G. R. No. L-10760. May 17, 1957

This is an  appeal taken by  the  Government from  a decision of the  Court of First  Instance of Manila, ordering the respondents to refund and deliver  to the  petitioners the sum of P10,000 deposited with the Government for the temporary stay of petitioner  Ly Giok Ha alias Wy Giok  Ha,  as well  as to pay  the costs.   There  is  no  dispute about the facts, the case having been submitted for decision upon a stipulation of facts.

Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. GcUa,ng, et al. On May 14, 1955, petitioner Ly Giok Ha, alias Wy Giok Ha, entered the Philippines as a citizen of the Nationalist Republic of China and a temporary visitor for a period of three (3) months, expiring on August 24, 1955, which was extended  up to March  14, 1956.   In order to make said entry feasible, her sister, and co-petitioner Wy Hong Bng, had, on March 28, 1955, made with the Bureau of Immigration, a cash deposit of P10,000, pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in an instrument, entitled “Cash Bond for Temporary Stay”, copy of which has been marked as Annex B.  On  March 8, 1956, Ly Giok Ha, alias Wy Giok Ha, married Eeatituto Lacasta, a Filipino. The next day the former  wrote respondent Emilio L.  Galang, as Commissioner of Immigration,  advising  him of the said  wedding and requesting that her alien immigration papers and said cash bond deposit be  cancelled, and  that the amount thereof be refunded, upon the ground that, by virtue of her  marriage, she became a citizen of  the Philippines.  This notwithstanding, on  March  16, 1956,  respondent  Galang declared said cash deposit forfeited.  He having subsequently refused to reconsider this action, Ly Giok Ha, alias Wy Giok  Ha, her husband  Restituto Lacasta, the former’s sister, Wy Hong Eng,  and the latter’s husband, Ngo In, instituted the  present  action against  Emilio  L.  Galang, as  Commissioner of  Immigration,  Enrique  Zapanta,  as Accounting Officer of the Bureau of Immigration, Manuel Agregado, as Auditor General, and Vicente Gella, as Treasurer  of  the  Philippines, upon the ground that the confiscation of said deposit is illegal  and unjust, it  having been ordered by respondent Galang without and in excess of his jurisdiction, and with grave abuse of discretion, and that the amount  of said deposit had been turned over     by  respondent  Zapanta, under  the order of  Galang,  to the Treasurer  of the  Philippines,  through  the Auditor  General, and praying that  judgment be  rendered  annulling  the aforementioned order of forfeiture  of  respondent Galang,  and  directing  the refund  of said sum  of Ly Giok JIat et al. vs. Gadwtig, el al. P10,000.   After due trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment for the petitioners, as  prayed for.  Hence,  this appeal.

Appellants  urge a  reversal  of the  judgment  appealed from  upon  the ground  that  the conditions  of  the  bail bond in question had  been violated because:  (a) requests for extension  of the period of the original authorized  stay had been made; and  (6) Ly Giok Ha, alias Wy  Giok Ha had failed to leave the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956,  date of expiration  of the last extension granted to said petitioner. The provisions of the bond in question, pertinent to the first count, read as follows:

(a)  That the undersigned,  with full  knowledge that Ly  Giok Ha, a temporary visitor  whose authorized stay in this  country  is limited only up to and including August  14,  1955,  do  hereby undertake that  said Ly  Giok  Ha will actually  depart from the Philippines on or before said  date so specified, or within such period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration  or his authorized  representative  may  properly  allow;

“(a-1)  That the undersigned hereby guarantee that no extension of the  original  authorized stay  of three  (3) months of Ly  Giok Ha will be requested.”  (See Annex E to  the petition, p. 7, rec.)

Appellants maintain that the  above-quoted paragraph a—1  had been infringed  by the requests for  extension— allegedly filed  by Ly Giok Ha, through her counsel—of the period of  her stay as a  temporary visitor.  Apart from the fact that the alleged requests by said petitioner do not appear in  the stipulation of facts  already adverted to, we do not believe that said requests constituted a violation of the bond or sufficed to warrant its forfeiture, for:

(1)  Competent   authorities   granted   said   requests. Having thus, in effect, been found to be meritorious  and justified,  said requests cannot  be considered  violative of the contract in  question.

