JUSTA G. VDA. DE GUIDO, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR CASTELO, JUDGE OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, CALOOCAN BRANCH, ANTONIO ROSCA, TO TEE, AND DY CHONG, REPONDENTS.

In a case appealed from the justice of the peace court of Caloocan to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, the defendants (the herein respondents other
than the respondent Judge), after the plaintiff (the herein petitioner), had
closed her case, made a verbal motion for dismissal, with a reservation of their
right to present evidence in case of its denial. In his order of July 9, 1947,
the respondent Judge denied the motion and directed that the trial be continued
as soon as practicable. Taking the position that said respondents waived their
right to present evidence by filing a motion to dismiss after the submission of
petitioner’s evidence, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration praying
that the respondent Judge render judgment in accordance with the proof adduced
by the petitioner, which motion was denied in the order of August 12, 1947. The
present original action for certiorari and mandamus was instituted by the
petitioner for the purpose of securing an order compelling the respondent Judge
to desist from allowing the other respondents to present any evidence and
forthwith render Judgment upon the evidence already submitted by the
petitioner.

Of course, we have already held in Arroyo vs. Azur,^[1] April 13, 1946, 43 Off. Gaz., 54, that
“cuando el demandado interpone lo que se llama demurrer a la suficiencia de los
pruebas del demandante presentando una moción de sobreseimiento por la razón de
que tales pruebas son insuficientes o ineficaces para substanciar la demanda, no
tiene derecho a reservarse la presentación de sus pruebas sino que debe atenerse
a las resu1tancias de dicho demurrer tanto para lo favorible como para lo
adverso. Si la moción prospera y la decisión fuere sostenida en apelación, el
asunto termina definitivamente; pero tambein termina del mismo modo si la
decision fuere revocada y el Tribunal de alzada hallare que hay pruebas y
motivos suficientes para dictar una sentencia en el fondo a favor del
demandante. Naturalmente el efecto de todo esto es eliminar en estos casos la
llamada reserva de pruebas. obligando a las partes a que liquiden todas sus
controversies en una sola vista.” The scope of these pronouncements is obviously
not unlimited. That decision involved a motion for dismissal which was granted,
resulting in effect in a final termination of the case on the merits; and the
fundamental objective of this Court was merely to avoid possible delays due to
relays of cases between the lower and appellate courts should a dismissal be
found untenable on appeal. The fpllowing are typical passages demonstrative of
the line of reasoning only in the case above cited but in the earlier decisions
in Moody, Aronson & Co. vs. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Phil., 198, and
Gonzalez Castro vs. Azaola, 63 Phil. 841.

“Esta doctrina admite más que una inferencia o interpretacion y es que en
adelante ya no se permitiria nungana reserva, pero que si por error se
permitiese, la misma ya no podria invocarse como motiva legal para que el asunto
se devolviera al tribunal inferior para los efectos de la articulación de las
pruebas reservadas. Si la doctrina no se interpretase de esta manera, jamás se
aplicaria la misma con todo rigor. porque si un Juzgado de Primera Instancia se
equivocase de nuevo permitiendo igual reserva y llegaramos a la conclusión, como
en el presente caso, de tener que revocar la desición de dicho Juzgado, cabria
invocar siempre la equidad para la devolución del asunto, y asi sucesivamente,
sin ninguna limitación de carácter final.

“*
        *        *        *        *        *        *        *”

” * * * Por tanto, los demandatos al presentar su moción de sobreseimiento
con el aditamento de la reserva de articular sus pruebas eventualmente, lo
hicieron allánandose al riesgo de que se rechazase dicha reversa en apelación
como hoy lo hacemos. La intención de la Corte era clara, terminente y decisiva:
evitar la multiplicación y la prolongación de los pleitos, cosa siempre odiosa
no sólo por la perturbación y la anomalía que ocasionan en la vida y en los
negocios del individuo, sino tanbién por lo que cuestan en dinero y en energías
tanto al ciudadano como al Estado.” (Arroyo contra Azur, y otros.^[1] CA-No. 9320 Abril 13, 1946, 43 Off. Gaz., No.
1, pp. 54, 60.)

” * * * The defendant who, after the plaintiff has submitted his evidence,
makes, a motion to dismiss which the trial court in a decision grants, and who,
on appeal of the plaintiff, has the judgment reversed, cannot then be permitted
to produce evidence in defense. The defendant in offering a motion to dismiss in
effect elects to stand on the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s case. Otherwise,
the result will be to Invite unnecessary litigation.” (Moody, Aronson & Co.
vs. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Phil., 198, 200.)

“The record shows that immediately after the attorney for the defendant had
presented his oral motion to dismiss, he signified his intention to call his
client as a witness in the event that his motion to dismiss should be denied.
The court, in such a situation, should not have rendered its decision, but in
order to avoid any possible delay of the case and enable it to render its
decision with all the disputed questions in view, it should have required the
defendant to present his evidence.” (Gonzalez Castro vs. Azaola, 63
Phil., 841, 842.)

The delay thus sought to be eliminated certainly cannot happen where the
motion to dismiss is denied and the movant (defendant) required to proceed with
the submission of his evidence in the lower court which, it is needless to
state, still has full jurisdiction and control of the case. The procedure
followed by the respondent Judge in the case at bar is virtually in consonance
with the suggestion contained in Gonzalez Castro vs. Azaola, supra, to the
effect that “the court, in such a situation, should not have rendered its
decision, but in order to avoid any possible delay of the case and enable it to
render its decision with all the disputed questions in view, it should have
required the defendant to present his evidence.”

The petition is, therefore, hereby denied with costs against the petitioner.
So ordered.

Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.

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^[1]76 Phil., 493.
^[1]76 Phil., 493.