duly sworn in accordance with law,
deposes and says:
- That he is the petitioner in the foregoing petition for a writ of habeas
corpus; - That he caused the same to be prepared and presented; and
- That all the facts therein alleged are true and correct.
Further affiant sayeth naught.
Manila, November 11, 1946.
| (Sgd.) Cecilio M. Lino | ||
| Affiant | ||
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of November, 1946, at the
City of Manila, Philippines. The affiant exhibited to me his Residence
Certificate No. A-20721, issued at the City of Manila, on January 9, 1946.
| (Sgd.) F. A. Rodrigo | |||
| Notary Public | |||
| Until December 31, 1947 | |||
Doc. No. 36
Page No. 9
Book No. 1
Series of 1946.
Appendix B
RETURN OF WRIT
Come now the respondents in the above-entitled case, Valeriano E. Fugoso,
Lamberto T. Javalera and John Doe, in their respective capacities as Mayor,
Chief of Police and Officer in Charge of the Municipal Jail, all of the City of
Manila, through their counsel, the undersigned City Fiscal, and in making their
return to the petition filed herein, to this Honorable Court respectfully
allege:
- That they admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of said
petition. - That they admit the fact, stated in paragraph 3 of said petition, regarding
the arrest of the persons whose names are listed in paragraph 2 thereof, without
warrant, by members of the Manila Police Department, and their detention until
yesterday, November 11, 1946, at the Municipal Jail of the City of Manila; but
they deny the rest of the allegations, especially that which states for a fact
that said detained persons were arrested without lawful cause upon order of the
respondent Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, the truth of the
matter being that the arrest was lawful, it having been made by members of the
Manila Police Department duly appointed and qualified as such who acted in the
performance of their official duties, and acting in the belief that the said
detained persons, before or at the time of their arrest, were committing acts in
violation of the laws of the land. - That they admit the fact, alleged in paragraph 4 of said petition, that all
the arrested persons have been placed under detention until yesterday, November
11, 1946, at the Municipal Jail of the City of Manila; but they deny the rest of
the allegations, specially that part which says that no charges have been filed
against them notwithstanding the lapse of the period of six hours from the time
of their arrest and commitment, the truth of the matter being that charges for
inciting to sedition, disobedience to police orders and resisting arrest have
been filed against them by the arresting police officers with the Office of the
City Fiscal which has conducted the preliminary investigation of said cases in
accordance with law. - That they deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of said petition,
the same being merely conclusions of facts and/or of law.
As special
defenses, respondents hereby allege:
(a) That all of the twelve detained persons were arrested by police
officers for acts which the arresting officers believed to constitute inciting
to sedition, resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders, filing the
corresponding cases against them with the Office of the City Fiscal immediately
thereafter.
(b) That yesterday, November 11, 1946, before and after the receipt by
them of their respective copies of the petition for habeas corpus herein filed,
complaints had already been presented with the Municipal Court of Manila against
Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco not for inciting to sedition but for
unjust vexation and for disobedience to police orders, respectively, the same
being criminal cases Nos. 6765 and 7666 of the Municipal Court of
Manila, copies of which complaints are being attached hereto and made a part
hereof as Annexes 1 and 2.
(c) That likewise, before and after the receipt by them of their
respective copies of the petition for habeas corpus, said respondents Valeriano
E. Fugoso and Lamberto T. Javalera had already been notified of the dismissal by
the Office of the City Fiscal of the cases for inciting to sedition against all
the detained persons, for insufficiency of evidence, and of filing in the
Municipal Court of Manila complaints against Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico
Deoduco, as aforesaid.
(d) That, similarly, before and after his receipt of a copy of the
petition for habeas corpusrthe respondent John Doe, in his capacity as Officer
in ciiarge of the Municipal Jail, had received from the City Fiscal letters
bearing date of November 11, 1946, copies of which are hereto attached as
Annexes 3 and 4 of this Return, wherein he was advised that the cases against
said detained persons for inciting to sedition have been dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence, but that complaints were being filed against Pascual
Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco for unjust vexation and for disobedience to
police orders, respectively, and wherein said respondent John Doe has been
ordered by the City Fiscal to forthwith release all of said detained persons
with the exception of Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Diodoco, an order which has
been complied with by said respondent John Doe as shown by the fact that said
detained persons, with the exception of the latter two, had forthwith been
released from custody.
(e) That Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco continue to be
detained and are being deprived of their liberty not without lawful cause, for
the reason that there are at present pending against them criminal complaints
with the Municipal Court of Manila for unjust vexation and disobedience to
police orders as stated above.
Wherefore, respondents herein pray this Honorable Court to dismiss the
petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Manila, November 12, 1946.
| (Sgd.) JOSE P. BENGZON | ||
| City Fiscal | ||
Annex 1
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses Pascual Montaniel y Avelar of the crime of unjust
vexation, committed as follows:That on or about the 8th of November, 1946, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and unjustly vex and annoy one Jesus Cambare, who was then a driver
at the City Motor Pool assigned to the Department of Engineering and Public
Works of the Government of the City of Manila, while in the act of managing,
driving and operating a jeep being used by the Assistant City Engineer of said
City in the latter’s official capacity, by then and there stopping the jeep
driven by said Jesus Cambare without any just cause therefor and telling him to
stop driving for the City of Manila while the strike of city laborers was still
going on, all in a threatening attitude, and to the great disgust and annoyance
of the aforementioned Jesus Cambare. Contrary to law.
(Sgd.) JULIO VILLAMOR Assistant Fiscal
Witnesses: Jesus Cambare—615 Merced, Paco Dets. Felix T. Pineda and Victoriano Antonio—Det. Bureau Chief Clerk—Dept. of Engineering and Public Works, City Hall (bringing records re appointment of Jesus Cambare as driver at the City Motor Pool)
Annex 2
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses Pacifico Deoduco of a violation of the second
paragraph of Art. 151 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:That on or about the 7th day of November, 1946, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously disobey Vicente Celeridad, a duly appointed and qualified police
officer of the City of Manila and, therefore, an agent of a person in authority,
while the latter was acting in the performance of his official duties, to wit:
while he was guarding the premises of the City Motor Pool on Cristobal St., in
said City, which acts of disobedience was in the following manner: That said
accused, having entered and was actually found in the aforesaid premises where
he had no right to be, without the knowledge and consent of the authorities
concerned, and having been ordered several times by the aforesaid police officer
to go out of and leave the said premises, defiantly and persistently refused to
do so, but instead he continued to remain therein. Contrary to law.
