G.R. No. L-4935. May 28, 1954

This is an action originally brought in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to recover possession of registered land
situated in barrio Tatalon, Quezon City.

Plaintiff’s complaint was amended three times with respect to the
extent and description of the land sought to be recovered. The original
complaint described the land as a portion of a lot registered in
plaintiff’s name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37686.of the
land record of Rizal Province and as containing an area of 13 hectares
more or less. But the complaint was amended by reducing the area to 6
hectares, more or less, after defendant had indicated the plaintiff’s
surveyors the portion of land claimed and occupied by him. The second
amendment became necessary and was allowed following the testimony of
plaintiff’s surveyors that a portion of the area was embraced in
another certificate of title, which was plaintiff’s Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 37677. And still later, in the course of
trial, after defendant’s surveyor and witness, Quirino Feria, had
testified that the area occupied and claimed by defendant was about 13
hectares, as shown in his Exhibit 1, plaintiff again, with the leave of
court, amended its complaint to make its allegations conform to the
evidence.

Defendant, in his answer, sets up prescription and title in himself
thru “open, continuous, exclusive and public and notorious possession
(of the land in dispute) under claim of ownership, adverse to the
entire world by defendant and his predecessors in interest” from “time
in- memorial”. The answer further alleges that registration of the land
in dispute was obtained by plaintiff or its predecessors in interest
thru “fraud or error and without knowledge (of) or notice either
personal or thru publication to defendant and/or predecessors in
interest.” The answer therefore prays that the complaint be dismissed
with costs, and plaintiff required to reconvey the land to defendant or
pay its value.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment for plaintiff,
declaring defendant to be without any right to the land in question and
ordering him to restore possession, thereof to plaintiff and to pay the
latter a monthly rent of ?132.62 from January, 1940, until he vacates
the land, and also to pay the costs.

Appealing directly to this court because of the value of the
property involved, defendant makes the following assignment of errors;

“I. The trial court erred in not dismissing the case on the ground that the case was hot brought by the real party in interest.

“II. The trial court erred in admitting the third amended complaint.

“III. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to strike.

“IV. The trial court erred in including in its decision land not involved in the litigation.

“V. The trial court erred in holding that the land in dispute is covered by transfer certificates of Title Nos. 37686 and 37677.

“VI. The trial court erred in not finding that the defendant is the true and lawful owner of the land.

“VII.
The trial court erred in finding that the defendant is liable to pay
the plaintiff the amount of P132.62 monthly from January, 1940, until
he vacates the premises.

“VIII. The trial court erred in not ordering the plaintiff to reconvey the land in litigation to the defendant.”

As to the first assigned error, there is nothing to the contention
that the present action is not brought by the real party in interest,
that is, by J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. What the Rules of Court
require is that an action be brought in the name of, but not
necessarily by, the real party in interest. (Section 2, Rule 2.) In
fact the practice is for an attorney-at-law to bring the action, that
is to file the complaint, in the name of the plaintiff. That practice
appears to have been followed in this case, since the complaint is
signed by the law firm of Araneta & Araneta, “counsel for
plaintiff” and commences with the statement “Comes now plaintiff,
through its undersigned counsel.” It is true that the complaint also
states that the plaintiff is “represented herein by its Managing
Partner Gregorio Araneta, Inc.”, another corporation, but there is
nothing against one corporation being represented by another person,
natural or juridical, in a suit in court. The contention that Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. can not act as managing partner for plaintiff on the
theory that it is illegal for two corporations to enter into a
partnership is without merit, for the true rule is that “though a
corporation has no power to enter into a partnership, it may
nevertheless enter into a joint venture with another where, the nature
of that venture is in line with the business-authorized by its
charter.” (Wyoming-Indiana Oil Gas Co, vs. Weston, 80 A. L. R., 1043,
citing 2 Fletcher Cyc. of Corp., 1082.) There is nothing in the record
to indicate that the venture in which plaintiff is represented; by
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. as “its managing partner” is not in line with
the corporate business of either of them,.

Errors II, III, and IV, referring to the admission of the third
amended complaint, may be answered: by mere reference to section 4 of
Rule 17, Rules of Court, which sanctions such amendment. It reads:

“SEC. 4. Amendment to conform to evidence.—When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at my time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result
of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleading’s to be amended and shall be so freely
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.”

