FERMIN SUPIA AND GAVINA BATIOCO, PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE M. QUINTERO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS, AND JUAN L. AYALA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul the proceedings
had in civil case No. 3206 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
entitled Juan L. Ayala, plaintiff, vs. Fermin Supia and Gavina
Batioco, defendants. The facts are not in dispute. The only question
presented is one of law, and may be stated in a general way as follows:
In an action of forcible entry and detainer, will the mere filing of an
answer, claiming title to the premises involved, divest a justice of
the peace of jurisdiction?

The action of forcible entry and
detainer is of statutory origin. In the United States, the general
purpose of the statutes creating the action is “that, regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence
or terror. One who is guilty of a forcible entry, therefore, or of a
forcible detainer after a peaceable but unlawful entry, is not only
subject to indictment, but is required to restore possession to the
party from whom it was so taken or detained, and in a proper case is
often required to pay him treble damages, notwithstanding the fact that
the entrant may have had the superior title or the better right to
present possession. In affording this remedy of restitution the object
of the statutes is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal
disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the
reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must
accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the
possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than
to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This
is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible
entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of
possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he
claims is his.” (11 R. C. L., 1137, 1138.)

In Chisholm vs.
Weise (5 Okla., 217, 220; 47 Pac., 1086, 1087), the court said: “The
general purpose of the statute does not regard the actual condition of
the title of the property, but, where any person is in the peaceable
and quiet possession of it, he shall not be turned out by force, by
violence, or by terror. The party so using force and acquiring
possession may have a superior title, or may have the better right to
the present possession; but the policy of the law is to prevent
disturbances of the public peace, and to forbid any person righting
himself by his own hands and by violence, and requiring that the party
who has obtained possession in this manner shall restore it to the
party from whom it has been so obtained. The party out of possession
must resort to legal means to obtain possession if he be entitled
thereto.”

In this jurisdiction the applicable provisions of
law are section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 68 of Act
No. 136, as amended. Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

“Anyone
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, and any landlord, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or determination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, and the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord,
vendor, vendee, or other person, shall at any time within one year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession be
entitled, as against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or against any person or persons claiming
under them, to restitution of the land, building, and premises
possession of which is unlawfully withheld, together with damages and
costs: Provided, however, That no landlord shall commence any
action against a tenant for restitution of possession of any land or
building for failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of
his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed, for a period of three
days, to pay the rent due or comply with the conditions of his lease
after demand therefor. The demand for payment or for the performance of
any condition of the lease may be made upon the tenant personally, or
by serving written notice of such demand upon any person who may be
found upon the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises, if
neither the tenant nor any other person can be found thereon at the
time the landlord or his agent may have gone there for the purpose of
making such demand.”

And the pertinent part of section 68 of Act No. 136, as amended by Act No. 3881, reads as follows:

“In
forcible entry and detainer proceedings the justice shall have original
jurisdiction, but he may receive evidence upon the question of title
therein solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent
of possession and damages for detention.”

From the statutory provisions above-quoted, it can be seen that the
scope of the action of forcible entry and detainer has been materially
enlarged in this jurisdiction. It covers three classes of cases. The
action may be brought by (1) anyone deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
(2) any landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or determination of the right to hold possession, by virtue
of any contract, express or implied; and (3) the legal representatives
or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or any other person.

In the case at bar, the action was originally brought before the
justice of the peace of Pagbilao, Tayabas, by the respondent Juan L.
Ayala against the petitioners Fermin Supia and Gavina Batioco. The
complaint alleged that the defendants below, now petitioners herein,
had sold to the plaintiff, the respondent herein, certain real property
with. right to repurchase the same within one year from January 2,
1931; that it was agreed that during the said period of one year, the
defendants would occupy said premises as tenants of the plaintiff; that
upon the expiration of said period of one year, the defendants failed
to exercise their right to repurchase the property and, consequently,
the agreement of lease was terminated; that notwithstanding the
termination of the lease, the defendants held over and unlawfully
withheld the possession of the property from the plaintiff. To this
complaint the defendants filed an answer, in which they claimed that
the alleged contract of sale with right to repurchase was not, in fact,
a sale but a mortgage.