(Sgd.) JULIO VILLAMOR Assistant City Fiscal
November 11, 1946. Witnesses: Pat. V. Celeridad, Precinct No. 3. Pat. Pedro Camata, Precinct No. 3. Chief Clerk, Manila Police Dept., to bring a certified copy of the latest appointment of Pat.
VicenteCeleridad of the Manila Police Dept. Bail recommended: P200
Annex 3
November 11, 1946
The Prison Officer
City Jail, ManilaSir:
With reference to the case of inciting to sedition presented with this Office
against (1) Ricardo Suarez, (2) Gregorio Santiago (3) Ismael de Jesus, (4)
Serafin Pascual, (5) Amado Racanday, (6) Antonio Bulagua (Burlagua), (7) Mauro
Fernandez, (8) Jose Radeo, (9) Francisco Navado (Levado), (10) Pascual
Montaniel, and (11) Pedro Martinez, please be informed that after an
investigation has been conducted in the premises, it was found out that there is
no sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of said accused in court, it
appearing that the leaflets, posters and other propaganda sheets which said
accused distributed to the public and pasted or posted at different places
within the city, did not contain any statement or phrases of seditious nature or
of the nature to incite to the commission of sedition. This Office, however, is
filing a complaint with the Municipal Court against Pascual Montaniel y Avelar
for unjust vexation only, wherein a bail of P100 has been recommended for his
temporary release.In view of the foregoing, all of the said accused, except Pascual Montaniel y
Avelar, should be released from custody or their bonds cancelled, if any have
been put up for their temporary release unless they are held on other
charges.
Respectfully, (Sgd.) JOSE P. BENGZON City
Fiscal
ANNEX
November 11, 1946
The Prison Officer
City Jail, ManilaSir:
With reference to the cases of disobedience to the Police and resisting
arrest presented to this Office against Pacifico Deoduco y Docio, please be
informed that after an investigation has been conducted in the premises, it was
found out that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant his prosecution in
court for the offense of resisting arrest. This Office, however, is filing today
a complaint with the Municipal Court against the said accused for disobedience
to an agent of a person in authority, under the second paragraph of Art. 151 of
the Revised Penal Code, wherein a bail of P200.00 has been recommended for his
temporary release.
Very respectfully, (Sgd.) Jose P. Bengzon City
Fiscal
[1] Omitted.
CONFORME
BRIONES, M.:
El presente caso es un incidente de la famosa huelga declarada y efectuada en
Noviembre del año pasado (1946) por obreros organizados de la ciudad de Manila
en el servicio municipal de limpieza de calles y en obras publicas tambien
municipales. Como fondo historico del caso en general, y de esta opinion en
particular, cabe incluir en la narration de hechos el de que—como es
acostumbrado en este genero de convulsiones sociales—despues de mucho
apasionamiento por ambos lados, de no poca nerviosidad y de laboriosas
negociaciones, la huelga que duro unas dos semanas quedo satisfactoriamente
solucionada, aviniendose los huelguistas a volver a su trabajo a cambio de
ciertas concesiones que hizo el Municipio de Manila, particularmente en la
cuestion de bonificaciones y salarios. Sin embargo, resulta de autos y de la
historia el dia reflejada principalmente en la prensa (de lo cual podemos
naturalmente tomar conocimiento judicial) que la exaltation de los animos, la
pasion ai rojo vivo produjeron algunos incidentes, unos dramaticos, otros
comicos, llegando la tension nerviosa de algunos a exagerar tremendamente las
proporciones del movimiento hasta el extremo de imaginarse rebeliones y
sediciones alii donde no habia sino un espiritu algun tanto militante de parte
de los obreros en la defensa de sus derechos e intereses y en la propaganda de
su causa con la mira de ganarse la simpatia del publico. Uno de esos incidentes
es la cogida o aprehension por la policia, sin previa orden de arresto, por el
especioso pretexto de que estaban incitando y promoviendo nada menos que una
sedicion contra el gobierno constituido, de doce obreros huelgistas,
confinandoseles en la carcel por dicho motivo.
En nombre de esos doce se ha presentado esta solicitud de mandamiento de
habeas corpus por Cecilio M. Lino, presidente de la Union de Empleados y
Obreros de la Ciudad, filial del “Congress of Labor Organizations” (CLO),
defendiendoles como abogados Emmanuel Pelaez, Francisco A. Rodrigo y Enrique M.
Fernando, miembros y representantes de la sociedad civica “Philippine Civil
Liberties Union,” y Manuel M. Crudo, Claudio Teehankee y Jose” W. Diokno,
miembros, y representantes del “Philippine Lawyers’ Guild.” En nombre de los
recurridos ha comparecido ante esta Corte el Fiscal auxiliar Julio Villamor, de
la ciudad de Manila.
Alegase en la solicitud que los doce obreros de que se trata fueron
arrestadcs mientras estaban ejerciendo pacificamente sus derechos
constitucionales, a saber: la libertad de la palabra y de la prensa, y el de
reunion pacifica para pedir del gobierno el alvio de sus agravios. Se detallan
especificamente los actos en que estaban ocupados cuando fueron arrestados, a
saber:
(a) Ricardo Suarez (Juarez), Gregorio Santiago,
Ismael de Jesus y Serafin Pascual fueron arrestados el 5 de Noviembre, 1946,
en la calle de Pinkian, arrabal de Tondo, Manila, mientras estaban distribuyendo
y pegando en las parades hojas volantes en que se explicaban las miserias y
tribulaciones de los obreros en huelga y se apelaba a la simpatia y sentimientos
humanitarios del publico para que apoyara la causa de los huelguistas.
(b) Amando Racanday, Antonio Bulagada (Burlagada) y
Mauro Fernandez fueron arrestados el 6 de Noviembre, 1946, mientras
estaban tranquilamente parados en la esquina de las calles de California y Gral.
Luna, Paco, Manila, y sin ningun motivo aparente como no fuese el de que se
habian adherido a la huelga y se hallaron en su posesion copias de las hojas
volantes menciondas en el parrafo anterior.
(c) Jose Badeo y Francisco Nevado (Levado) fueron
arrestados el 6 de Noviembre, 1946, mientras estaban tranquilamente parados en
la esquina de las calles de Perez y California, Paco, Manila, y tambien sin
ningiin motivo manifiesto como no fuese el de que se habian adherido igualmente
a la huelga y tenian en su poder el aviso de una reunion que la organizacion
obrera a que estaban afiliados iba a celebrar.
