ENRIQUE PAREJA, CONRADO RAAGAS, JUAN ARACO, ROMAN PAREJA, HILARIO RENDAL AND VICENTE REMOTO, PETITIONERS, VS. GREGORIO S. NARVASA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL ET …

Petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental a
protest contesting the result of the elections for vice-mayor and councilor held
in Ayuquitan on November 11, 1947.

The protest is dated on November 25, 1947. In answer dated December 13,1947,
protestees denied the facts alleged as grounds of protest.

On February 5, 1948, protestants moved through a written petition that the
ballot boxes of the eleven precincts of Ayuquitan be ordered opened and the
ballots thereof counted, as evidence in support of the following allegations
made in the protest:

“V

“3. Terrorism, threats, intimidation and coercion were used, before and
during the election, as follows:

“(a) A day before the election a leader of protestants was kidnapped with
intention of scaring away from the electoral polls on election day followers of
protestants as in fact many did not vote on this account.

“(b) Some leaders of protestants were attacked and bodily harmed by leaders
of protestees with evident intention of preventing them and protestants’
followers from coming to the electoral polls to vote for protestants, and this
in fact scared them from voting on election day.

“(c) A well-plumed public disturbance by firing guns in strategic places on
the eve of election dry accompanied by malicious propagation of information that
shooting would occur on election day, succeeded in planting fear in the hearts
and minds of the protestants’ electors, causing many of protestants’ electors
not to came to vote as was the evident intention of protestees’ leaders in
making the public disturbance.

“(d) Protestees armed with gun a freely went in and out of the polling places
for precinct 1 to 8 located in tho poblacion of the town, threatening the
leaders and followers of the protestants and forcing and coercing them to vote
for protestees and their candidates.

“(e) Leaders of protestoes, Many of whom claim si to be special agents of
Governor Praxedes Villanueva with authority to make arrests and all armed with
guns, freely entered the polling places for precincta Nos. 1 to 8 and their
immediate vicinities, threatening and intimidating the electors, and forcing and
coercing them to vote for protestees and their ticket, because of this and the
irregularity specified in (d) at least fifty 50 electors in each of precincts
Nos. 1 to 8, were forced to vote for protestess and their candidates.

“(f) That protestants and their watchers, and the watchers of proteatants’
provincial and national candidates were threatened and forced out of the polling
places for precincts Nos. 1 to 8 by protestees and their leaders, so that
protestees and their leaders could commit any or all irregularities they wished
and desired in fact they succeeded in doing so without any to prevent them from
committing the irregularities.

“(g) Protestees and their leaders, in open violation, of law, prepared the
ballots of at least sixty 60 electors in every precinct of precinct No. 1 to 8,
inclusive.

“(h) That during the counting and canvass of the votes for precincts Nos. 1
to 8, at least twenty 20 ballots in each of those precincts in which protestants
appeared voted for the office of Municipal Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors
were maliciously and illegally read and tallied as votes cast in favor of
protestees.

“(i) That at least ten 10 ballots in each of the eleven 11 precincts of the
municipality of Ayuquitan in which protestants were voted for the office of the
Municipal Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors were illegally not counted in
protestants’ favor on the pretext that they were marked ballots, when a a a
matter of fact they were not.

“(j) That at least fifteen 15 ballots in each of the 11 precincts of the
municipality of Ayuquitan in which protestees were voted for Municipal
vice-Mayor were marked ballots but were nevertheless counted in favor of the
protestees.

“VI

“That as alleged in the next preceding paragraph, at least 1,395 votes should
be deducted from tha votes credited in favor of protestees, and 200 votes should
be added to the votes credited to the protestants.”

On the same date, February 5, 1948,. respondent judge issued an order defying
the petition. quoting the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in Cecilio v.
Belmonte (48 Phil., 243) and Mandac vs. Samonte (49 Phil., 284), to the effect
that to order the opening of ballot boxes is a ministerial duty of the court,
the respondent qualified the doctrine to the effect that the allegations of the
protest must be “clear, rational and convincing,” adding that the allegations in
petitioner’s protest “are, on the face thereof, inaccurate and lacking in
definiteness and sincerity.”

Motion for reconsideration was filed on February 9, 1948, but was denied on
February 11.

Petitioners pray for us to order respondent judge to order the opening of the
ballot boxes in question and the counting of the ballots deposited therein, as a
ministerial duty.

Time and again, this Supreme Court has declared in numerous cases that, when
there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal,
examination, or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of
the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and
counting of the ballots deposited therein.

The doctrine has been laid down under legal provisions existing before the
enactment of the Election Code. The latter embodied expressly the mandatory
provision which was only implicit in former election laws.