(2)  Paragraph  (a) thereof  clearly  indicates  that  the Commissioner  of Immigration,  or his authorized representative, may properly allow an extension of the  period fixed therein.   Since,  in  the ordinary  course of  events,  such extension would not be allowed  without a corresponding request therefor, it  follows that the very bond  under consideration countenances and sanctions such  request. (3)  Said bond must  have  been  required and  given, pursuant to section  40 (a) of Commonwealth Act No.  61S (“The Philippine Immigration Act  of  1940”) reading:

“The Commissioner of Immigration shall have the  power to- exact bonds  in such  amounts and containing such  conditions as he  may prescribe:

“(1)  To control and regulate  the admission into, and departure from, the Philippines of aliens applying for  temporary admission;
“(2)  To insure against aliens passengers liable to be excluded as likely  to  become  public charges, from  becoming public  charges;
“(3)  To insure the  appearance of aliens  release from custody during:  the  course of  deportation  proceedings instituted against them.”

The requests for extension involved in the case at bar do not, in any manner  whatsoever, run counter to any of the purposes sought to be served by  the bond in question, as set forth in the above  provision, and,  consequently,  were not meant by the lawmaker to constitute  a violation of said bond.

(4)  Respondent Galang did not regard said requests for extension as a breach of said undertaking, the only reason given  in his communication  of  March 16, 1956,  declaring the bond forfeited,  being “the failure of  Ly  Giok Ha, alias Ky Giok Ha, to depart  upon expiration of the period granted her.”  

The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at  least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before .March  14, 1956.   In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners allege that,  upon her marriage to a Filipino,  Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen  of the Philippines.  Indeed, if this conclusion  were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as  such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would.have to be affirmed, for section 40 (e)  of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that “in the event  of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen  * *  * of  the alien on whose  behalf the  bond  deposit  is  given, the bond shall be cancelled or the  sum. deposited shall be returned to  the  depositor or  his legal  representative.’^/ Thus the issue boils down to whether an  alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political  status. The pertinent part of section  15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:

“Any woman who is now  or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the  Philippines,  and  who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”

Pursuant thereto, marriage to a  male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she “herself may be  lawfully naturalized.”  As correctly held in  an  opinion  of the Secretary of Justice (Op.  No.  52, series  of 1950) ^[1]  this limitation of  section 15  excludes, from  the benefits of  naturalization  by  marriage,   those disqualified from being naturalized  as citizens of  the Philippines under section 4 of said  Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:

” (a)  Persons opposed to  organized  government or  affiliated with any association or group of persons who  uphold and teach doctrines opposing  all  organized governments;
(b)  Persons  defending or teaching  the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their  ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers  in  the  practice  of  polygamy;
(d)  Persons convicted  of  crimes involving moral’ turpitude;
(e)  Persons  suffering  from  mental  alienation  or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Persons  who,  during the period  of  their  residence  in  the ,  Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to  learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of  the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens  or  subjects of nations with whom the * * * Philippines  are at  war,  during the  period of such war;
(h) Citizens  or  subjects  of  a foreign country  other than  the United  States,  whose laws do  not  grant  Filipinos  the  right to become  naturalized citizens  or subjects  thereof.”

In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the  pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the  classes disqualified by law.  Moreover,  as the parties  who claim that,  despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen.  Strictly  speaking,  petitioners  have not made out, therefore,  a case against the respondents-appellants.

Considering, however, that neither in the  administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an  issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may “be lawfully  naturalized,”   and this being a case  of first impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the  interest of equity and  justice, the parties herein should  be given  an opportunity to  introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue.”

Wherefore,  the  decision  appealed from  is  hereby  set aside and let  the records of  this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, not inconsistent  herewith,  without special  pronouncement  as  to  costs.   It  is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.  B.  L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

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^[1] 1 See, also, Ops., Sec. of  Jus.,  No.  28, s. 1950; No. 96,  s. 1949; Nos.*43, %8, “98 and* 281, s.  1948; No. 95, s. 1941; Nos.  79 and 168, s. 1940.