The petitioners now contend that the
filing of this answer deprived the justice of the peace of Pagbilao,
Tayabas, of jurisdiction to try the case. In support of their
contention petitioners cite the cases of Falcon and Falcon vs. Barretto (26 Phil., 72), and Tiempo vs.
Viuda e Hijos de Reyea (27 Phil., 33). On the other hand, the
respondents maintain that the justice of the peace of Pagbilao had
original jurisdiction to try the case, and that the mere filing of the
answer, in which the question of title is raised, did not divest the
justice of the peace of jurisdiction. Respondents rely principally on
the cases of Mediran vs. Villanueva (37 Phil., 752); Alderete vs. Amandoron and Angosto (46 Phil., 488); and Gonzalez and Javellana vs. Salas (49 Phil., 1). It, therefore, becomes necessary to review some of the cases already decided.

In Falcon and Falcon vs. Barretto, supra,
it was held “that, in enacting section 80, it was the intention of the
Legislature to give the justice of the peace jurisdiction of actions of
unlawful detainer based upon sales only in those cases where the sale
is admitted and the ownership cannot, therefore, in the nature of
things, be disputed. This is necessarily so, for, if the sale itself is
disputed—that is, if an attempt is made to take from the parties the
quality and relation of vendor and vendee—there is presented instantly
the question of ownership; and the right to possession resting wholly
upon the fact of sale, such right must wait and be dependent upon the
determination of that question. Whether there was really a sale or not
and whether the parties take on the qualities of vendor and vendee are
matters which go to the very essence of title. But when the question of
title necessarily arises the justice’s court loses jurisdiction. It is,
therefore, apparent that the cases included within the definition of
the sale specified in section 80 are only those in which the question
of whether or not there was a sale, that is to say, as to who
owns the property, cannot arise. This is true as to the other cases
described in “section 80. No question of title can arise where
possession has been obtained by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth, or where there is a lease. There is not a case mentioned in
section 80 in which the title to the property can come in question. If
it does arise and its determination is necessary for a resolution of
the cause, then instantly the case is taken from the domain of section
80 and the justice’s court loses jurisdiction. Perhaps it were better
said, and more nearly correctly, that the case was never within the
section.” The rule, laid down in this case was followed in Tiempo vs. Viuda e Hijos de Reyes, supra.

In See Kiong Pha vs.
Ti Bun Lay (45 Phil., 670), this court held: “In an action of forcible
entry and detainer, when it is made to appear by the answer of the
defendant that a real question of title and ownership of property is
presented, the court of the justice of the peace has no jurisdiction to
hear and determine the question presented. If the justice of the peace
does take jurisdiction under such circumstances and an appeal is taken
to the Court of First Instance, the latter has no jurisdiction to
determine the question presented. An appeal from the judgment of the
court which has no jurisdiction does not give the appellate court
jurisdiction to try the cause.”

In Mediran vs. Villanueva, supra,
the court said: “Upon the second point it is clear that under the law
now in force it’ is beyond the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace
to adjudicate in any case upon the question of the title of real
property, or to declare that one person rather than another is the
owner. But it does not result from this that when an action of forcible
entry and detainer is instituted to recover possession the defendant
can defeat the proceeding merely by asserting ownership in himself.
Though the jurisdiction to determine the question of ownership is
vested exclusively in the superior court, the inferior court of the
justice of the peace possesses full power to determine the right of
possession and assess the damages incident to the unlawful detention.
To this end it may consider the evidence of ownership.”

And in Alderete vs. Amandoron and Angosto, supra, the court, commenting on the decision in Falcon and Falcon vs. Barretto, supra,
observed: “Upon the facts so stated there can be no question that the
conclusions of the court were entirely correct; the case clearly
involved questions of ownership over which the justice of the peace had
no jurisdiction. But unfortunately, the decision contains certain dicta from which the inference has been drawn that under no circumstances can a vendee under a pacto de retro sale, maintain an action of forcible entry and detainer against the vendor for the possession of the land sold.