(d) Pedro Martinez fue arrestado el 8 de Noviembre, 1946, en la
calle de Juan Luna, Gagalangin, Manila, y sin ninguna razon aparente excepto que
el mismo se habia adherido a la huelga y andaba paseandose a lo largo de dicha
calle con una banda llamativa que llevaba diagonalmente alrededor de su cuerpo y
en la cual estaban escritas las siguientes palabras en tagalo: ¡DAMAYAN KAMI,
HUAG MAG-ISKIROL! (Help us! Don’t be a scab!—Ayudadnos! ¡No seais
desertores!)
(e) Pascual Montaniel fue arrestado el 8 de Noviembre, 1946, en
la calle de Cristobal, Paco, Manila, sin ningun motivo aparente como no fuese el
de que habia saludado amistosamente a uno que no era huelguista.
(f) Pacifico Deoduco fue arrestado el 7 de Noviembre 1946, en
la citada calle de Cristobal tambien sin razon manifiesta excepto que se habia
adherido a la huelga.
Se puso de manifiesto en la audiencia, en los informes orales producidos por
las partes, que los obreros arriba mencionados fueron recluidos en los calabozos
desde que fueron arrestados hasta que, por recomendacion del Promotor Fiscal de
la Ciudad, la Policia los puso en libertad, menos Montaniel y Deoduco, a las
tres y media de la tarde del 11 Noviembre, por haberse hallado, segun la carta
de dicho Fiscal al oficial de las prisiones de Manila, “que no hay prueba
suficiente para justificar la prosecucion de dichos acusados ante los
tribunales, apareciendo que las hojas volantes, manifiestos y otras hojas de
propaganda que tales acusados distribuyeron entre el publico y exhibieron o
fijaron en diferentes lugares dentro de la ciudad, no contenian ninguna frase o
expresion de caracter sedicioso o de tal naturaleza que incitase la comision del
delito de sedition” (Carta del Fiscal de la Ciudad de Manila, Jose P. Bengzon,
de 11 de Noviembre de 1946, al oficial de las prisiones de la ciudad, anexo 3).
Se ordeno, sin embargo, la continuation de la detention de Montaniel y Deoduco,
a pesar de que tampoco habia pruebas de sedition contra ellos, porque la
Fiscalia decidio a ultima hora presentar querellas, a saber: (a) contra
Montaniel, por supuesta vejacion injusta, alegandose que el 8 de Noviembre,
mientras Jesus Cambare guiaba y manejaba un “jeep” de la oficina del Ingeniero
de la ciudad, Montaniel trato de pararle diciendole que dejase de guiar al
servicio de la ciudad de Manila mientras durase la huelga, “con gran disgusto y
molestia de dicho Jesus Cambare”; (b) contra Deoduco, por supuesta
desobediencia a un policia, alegandose en la querella que el 7 de Noviembre,
1946, el acusado entro sin permiso en el deposito de vehiculos de motor
(motor pool) de la ciudad situado en la calle de Cristobal, Paco, y que
cuando el policia de guardia, Vicente Celeridad, le intimido que saliera del
lugar, dicho acusado persistio en quedarse desobedeciendo asi al policia.
Al llegar a este punto parece importante, y hasta necesario, fijar
especificamente el tiempo en que tuvieron lugar ciertos acaecimientos y
tramites. Esto nos servira para poner de relieve ciertos hechos capitales y
ciertos puntos en contencion, y evaluarlos en toda su densidad. De autos e
informes resultan los siguientes hechos: (a) que la presente solicitud de
habeas corpus se presento y registro en la escribania de esta Corte el 11
de Noviembre, 1946, a las 9 de la mañana poco mas o menos; (b) que el
recurrido Alcalde Valeriano E. Fugoso fue emplazado de la solicitud en aquella
misma mañana, a las 11:20; (c) que el recurrido jefe de policia Lamberto
Javalera tambien fue emplazado de la solicitud en aquella misma mañana, a las
11:30; (d) que el recurrido oficial de las prisiones de la ciudad John
Doe fue asimismo emplazado en aquella mañana, a las 11:30; (e) que a la
1:05 p. m. de aquel dia el Fiscal de la Ciudad envio su carta ya citada al
oficial de las prisiones, dando instrucciones para que se pusiese inmediatamente
en libertad a los detenidos, menos Montaniel y Deoduco; (f) que la
policia recibio dichas instrucciones a las 2 de la tarde, y a las 3:30 p. m. las
cumplimento soltando a los detenidos, excepto los ya mencionados Montaniel y
Deoduco; (g) que, a pesar de que estos dos ultimos fueron arrestados el 8
y 7 de Noviembre, respectivamente, la policia no envio a la Fiscalia los papeles
acerca de sus casos sino en la tarde del 11 de Noviembre, es decir, del mismo
dia en que se presento la solicitud de habeas corpus; (h) que la
querella contra Montaniel, por vejacion injusta, se presento ante el juzgado
municipal de Manila a las 2 de la tarde del 11 de Noviembre, es decir, algunas
horas despues de presentada la solicitud de habeas corpus; (i) que
la querella contra Deoduco, por desobediencia a un policia, se presento ante el
juzgado municipal solamente en la mañana del 12 de Noviembre, o sea, al dia
siguiente de interpuesto el recurso de habeas corpus.
Tambien resultan de los autos e informes los siguientes hechos: (1) que
respecto de los diez detenidos que posteriormente fueron puestos en libertad por
no haberse hallado ningun cargo fundado contra ellos, la Fiscalia admite haber
recibido a tiempo de la policia los papeles correspondientes, es decir, dentro
de 6 horas despues de verificados los arrestos, pero que si no pudo presentar
ninguna querella durante un periodo de 7 dias—del 5 al 11 de Noviembre—o decidir
que no habia ninguna sedicion como despues decidio, fue porque tenia otros
muchos trabajos y porqne, ademas, necesitaba de tiempo para leer y desentrañar
el significado de las hojas volantes y manifiestos, y ver si en ellos habia
alguna manifestation sediciosa o criminal; (2) la Fiscalia admite que las hojas
volantes y manifiestos no eran voluminosos sino que se componia de unas cuantas
hojas y que normalmente no se necesitaban dias ni siquiera horas para leerlos y
determinar su signification y sentido, pues no estaban concebidos y escritos en
jeroglificos, sino en un tagalo sencillo, llano y popular, como es usual en
papeles de propaganda; (3) que durante la detencion de los arrestados se trato
de gestionar y obtener su libertad provisional y la Fiscalia señalo a dicho
efecto la prestacion de una fianza de Pl2,000 para cada uno, basando la Fiscalia
su requerimiento en la gravedad del delito supuestamente cometido—el de
sedicion; (4) que asi continuaron las cosas hasta que se presento ante esta
Corte la solicitud de habeas corpus en la mañana del dia 11, viniendo
luego la rapida sucesion de acontecimientos de que ya se ha hecho merito.