Under this provision amendment is not even necessary for the purpose
of rendering judgment on issues proved though not alleged. Thus,
commenting on the provision, Chief Justice Moran says in his Rules of
Court:

“Under this section, American courts have, under the
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ruled that where the facts shown
entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no amendment to
the complaint is necessary, especially where defendant has himself
raised the point on which recovery is based, and that the appellate
court treat the pleadings as amended to conform to the evidence,
although the pleadings were not actually amended.” (I Moran, Rules of
Court, 1952 ed., 389-390.) Our conclusion therefore is that
specification of error II, III, and IV are without merit.

Let us now pass on the errors V and VI. Admitting, through his
attorney, at the early stage of the trial, that the land in dispute “is
that described or represented in Exhibit A and in Exhibit B enclosed in
red pencil with the name Quirino Bolanos,” defendant later changed his
lawyer and also his theory and tried to prove that the land in dispute
was not covered by plaintiff’s certificate of title. The evidence,
however, is against defendant, for it clearly establishes that
plaintiff is the registered owner of lot No. 4-B-3-C, situate in barrio
Tatalon, Quezon City, with an area of 5,297,429.3 square meters, more
or less, covered by transfer certificate of title No. 37686 of the land
records of Rizal province, and of lot No. 4rB-4, situated in the same
barrio, having an area of 74,789 square meters, more or less, covered
by transfer certificate of title No. 37677 of the land records of the
same province, both lots having been originally registered on July 8,
1914 under original certificate of title No. 735. The identity of the
lots was established by the testimony of Antonio Manahan and Magno
Faustino, witnesses for plaintiff, and the identity of the portion
thereof claimed by defendant was established by the testimony of his
own witness, Quirico Feria. The combined testimony of these three
witnesses clearly shows that the portion claimed by defendant is made
up of a part of lot 4-B-3-C and major on portion of lot 4-B-4, and is
well within the area covered by the two transfer certificates of title
already mentioned. This fact also appears admitted in defendant’s
answer to the third amended complaint.

As the land in dispute is covered by plaintiff’s Torrens certificate
of title and was registered in 1914, the decree of registration can no
longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error or lack of notice to
defendant, as more than one year has already elapsed from the issuance
and entry of the decree. Neither could the decree be collaterally
attacked by any person claiming title to, or interest in, the land
prior to the registration proceedings. (Sorongon vs. Makalintal,^[1]
45 Off. Gaz., 3819.) Nor could title to that land in derogation of that
of plaintiff, the registered owner, be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. (Section 46, Act No. 496.) Adverse, notorious and
continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed by
law is ineffective against a Torrens title. (Valiente vs. Judge of CFI
of Tarlac,^[2] etc., 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. 9, p. 43.) And it is
likewise settled that the right to secure possession under a decree of
registration does not prescribe. (Francisco vs. Cruz, 43 Off. Gaz.,
5105, 5109-5110.) A recent decision of this Court on this point is that
rendered in the case of Jose Alcantara et al., vs. Mariano et al., 92
Phil., 796. This disposes of the alleged errors V and VI.

As to error VII, it is claimed that ‘there was no evidence to
sustain the finding that defendant should be sentenced to pay plaintiff
P132.62 monthly from January, 1940, until he vacates the premises.” But
it appears from the record that the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the premises, as stipulated at the hearing was P10 a
month for each hectare and that the area occupied by defendant was
13.2619 hectares. The total rent to be paid for the area occupied
should therefore be P132.62 a month. It also appears from the testimony
of J. A. Araneta and witness Emigdio Tanjuatco that as early as 1939 an
action of ejectment had already been filed against defendant. And it
cannot be supposed that defendant has been paying rents, for he has
been asserting all along that the premises in question “have always
been since time immemorial in open, continuous, exclusive and public
and notorious possession and under claim of ownership adverse to the
entire world by defendant and his predecessors in interest.” This
assignment of error is thus clearly without merit.

Error No. VIII is but a consequence of the other errors alleged and needs for further consideration.

During the pendency of this case in this Court appellant, thru other
counsel, has filed a motion to dismiss alleging that there is pending
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal another action between the
same parties and for the same cause and seeking to sustain that
allegation with a copy of the complaint filed in said action. But an
examination of that complaint reveals that appellant’s allegation is
not correct, for the pretended identity of parties and cause of action
in the two suits does not appear. That other case is one for recovery
of ownership, while the present one is for recovery of possession. And
while appellant claims that he is also involved in that other action
because it is a class suit, the complaint does not show that such is
really the case. On the contrary, it appears that the action seeks
relief for each individual plaintiff and not relief for and on behalf
of others. The motion for dismissal is clearly without merit.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

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^[1] 80 Phil., 259.                                                       ^[2] 80 Phil., 415.