“This view is clearly erroneous. A sale with pacto de retro transfers
the legal title to the vendee and this, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, carries with it the right of possession. In the case
of Santos vs. Heirs of Crisostomo and Tiongson (41 Phil., 342), this court, in discussing the nature of sale with pacto de retro,
said: ‘* * * It is our opinion, however, that the insertion of a
stipulation for repurchase by the vendor in a contract of sale does not
necessarily create any right inconsistent with the right of ownership
in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in the nature of an option, and
the possible exercise of it rests upon contingency. It creates no
subsisting right whatever in the property, and so far from being
inconsistent with the idea of full ownership in the purchaser, it
really rests upon the assumption of ownership in him. * * *’ “

The doctrine enunciated in this case was followed in Gonzalez and Javellana vs. Salas, supra.

In Sevilla vs.
Tolentino (51 Phil., 333, 335, 336), Chief Justice Avanceña, speaking
for the court, said: “We should not lose sight of the fact that the
action for forcible entry and detainer established by section 80 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which establishes a summary proceeding
therefor, is for the purpose of providing an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession which is presumed to be lawful, until the
contrary is proven, from any disturbance implying a contrary
presumption. This is why justice of the peace courts have been given
jurisdiction to entertain such action, said courts being more
accessible and in a position to afford the promptest remedy through a
simple procedure. It may be that the possessor is not the owner and is
not entitled to the possession, but, in order to decide this, the law
provides remedies other than this summary proceeding, whose sole object
is to protect, for the moment, the disturbed actual possession. If this
were not so, there could have been no reason for the institution of
this summary proceeding, because the ordinary action for the recovery
of real property also includes the remedy for the possession. These
considerations are applicable to the case of a lessee, who as such,
possesses the thing with the consent and in representation of the
lessor, when against the latter’s will, he continues in possession
after the expiration of his right of possession acquired by contract,
and this is why the law has extended this remedy against him,
considering him as much of an intruder as he who has acquired
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

“If
these are the purposes of the summary proceeding of forcible entry and
detainer, the legal provision (sec. 3, Act No. 1627), which makes an
exception of the case involving the question of ownership, must be
strictly interpreted, and this exception is to be applied only to such
cases as involve the question of ownership so necessarily that it would
be impossible to decide the question of mere possession without first
settling that of ownership. It is plain that it is not to be applied
simply because the defendant raises the question of ownership, so long
as such a question is not necessarily involved, since it can be said
that the defendant can always do so. The relief has been provided in
favor of the possessor and not of the intruder. It is the possessor who
should be allowed to decide whether or not he is to avail himself of
such relief, and once he has decided to do so, the intruder should not
be left with an instrument in his power by means of which he can thwart
it, nor should the efficacy of the relief granted precisely against him
be made to depend upon his will. The decision of this court in the case
of Mediran vs. Villanueva (37 Phil., 752), abounds in weighty considerations to this effect.”

It will be perceived that the real controversy between the parties in
this case centers around an apparent conflict between two lines of
decisions of this court on the subject of the jurisdiction of a justice
of the peace in actions of forcible entry and detainer. Experience has
shown the necessity for laying down a clear and, as far as possible,
definite rule on the question, in order to avoid further confusion and
unnecessary litigation. After a careful consideration of the whole
question in the light of pertinent authorities, we have come to the
conclusion that (1) the purchaser under a contract of sale with right
to repurchase, is a vendee within the meaning of section 80 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, and (2) in an action of forcible entry and
detainer, the mere filing of an answer, claiming title to the premises
involved or raising the question of ownership, will not divest a
justice of the peace of jurisdiction.

We believe that the
conclusion thus reached is in harmony with sound principles of law and
jurisprudence. As stated by the court in Pettit vs. Black (13
Neb., 142, 154), “the answer is a mere statement of the facts which the
party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. If, however,
on the trial it should appear that the action is not in fact for the
recovery of the possession of the premises, but to determine a question
of title, the court will have no authority to proceed, and the case
must be dismissed. In other words, where the question to be determined
is one of title, it will oust the court of jurisdiction. But the court
has authority to proceed with the hearing of the cause until this fact
is clearly established.”