Habiendo sido puestos en libertad diez de los doce detenidos antes de que se
viera la presente solicitud de habeas corpus ¿es todavia pertinente que
examinemos la totalidad de los hechos, incluso los relativos a los ya liberados?
Creemos que si; la cuestion, a nuestro juicio, no ha venido a ser meramente
academica, por las siguientes razones: primera, porque ya esta Corte
habia asumido jurisdiccion sobre el caso mediante la presentacion de la
solicitud de habeas corpus cuando los diez detenidos fueron soltados—de
hecho, cabe afirmar que la interposicion de este recurso fue cl motivo de que se
les soltase, pues no podia ser simple coincidencia casual el que, al cabo de
varios dias de extraña inaccion, se diese como de prisa y corriendo la orden de
libertad provisional unas cuantas horas despues de registrada en la escribania
de esta Corte al solicitud de habeas corpus; segunda, porque si
bien es cierto que Montaniel y Deoduco, los dos que no han sido soltados, fueron
arrestados independientemente de los otros y en diferentes fechas, sus casos,
sin embargo, son perfectamente identicos a los de los otros, pudiendo decirse
que la policia arrestd y detuvo a todos ellos como partes de una conspiracion y
sedicion organizada; asi que para lograr una adecuada perspectiva no hay mas
remedio que enfocar conjuntamente los casos, o hay que decirlo mas bien en
singular—el caso de los doce; y tercera, porque si bien es verdad que en
los procedimientos de habeas corpus la cuestion principal es la
liberacion fisica de la persona que esta privada de libertad y que cuando se ha
obtenido tal resultado parece que los procedimientos deben darse por terminados
y, por lo general, huelga todo comentario o exposicion de criterio sobre los
hechos y la ley o doctrina juridica aplicable o deducible de los mismos, es
evidente, sin embargo, que se dan casos en que los hechos son de tal
transcendencia en relation con la vida de las instituciones, con la existencia
del Estado, con las libertades publicas, con el orden social, o con la
existencia de la misma comunidad civil y politica, que no porque deliberada o
indeliberadamente se logra hurtarlos a la accion y decision de los tribunales,
estos quedan excusados de exponer su criterio o hacer algun pronunciamiento,
maxime si como en nuestro caso, en el caso de esta Corte Suprema, el
pronunciamiento judicial, la exposicion de criterio puede no ser una cosa
meramente teorica y academica, sino que puede irradiar un activo y eficaz
influjo de saludable ejemplaridad y repercusion en la vida juridica sentando
normas inequivocas de politica y conducta publica, o bien condenando y
corrigiendo desmanes y abusos si abusos y desmanes se han cometido; y no cabe
duda de que el que tenemos ante Nos es uno de esos casos. Este es un caso en que
no hay mas remedio que hablar claro y fuerte para que lo oigan hasta los sordos,
si se quiere que esta republica pise terreno firme y seguro en su lento caminar
hacia el cumplimiento de sus destinos humanos e historicos; si se quiere que
entre nosotros la constitucion, la ley, el orden, la libertad y la democracia no
sean un mito, juguete de tiranuelos y despotillas, sino realidades vivientes y
cotidianas; si se quiere, en una palabra, que este colosal experimento en que
estamos empeñados—experimento de democracia politico-economico-social-cristiana
en el gran pielago de la Oceania—resulte un acabado exito y una obra que podamos
legar con orgullo a nuestros descendientes.
Lo primero que salta a la vista es que los doce obreros de que se trata no
estaban cometiendo ningun delito, mucho menos el de sedicion, cuando sin previa
orden judicial de arresto fueron aprehendidos como si hubiesen sido cogidos
in fraganti en el preciso momento de perpetrar un crimen, de esos que dan
lugar a procedimientos de oficio y captura y detencion inmediatas por cualquier
agente de seguridad publica. Es verdad que eran huelguistas, pero ¿es acaso la
huelga un crimen? Es verdad tambien que algunos de ellos fueron cogidos
repartiendo y distribuyendo en las calles ciertas hojas volantes y pegando en
muros y paredes ciertos manifestos, pero ¿eran criminosos, incendiarios o
subversivos estos papeles? Tampoco: la Fiscalia de la ciudad, despues de
examinarlos por varios dias—¡paciente y minucioso examen!—acabo por dictaminar a
ultima hora que se trataba de literatura inocente, esto es, que no contenia
ninguna manifestacion sediciosa, recomendando en consecuencia que diez de los
doce fuesen inmediatamente soltados despues de una detencion no solo
absolutamente injustificada, sino ademas ilegal porque excedio con mucho las 6
horas que fija el codigo penal como tiempo maximo de detencion en los casos en
que no hay previa orden judicial de arresto y no se entrega al detenido a la
autoridad judicial correspondiente dentro de dichas 6 horas.
Es cierto asimismo que algunos de los mencionados obreros fueron cogidos por
la policia mientras estaban pacificamente parados en una esquina formando
pequeños grupos, hallandose a lo mas en su poder copia del aviso para un mitin
de la organizacion obrera a que estaban afiliados; pero ¿de cuando aca ha sido
un crimen el estar pacificamente levantados en una esquina, siquiera fuese en
pequeños grupos, y el tener en el bolsillo la copia de una convocatoria para un
mitin pacifico? Esto jamas habia sido un crimen ni en los dias mas obscuros de
nuestra sujecion a la soberania americana; menos ha de serlo ahora en que somos
una nacion independiente, constituimos una republica, y estamos cobijados bajo
la sombra de nuestra propia bandera, teñida en grana de la sangre de tantos y
tantos martires de la libertad que no, ¡no es posible hayan muerto en vano!
Es cierto igualmente que a uno de dichos obreros se le cogio porque andando
por las calles tenia arrollada al cuerpo—¡notable experto en el arte de la
propaganda!—Una banda en que se leian siguientes palabras en tagalo: “¡Damayan
kami, huwag mag-eskirol!” (Help us, don’t be a scab! ¡Ayudadnos, no seais
desertores!); parece que la policia hallo esto como algo subversivo, como una
incitacion a cometer sedicion. Resulta patente, sin embargo, que el gesto de
este obrero propagandista no podia ser mas subversivo ni mas incendiario que el
de Diogenes, el cinico, aquel que, metido en una barrica y portando una
linterna, rodaba por las calles de Atenas en pleno dia buscando un
hombre. Que sepamos, a ningun policia ateniense se le ocurrio coger a
Diogenes por atentar contra la seguridad de la republica. * * *
Ahora llegamos al caso de Montaniel y Deoduco: el primero fue cogido porque
trato de parar a un chofer de la ciudad mientras guiaba un “jeep” y le invito a
que se sumase a la huelga; y el segundo porque entro sin permiso en un deposito
de vehiculos de motor de la ciudad y no quiso salir de alli desobedeciendo las
ordenes del policia de guardia. La policia creia que estos actos eran
sediciosos, y arresto y detuvo a Montaniel y Deoduco por varios dias. Sin
embargo, la Fiscalia, al igual que en los otros casos, dictamino que tampoco
habia aqui sedicion, pero recomendo la continuacion de la detencion
querellandoles por faltas que ni siquiera dan lugar a obligado arresto, segun el
codigo penal: contra Montaniel, por supuesta vejacion injusta; y contra Deoduco,
por supuesta desobediencia ligera a unas ordenes policiacas. ¿Verdad que esto
hace recordar el laborioso parto de los montes? Un raton despues de tanto
estruendo, tanta batahola. * * * Pero tambien hace recordar algo mas: la hoja de
parra biblica para cubrir embarazos y verguenzas de ultima hora. * * * Algunos
podran incluso decir que para el buen nombre y prestigio de la autoridad acaso
hubiera sido mejor reconocer el error paladinamente, con gallarda hombradia,
soltando a todos los detenidos sin excepciones forzadas y especiosas. Hay hasta
grandeza y respetabilidad en la valiente admision de las propias faltas, yerros
y limitaciones.
Se ha querido atenuar la gravedad de la accion policiaca tomando por sedicion
Io que no era mas que llano ejercicio de derechos elementales de ciudadania, con
la excusa de la ignorancia, alegandose que los aprehensores eran simples
patrulleros o reclutas, por lo que no cabia esperar de ellos que discerniesen
bien entre el delito de sedicion y un acto puramente inocente o una mera falta.
Pero ¿es posible tal cuantia de ignorancia en el personal policiaco de este
pais? ¿No se celebran acaso examenes de servicio civil para la calificacion de
dicho personal, fijandose ciertas reglas, normas y requisitos de estudios
escolares para poder ser admitidos en tales examenes? Pero suponiendo ya—lo que
es mucho suponer—que cupiera invocar la ignorancia o falta de instruccion a
favor del policia, patrullero o recluta de una aldea, de un villorrio ¿es
posible, es siquiera medianamente decoroso que eso se invoque a favor del
policia metropolitan de la ciudad de Manila, la capital de la republica? Ademas,
tratandose de una huelga obrera de tales proporciones como la que motivo los
arrestos que nos ocupan—suceso dramatico, sensacional que agito y conmovio a
todo el vecindario de la ciudad de Manila por afectar a ciertos servicios
municipales indispensables—¿como se puede concebir que los patrulleros y
reclutas del cuerpo de policia salieran a la calle para cumplir sus deberes en
la custodia y mantenimiento del orden publico sin un plan previamente concert
ado y preparado por sus jefes y superiores, y sobre todo, sin recibir antes de
estos las necesarias instrucciones sobre como iban a cumplir tales deberes,
sobre que actos debian considerarse delictivos o sediciosos, sobre que actos y
manifestaciones podian permitirse y tolerarse, etc., etc.? Es mas: suponiendo ya
que los aprehensores, en la precipitacion o en el calor del momento, se
equivocaran o se excedieran abusando de sus poderes, haciendo lo que hicieron,
esto es, arrestando sin motivo justificado a los doce huelguistas de que se
trata ¿no tenia, no tiene la policia de Manila un cuerpo o una division legal,
compuesta de abogados, trabajando tranquilamente en sus mesas, entre las cuatro
paredes de una oficina, rodeados de libros, sin prisas, sin excitaciones,
depurando los hechos de cada caso, de cada arresto, examinando su fase legal,
compulsando y analizando papeles y documentos, evaluando precedentes locales y
extranjeros, etc., etc.? Y ¿no tenia la policia de Manila, con toda su division
legal, el periodo de 6 horas que señala la ley para todo ese trabajo de
investigacion, de examen, de analisis de los hechos y de la ley, para ver si se
habia cometido o no un crimen, si se habia perpetrado o no el delito grave de
sedicion? Si hubiera habido el debido respeto, la debida consideracion a la
libertad, a los derechos constitucionales del individuo—derechos sagrados,
inviolables, aunque ese individuo fuese un simple obrero, un humilde recogedor
de cubetas municipales—¿por que la policia de Manila, con toda su bateria de
abogados, comenzando por el Jefe hasta el ultimo oficial, no habia de exprimir
ese periodo legal de 6 horas, sacar de el todo el partido posible para estudiar
y depurar los arrestos y ver que no estaban justificados a la luz de la ley de
sedicion—conclusion a que despues se llego, pero varios dias despues de tener
pisoteada la libertad en los calabozos municipales, en contravencion de la
ley?
Los abusos, arbitrariedades, extralimitaciones y excesos autoritarios por
parte de la policia o de cualquier agente de seguridad y orden publico son una
cosa que jamas debe ser tomada ligeramente, frivolamente, con la indiferencia y
despreocupaeion con que muchas veces se toman ciertas cosas que se estiman
inevitables o rutinarias—”matter of course,” como se dice en ingles—si se quiere
que la causa de la democracia y libertad no sufra entre nosotros un quebranto
que puede ser fatal para la existencia misma de la republica. La historia y la
experiencia nos demuestran de consuno que la indiferencia, la dejadez de los
pueblos es la que siempre ha echado a perder la libertad en el mundo. Es harto
significativo que en nuestra misma epoca los gobiernos totalitarios, de sangre y
de fuerza, hayan todos tenido que afianzarse en la policia para consolidar su
poder por los cuatro costados y asegurar la castracion, mejor todavia, la
estrangulacion de la voluntad popular, el abatimiento de toda resistencia
ciudadana: el nazismo, en Hitler y su gestapo; el fascismo, en los
rufianes de camisa negra de Mussolini; el despotismo nipon, en su famoso
kempetai; y el absolutismo comunista, en la ogpu. Y el proceso de
disolucion ha comenzado siempre por la inercia, la abulia de las masas. Pocas
frases historicas tienen la perenne significacion vital de esta: “La vigilancia
es el eterno precio de la libertad.” O de estas otras de nuestro gran Dr. Rizal:
“La resignacion no siempre es virtud; es crimen cuando alienta tiranias”—”No hay
tiranos donde no hay esclavos.” O de esta otra: “Cada pueblo tiene el gobierno
que se merece.”