In Green vs. Morse (57
Neb., 391; 73 Am. St. Rep., 518), the court held that jurisdiction of
forcible entry and detainer proceedings is not ousted by a mere
averment in an answer that such proceedings involve the question of
title. In the course of its opinion, the court said: “Nor were the
forcible entry and detainer proceedings without jurisdiction because of
the averment in the supplemental petition here that they would require
an inquiry into the title of land. Even an answer to that effect in the
forcible entry suit would not oust the jurisdiction. The court might
still proceed until the evidence should disclose that the question
involved was one of title. (Pettit vs. Black, 13 Neb., 142; Lipp vs. Hunt, 25 Neb., 91.)” To the same effect are Brown vs. Hartshorn (12 Okla., 121; 69 Pac., 1049); and Hackney vs. McKee (12 Okla., 401; 75 Pac, 535).

Our statute clearly contemplates that the mere fact that the question
of title is raised in the answer, should not oust a justice of the
peace of jurisdiction; and so it provides that “he may receive evidence
upon the question of title therein solely for the purpose of
determining the character and extent of possession and damages for
detention.” (Section 68 of Act No. 136, as amended by Act No. 3881.)

It results that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.

---

 

DISSENTING

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The present case is on all fours with the case of Mendoza vs. Arellano and B. de Arellano (36 Phil., 59).

In
that case as in this case the purpose of the action was the ejectment
by an alleged lessor, who was at the same time an alleged pacto de retro vendee, of an alleged lessee who was at the same time the alleged pacto de retro vendor, from the land alleged to have been sold with pacto de retro;
and the defense in that case as in the present one was that the
defendant was in fact and in truth not a lessee but a mortgagor paying
a usurious interest in the guise of rent; that the contract, while in
the form of a pacto de retro sale, was in reality of mortgage; and that the said defendant was the owner of the land in question.

In said case, in which the case of Falcon and Falcon vs. Barretto (26 Phil., 72), was cited, this court laid down the following doctrine:

“Where
the real issue raised by defendant’s pleadings in an action of this
kind in a court of a justice of the peace is whether an alleged
contract of sale with right to repurchase, including an alleged rental
contract, is a valid contract, or a fictitious and simulated contract
which does not set forth the real nature of the agreement entered into
by the parties, a question of title is involved which necessitates the
transfer of the record for trial in the Court of First Instance by
certificate of the justice of the peace.”

In the case of Falcon and Falcon vs. Barretto, supra, this court said:

“This
is a typical case of a sale with right to repurchase as they come to
this court, and the typical questions presented in such case are raised
herein. It is claimed by the vendor that the instrument is a mortgage
and not a sale with a right to repurchase; that she has paid the amount
of the indebtedness within the time required by the terms of the
document, and that she is therefore the owner of the premises and
entitled, by virtue of such ownership, to retain possession thereof.
The vendees, on the other hand, assert that the instrument is not a
mortgage but a sale with a right to repurchase; that the time
stipulated in the instrument within which payment must be made has
expired and that no such payment has been made or tendered; that by
virtue of that fact they have become absolute and sole owners of the
premises, and, by virtue of such ownership, are entitled to the
immediate possession thereof. It is, therefore, clear that the question
to be determined in this case is primarily the question of ownership,
for upon ownership, pure and simple, depends the right to possession.
It is equally clear that the justice’s court, therefore, had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and that, as a
necessary consequence, the Court of First Instance on appeal had no
jurisdiction further than to set aside and annul the judgment entered
in the justice’s court.”