(Asi que, entre parentesis, merecen placemes las sociedades de caracter
civico y profesional y algunos de sus miembros que romanticamente,
desinteresadamente, han comparecido en el presente caso para romper lanzas por
la causa de la libertad. Ellos pertenecen a una orden benemerita que puede
propiamente llamarse la Orden de los Vigilantes de la Libertad.)
Se arguye en favor de los recurridos que la policia entrego a la Fiscalia de
Manila los papeles correspondientes dentro de las 6 horas que fija el articulo
125 del Codigo Penal Revisado y que, por tanto, la demora ilegal, si la hubo, no
tuvo lugar en los cuarteles de la policia sino en la oficina del Fiscal. Aunque
ello no se trasluce clara e inequivocamente en autos, parece que se puede
admitir que respecto de los 10 que han sido puestos en libertad los papeles se
entregaron a la Fiscalia oportunamente; no asi respecto. de Montaniel y Deoduco,
los dos cuya detencion se ha prolongado. Resulta de autos y de los informes
producidos’ en la audiencia que Deoduco fue arrestado el 7 de Noviembre y
Montaniel el 8; que los papeles en ambos casos se entregaron por la policia a la
Fiscalia en la tarde del 11 de Noviembre, 4 y 3 dias respectivamente despues del
arresto, es decir, mucho despues de las 6 horas fijadas por la ley; que
la querella contra Montaniel se presento, como queda dicho mas arriba, en la
misma tarde del dia 11, y la querella contra Deoduco, por desobediencia, ya en
la mañana del 12, esto es, en el mismo dia de la vista de la presente solicitud
de habeas corpus.
La Fiscalia explica la demora diciendo que por aquellos dias estaba
sobrecargada de trabajos; que, ademas de los 12 obreros detenidos de que se
trata, habia otros muchos por diferentes delitos y faltas; que necesitaba de
tiempo para examinar bien las hojas volantes y demas papeles; que tambien
necesitaba de tiempo para atar bien los cabos y las circunstancias a fin de ver
si con la huelga estaba relacionado un movimiento coordinado de sedicion, y si
los actos de los 12 arrestados formaban parte de ese movimiento. La Fiscalia
admite haber fijado en la cantidad prohibitiva de P12,000 la fianza que debia
prestar cada detenido para su libertad provisional mientras se estudiaban los
casos. Mas tarde, cuando la Fiscalia se convencio de que no habia sedicion ni
nada que se le pareciera, recomendo una fianza de P100 para Montaniel y de P200
para Deoduco.
Sin discutir la responsabilidad de la Fiscalia por la demora—si esta se puede
o no justificar administrativamente es cuestion que no nos compete considerar ni
resolver—vamos a limitarnos a comentar y discutir la fase juridica, legal. Esta
en orden naturalmente el hacer la siguiente pregunta: ¿es correcta, es acertada
la asercion de que el “Promotor Fiscal de Manila es un funcionario judicial
(judicial officer),” y que, por tanto, la entrega al mismo de la persona de un
detenido dentro del periodo de 6 horas equivale a la entrega a las autoridades
judiciales correspondientes (proper judicial authorities) de que habla el
articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado? Creemos que no: ni por su letra ni por
su espiritu puede aplicarse por extension la fraseologia de ese articulo al
Fiscal de la ciudad de Manila o a cualquier otro Fiscal; ese articulo no puede
referirse mas que a un tribunal, a un juzgado, sea municipal, sea de primera
instancia. Asi que estoy de perfecto acuerdo con la ponencia cuando
positivamente sienta la doctrina de que “si bien un arresto puede hacerse sin
orden cuando hay motivos razonables para ello (regla 109, articulo 6, Reglamento
de los Tribunales), el detenido no puede ser recluido fuera del periodo
prescrito por la ley, a menos que una orden de arresto se obtenga antes de un
tribunal competente” (veanse las autoridades que se citan), y que “en el
presente caso el Fiscal de la ciudad no tenia autoridad para expedir ordenes de
arresto y carecia de facultad para convalidar tal detencion ilegal con solo
presentar las querellas, o con una orden de su propia cuenta, ora tacita, ora
expresa” (veanse asimismo las autoridades que se citan).
De lo dicho se sigue que cuando la policfa entrega a la Fiscalia de la ciudad
despues del periodo de 6 horas prescrito por la ley los papeles sobre un
detenido arrestado sin previa orden al efecto, no por ello se cura la ilegalidad
del arresto y detencion, sino que dicha ilegalidad continua y persiste hasta que
el Fiscal presenta la qnerella y obtiene una orden de arresto del tribunal
competente, o que, tratandose de delito, mediante la prestacion de una fianza
cuya cuantia se fijare y recomendare por dicho Fiscal, la policfa soltare al
detenido, a tenor de lo previsto en el articulo 2460 del codigo
administrativo.
Puede ocurrir, sin embargo, que la policia entregue los papeles a la Fiscalia
de la ciudad dentro del periodo de 6 horas, pero que la Fiscalia no solo deja
pasar dicho periodo, sino que transcurren dias, hasta semanas sin actuar sobre
el caso en uno u otro sentido. La cuestion en orden naturalmente es la
siguiente: ¿es legal o ilegal la detencion del arrestado en tal caso? En otras
palabras: ¿queda suspendido el periodo de 6 horas durante el tiempo que el
Fiscal de la ciudad tarda en actuar sobre el caso? La contestation tiene que ser
necesariamente negativa. La rigidez, la inflexibilidad del periodo de 6 horas
reza no solo para la policia, sino hasta para cualquier otra agencia o ramo
oficial, sin excluir a la Fiscalia de la ciudad de Manila. Si por cualquier
motivo la Fiscalia dejare de actuar dentro de dicho periodo, el deber de la
policia o del que tenga la custodia del detenido es soltarle, quiera o no quiera
el Fiscal, lo recomiende o no lo recomiende. De otra manera, la restriccion que
estatuye la ley a favor de los detenidos sin previa orden de arresto—restriccion
que implementa las garantias de la libertad establecidas en la
Constitucion—resultaria un mito. La filosofia de la ley es, a saber: solamente
se verifica un arresto sin previa orden cuando hay motivos razonables para ello,
v. gr., cuando un individuo es cogido in fraganti cometiendo un
delito. La ley presupone, por tanto, que el Estado tiene a mano todos los
elementos necesarios para decidir que accion ha de tomar dentro del periodo de 6
horas, ya entregando la persona del detenido a las autoridades judiciales
correspondientes mediante la querella procedente, a tenor del articulo 125 del
codigo penal revisado; ya poniendole en libertad provisional bajo una fianza
razonable, de acuerdo con el citado articulo 2460 del codigo administrativo; o
ya poniendole completamente en la calle por falta de meritos en el caso. Si
ninguna de estas cosas puede hacer el Estado en 6 horas no puede ser mas que por
dos motivos: o porque se quiere cometer una arbitrariedad, o la maquinaria
oficial se halla en un deplorable estado de confusion, ineptitud o
impotencia.