The above-cited
doctrines are also cited in 35 Corpus Juris, page 505, sec. 70,
alongside with the decisions of the supreme courts of many states of
the Union in support of the following statement: “* * * But in other
states the title may be involved, and where it does actually come into
question, the jurisdiction of a justice is ousted. * * *”

Commenting upon the above doctrine, this court, in a decision penned by Justice Ostrand in the case of Alderete vs. Amandoron and Angosto (46 Phil., 488, 491), said:

“There are, of course, many cases involving alleged sales with pacto de retro
in which questions of ownership arise and of which the Courts of First
Instance have original jurisdiction. Of this class Falcon and Falcon vs. Barretto, supra, offers a good example. But there are also cases where the fact that the transaction is a true sale with pacto de retro
is not disputed, and in such cases there can be no reason Why actions
of forcible entry and detainer may not be taken cognizance of by the
justice of the peace if brought within the time limit prescribed by
law. The matter depends entirely upon the circumstances of each
particular case. * * *”

In the case just mentioned this court establishes a distinction between a pacto de retro sale which is not disputed and a pacto de retro sale which is disputed. As to the first. the doctrine laid down in Falcon and Falcon vs. Barretto, supra, is held to be correct, but not as to the second. The present case falls under the Falcon doctrine, inasmuch as the pacto de retro sale is disputed in the answer.

In the case of See Kiong Pha vs. Ti Bun Lay (45 Phil., 670), this court laid down the following rule:

“COURT
OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; JURISDICTION.—In an action of forcible
entry and detainer, when it is made to appear by the answer of the
defendant that a real question of title and ownership of property is
presented, the court of the justice of the peace has no jurisdiction to
hear and determine the question presented. If the justice of the peace
does take jurisdiction under such circumstances and an appeal is taken
to the Court of First Instance, the latter has no jurisdiction to
determine the question presented. An appeal from the judgment of the
court which has no jurisdiction does not give the appellate court
jurisdiction to try the cause.”

The only
ground on which the majority of the court seems to rely in reversing
the above-cited doctrines and in laying down the rules that “(1) the
purchaser under a contract of sale with right to repurchase, is a
vendee within the meaning of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
and (2) in an action of forcible entry and detainer, the mere filing of
an answer, claiming title to the premises involved or raising the
question of ownership, will not divest a justice of the peace of
jurisdiction,” is the provision of section 68 of Act No. 136, as
amended by Act No. 3881, which reads as follows: “In forcible entry and
detainer proceedings the justice shall have original jurisdiction, but
he may receive evidence upon the question of title therein solely for
the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention.”

It will be seen that the
above-quoted provision refers to forcible entry and detainer and not to
ejectment or recovery of possession proceedings, and it does not
prohibit the setting up of a special plea of title or ownership in the
answer. The majority opinion admits, however, that such special defense
may be pleaded, but that the justice of the peace may not act on it; he
must proceed to trial. If in the course of such trial he discovers that
a real question of title or ownership is involved, it is only then that
he should inhibit himself from taking cognizance of the case for lack
of jurisdiction and dismiss it. This is, however, contrary to the rule
laid down in most jurisdictions in the United States as stated in 35
Corpus Juris, page 508, sec. 72, as follows:

“*
* * In most jurisdictions, if defendant in a justice’s court wishes to
raise the question of title to land, he must set up the defense
specially in his plea or answer, or give notice that title will come in
question. * * *”

Section 68 of Act No. 136,
as amended by Act No. 3881, in permitting the reception of evidence
upon the question of title does so solely for the purpose of
determining the character and extent of possession and damages for
detention in forcible entry and detainer proceedings, and it does not
say that it is only then that the justice of the peace should determine
whether or not a real question is involved as specially pleaded in the
answer. Thus, instead of saving the defendant the trouble and expense
of going into trial when question of title or ownership is specially
pleaded, the majority compels him to undergo such trouble and expense
and to show in the trial that his special defense is meritorious. In
proceedings of recovery of possession after expiration of a lease, it
has been held that “where the tenancy has terminated or the facts show
a bona fide claim of title by defendant under circumstances not
involving a denial by a tenant of his landlord’s title, the justice
loses jurisdiction, * * *.” (35 Corpus Juris, page 507, sec. 70.) It
will thus be seen that the doctrine laid down in this jurisdiction in
the cases cited above is more conducive to speedy justice and less
expensive to litigants than the new rule that the majority lays down in
its opinion.

For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the writ should be granted.