Se arguye con enfasis que bajo esta interpretacion la prosecucion del crimen
sufriria un serio quebranto, sobre todo en la ciudad de Manila; que
materialmente la Fiscalia no puede actuar adecuadamente sobre algunos casos en
el plazo perentorio de 6 horas. Si esto es verdad el remedio no es infringir la
ley como cosa inevitable, rutinaria; el remedio seria—o recabar de la
Legislatura que se reforme la ley en la forma que se estime conveniente, o
implementar y perfeccionar la maquinaria de la prosecucion criminal colocandola
a la altura de las circunstancias. No hay nada mas anarquico, mas subversivo y
fatal para el principio de la autoridad del buen gobierno que el tener leyes que
no se cumplen, leyes que se infringen hasta por los llamados a ponerlas en
vigor. “To be or not to be, that is the question.” O existe la ley y hay que
cumplirla; o si la ley es mala o impracticable, hay que reformarla o derogarla.
Lo que no se debe permitir es el disolvente espectaculo de la diaria
inobservancia de la ley.
Tenemos un precedente recientisimo: la ley sobre el
Tribunal del Pueblo (Ley del Commonwealth No. 682, articulo 19). Una de las
disposiciones mas importantes de esa ley es precisamente la que reforma el
articulo 125 del codigb penal revisado, extendiendo el periodo de 6 horas a 6
meses a fin de legalizar la detencion de los que, sospechosos de traicion,
fueron arrestados y detenidos por las autoridades del ejercito americano
inmediatamente despues de la liberation de Filipinas de la conquista japonesa.
De paso se puede precisamente decir que esa reforma es uno de los mejores
argumentos contra la tesis de que durante el tiempo en que la Fiscalia de la
ciudad estudia el caso el periodo de 6 horas queda en suspenso y se legaliza la
detencion. Si esto fuese correcto, no hubiera habido necesidad de insertar esa
disposicion reformatoria en la ley sobre el Tribunal del Pueblo.
DISSENTING
TUASON, J.:
The writ should have been denied or dismissed as to all the persons on whose
behalf the petition was filed, including Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico
Deoduco.
According to the return the last two had been arrested by the police for
inciting to sedition on the occasion of the strike of the City of Manila workers
and had been duly charged after their arrest with unjust vexation and
disobedience to public orders, respectively. The complaints had been filed by
the City Fiscal with the municipal court, and the Fiscal had recommended a bail
of P100 for Montaniel and P200 for Deoduco for their temporary release. The
fiscal in his return further stated that these complaints had been docketed on
“November 11, 1946, before and after the receipt by them (respondents) of their
respective copies of the petition for habeas corpus herein filed.” The last
allegation contradicts the finding in the decision of the majority that “the
complaints were filed on the same day when this case was heard before this
Court, that is, on November 12, 1946.”
The allegations in the return are presumed to be correct, the same not having
been controverted. The return to the writ, of itself, is not conclusive of the
facts alleged therein, but is prima facie proof of such facts. In the
absence of a denial, or appropriate pleading avoiding their effect, they will be
taken as true and conclusive, regardless of the allegations contained in the
petition, and the only question for determination is whether or not the facts
stated in their return, as a matter of law, authorizes the restraint under
investigation. (39 C. J. S., 664, 665.)
Here Pascual Montaniel or Pacifico Diaduco entitled to be discharged upon the
facts set forth in the return? The decision of the majority says yes. It reasons
that “Even assuming that they (the prisoners) were legally arrested without
warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively, their continued detention
became illegal upon the expiration of six hours without their having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125, Rev. Pen.
Code, as amended by Act No. 3940.) Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal
late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946, that is four and three days,
respectively, after they were arrested. The illegality of their detention was
not cured by the filing of the informations against them, since no warrants of
arrest or orders of commitment have been issued by the municipal court up to the
hearing of this case before this Court.” The decision goes on to say that “the
City Fiscal, who has no authority to issue warrants of arrest (Hashim vs.
Boncan and City Fiscal of Manila, 71 Phil., 261) was powerless to validate such
illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own,
either express or implied.”
With all modesty and with due respect to the opinion of the majority, I take
a different view. The bringing of the prisoners before the City Fiscal made a
whole lot of difference and totally changed the legal aspects of the detention.
The Prosecuting Attorney of the City of Manila 13 a judicial officer with powers
to make investigations on the same level as a municipal judge or justice of the
peace. (United States vs. Rubal, 37 Phil., 577; section 2, Rule 108, of
the Rules of Court.) Section 2, Rule 108 provides that “every justice of the
peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation of all offenses alleged to have been committed within
his municipality or city, cognizable by the Court of First Instance.” And with
particular reference to the Fiscal of the City of Manila, section 2465 of the
Revised Administrative Code ordains that he “shall cause to be investigated all
charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the
necessary informations or complaints prepared or made against the persons
accused.”
I conclude from these provisions that when Montaniel’s and Diaduco’s cases
were reported to the City Fiscal, that action put an end to the illegality of
their detention, assuming that the prolonged detention had been unwarranted. In
other words, if Montaniel’s and Diaduco’s detention had become illegal upon the
expiration of six hours from the time of their arrest, it reacquired its lawful
character the moment they were taken to the City Fiscal for appropriate action
on their cases; in fact the prisoners could not thereafter be released by the
police except in the manner provided by law. What the law is, I shall endeavor
to explain.
There is legal and rational support for the proposition that after the case
of an arrested person has been placed in the hands of a fiscal or municipal
judge, il is the right, let alone the duty, of the police to keep him in custody
until he is discharged according to law regardless of the illegality of his
previous detention, which, by the way, is not to be confused with the arrest.
This practice is made necessary, at least in the City of Manila, by the very
nature of things as well as by express enactments. The law, statutory and
common, is that an officer or private individual who has made an arrest of a
person without a warrant has authority to detain him in custody until a
preliminary hearing against him can be had (4 Am. Jur., 49) and he may then be
committed to jail or held to bail (William F. Downs vs. Sherlock Swann,
23 L. R. A., N. S., 739, citing Brish vs. Carter, 98 Md., 445, and Edger
vs. Burke, 96 Md., 722). Supplementing and confirming this general rule
the Manila Charter specifically vests on the Chief of Police the power to keep
the prisoner in custody or release him on bail, although in cases of violation
of any penal law, as distinguished from violations of municipal ordinances, the
bail is fixed by the City Fiscal and the release must be authorized or
recommended by the latter. Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code thus
states that “the chief of police may take good and sufficient bail for the
appearance before the city court of any person arrested for violation of any
city ordinances: Provided, however, That he shall not exercise
this power in case of violations of any penal law, except when the fiscal of the
city shall so recommend and fix the bail to be required of the person
arrested.”
In consonance with the foregoing rule and provision, the practice followed by
the City Fiscal of Manila, when a person arrested without a warrant is brought
before him, has been either to fix the bond and order the provisional release of
the prisoner before filing a complaint or information or making an
investigation, or else to file a complaint or information and leave it to the
appropriate court to admit the detained person to bail. In neither case it is
necessary to, nor does the court, as a matter of fact, issue an order of arrest.
This is so simply because the accused is already under arrest; and the court
does not issue a commitment because there is no final judgment and because the
arrest has not been effected by its order. It is to be remembered that the City
Fiscal himself has no authority to order, but only to recommend to the police,
the release of detained persons. Neither is the City Fiscal empowered to order
the continued detention of such persons for the reason already stated, that it
is upon the authority and responsibilty of the Chief of Police that this
functionary holds the prisoners until the court commands his discharge.
The previous illegality of the detention of Montaniel and Deoduco has no
relevancy to their petition for habeas corpus and it is a mistake for this Court
to allow itself to be influenced thereby. There can be no serious doubt as to
the intent of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940,
which says that “The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours.” This provision refers solely to
detention by a police officer prior to the retained person’a delivery to the
proper judicial officer. It does not restrict the time within which the fiscal
of the city, a justice of the peace or a municipal judge should act on the case.
It seeks to prevent abuses by the police—to prevent them from keeping for an
unreasonable length of time arrested persons who are not properly charged before
a competent judicial officer, or whose detention has no justifiable cause. It
does not force the city fiscal, justice of the peace or municipal judge to
release the prisoners at or before the expiration of six hours from the time of
their arrest. Nothing could have been farther from the thought of the
legislature than to tie so tightly the hands of the law, and coddle and pamper
lawlessness to a calamitous extreme. It requires no mental effort to see that it
is beyond the ability of any person to make an investigation of a criminal case,
file a complaint or information, and secure an arrest warrant or commitment in
six hours, or worse still what remains, if any, of that period computed from the
time of the arrest. The theory sustained by the majority, if put into practice,
would play havoc on the efforts of law-enforcement agencies and the
administration of criminal law, certain to produce disastrous consequences, not
difficult to imagine, in the maintenance of peace and order. The decision of
this Court sets a precedent which will open the door to evasions of criminal
prosecution. The populous conditions of Manila and other centers of population
in the Philippines as they exist today, and the modern facilities of
transportation and rapid transit afford easy means for avoiding re-arrest or
fleeing from justice. Such evasions and such escapes would be the result of the
holding that a person who has been arrested without a warrant and detained
beyond the six-hour limit by the police should be discharged irrespective of the
filing of a complaint after the lapse of that period, on the pendency of an
appropriate criminal action against him. The situation which I have pictured
will follow from the ruling that even if a crime has been committed by the
person arrested and a complaint has been filed against him, he nevertheless
should be released, without prejudice to his re-arrest on a formal information
or complaint lodged against him.
I do not justify or condemn the arrest or the detention beyond the six-hour
limit of the petitioners. This question is not in issue and must be judged in
the light of the surrounding circumstances of the case which are not before us.
But I do maintain that the illegal detention, if there was illegal detention,
and the subsequent lawful restraint are separable and must not be confounded
with each other. If a crime was committed as a result of the prolonged detention
of the prisoners, there is the penal law and the proper machinery of justice to
take care of the erring officials. To prosecution and punishment or correction
of criminal offenders is a vital concern of the State, vital to its very
existence. The interests of the people should not be sacrificed or jeopardized
by the ignorance, negligence or malicious conduct of the police.
The opinion of the majority stems from the erroneous assumption that the
right to the writ must be determined according to the facts as they appear at
the time of the filing of the petition. Some early cases did hold that
valid process obtained after the time of service of the writ of habeas corpus
was not sufficient, and that a person detained unlawfully must be discharged
from the imprisonment under the unlawful proceedings, although he might
thereafter be detained on lawful proceedings. But the better, present-day and
preponderant rule, which is more in keeping with modern conditions and better
safeguards against modern facilities for escape, is that a prisoner has no right
to a writ of habeas corpus unless he is entitled to immediate release, and the
writ will not issue unless he is presently in restraint of his liberty without
warrant of law; that the writ of habeas corpus is concerned solely with the
legality of the restraint at the time of the filing of the petition for its
issue, or by the conditions existing at the time of the hearing or final
decision thereon, and does not depend on the legality or illegality of the
original caption; and that where the detention is lawful at the time of the
return, it is sufficient to defeat the writ. (39 C. J. S., 443, 444.) The United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, declares
that “the validity of a detention questioned by a petitioner for habeas corpus
is to be determined by the conditions existing at the time of the final decision
thereon.” (United States ex. rel. Mensevich vs. Tod, 68 Law. ed.,
591.) Conversely, it has been held, detention which was lawful in its inception
may afterwards become unlawful and the prisoner is then entitled to be
discharged on habeas corpus, as, for example, where a prisoner has been
pardoned.
The statement therefore that “the city fiscal who has no authority
to issue warrants of arrest (Hashim vs. Boncan and City Fiscal of Manila, 71
Phil., 261) was powerless to validate such illegal detention by merely filing
an information or by any other of his own, either express or implied, must be
qualified. If by validation of the illegal detention is meant wiping out of the
penal offense that has already been consummated and which resulted from the
unlawful detention, there can be no disagreement. But if it means that the
detention having become illegal because it extended beyond six hours nothing
short of a warrant of arrest issued by a competent judge could stop the release
of the prisoners under detention, the conclusion is against law and sound
principles of jurisprudence.