Section 175 of the Election Code reads as follows:

“SEC. 175. Judicial counting of votes in contested elections. — Upon
the petition of any interested party, or motu proprio, if the interests of
justice so require, the court shall immediately order that the copies of the
registry lists, the ballot boxes, the election statements, the voters’
affidavits, and the other documents used in the election be produced before it
and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted, and for such purpose
it may appoint such officers as it may deem necessary and shall fix the
compensation of each at not less than five pesos but not more than fifteen pesos
for every election precinct which they may completely revise and report upon.”

The above-quoted provision contemplates two cases in which “the court shall
immediately order * * * that the ballot boxes * * * be produced before it and
that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted”; first, “upon the petition
of any interested party,” and Second, “or motu proprio if the interests
of justice so requires”.

Under the first case, the more “petition of any interested of party” of
course, in accordance with the pleadings, is by itself enough. The limitations
implicit in the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court as to the effect that
the allegations of the protest must show the need of counting and examining the
ballots have been eliminated by the drafters of the Election Code. Their evident
purpose was to cut short all technicalities and controversies on legal niceties
standing in the way of a prompt examination and counting of the ballots and
early disposal of protests, and to avoid the recurring petitions filed with the
Supreme Court.

The opportunity for the opening of ballot boxes and the counting of ballots
has been broadened by the Election Code to such an extent that the right to ask
for it is not reserved exclusively to protestants, as had happened formerly, but
has been extended to “any interested party”, including protestees and third
party litigants.

The qualification of “if the interests of justice so requires” is attached to
the “motu proprio” case, as grammatically is indicated by the first
separating comma in the provision.

As prayed for, respondent judge is ordered to immediately order the opening
of the ballot boxes of the eleven precincts of Ayuquitan and the counting and
examination of all tho ballots deposited therein, and follow the procedure
outlined by section 175 of the Election Code, with costs in favor of
petitioners.

Parás, Actg. C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., I concur in the result.

Paras, Actg. C.J., I certify that Mr. Justice Pablo voted with the majority.

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DISSENTING

HILADO, J.:

I am constrained to dissent from the determination made by the majority of
the instant case. Section 175 of the Revised Election Code provides as follows:

“SEC. 175. Judicial counting of votes in contested elections.—Upon
the petition of any Interested party, or motu proprio, if the
interests of justice so require, the court shall immediately order that the
copies of the registry lists, the ballot boxes, the election statements, the
voter’s affidavits, and the other documents used in the election be produced
before it and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted, and for such
purpose it may appoint such officers as it may deem necessary and shall fix the
compensation of each at not less than five pesos but not more than fifteen pesos
for every election precinct which they may completely revise and report upon.
(C. A., 357-169)” (Italics supplied.)

The source of this provision was Commonwealth Act No. 357, Section 169, which
also contained the all-important modifying phrase “if the interests of justice
so require”. This phrase, coming as it does after two previous phrases separated
from each other with a “comma” and the second of which is also separated with a
“comma” from the modifying phrase, must be interpreted to modify both phrases.
The result is, that what the law here ordains is that whether the opening of the
ballot boxes and the examination of the ballots and recounting of the votes is
sought “upon the petition of any interested party”, or is contemplated to be
ordered by the court motu proprio. such opening and such examination
and such recounting can only be ordered if the interests of justice so
require. Now it is plain that this legal provision confers discretion upon
the court before which the contest is pending to determine whether the interests
of justice require them. If the lawmaker intended that it shall be the court’s
mandatory duty to so order upon the mere petition of any interested party
regardless of whether or not the interests of justice require it, he would not
have placed a “comma” after the word “party” in the first phrase. Neither can I
agree with the construction which would say that this modifying phrase applies
only to a motu proprio order of the court, for if the interests of
justice are to control the motu proprio action of the court, it would
be absurd to hold that they shall not control the action of the court if such
action is requested by an interested party. It seems to me to be self-evident
that the interests of justice are supreme in the two cases, and must control the
action of the court in one or the other. The legality of the election being
presumed, I am of the considered opinion that where a prima facie case
is not made that it was tainted with illegality sufficient to alter the result
of the election, and that the opening of the ballot boxes and examination or
recounting of the ballots, are material to establish such prima facie
case, the interests of justice do not require such opening, examination and
recounting. Paragraph V, 3 (e)-(j) of the motion of protest
dated November 25, 1947, is pointed to as justifying such reopening, examination
and recounting. But said motion is not so much as verified, and no evidence is
of record to support it.

It will be noted that the cases cited by petitioners were decided under the
election law in force prior to the present Revised Election Code, and even prior
to the election code immediately preceding, namely, Commonwealth Act No. 357.
For instance, in Cecilio vs. Belmonte, 48 Phil., 243, 249-250, this
Court quoted the pertinent provision of section 479 of the then existing
Election Law, as then drafted, and as it was successively amended by section 44
of Act No. 3030, and by Section 25 of Act No. 3210. As originally drafted and as
thus amended by Act No. 3030, said Election Law imposed upon the Court of First
Instance with which the election protest was filed this mandatory duty: “and
shall forthwith cause the registration lists and all ballots used at such
election to be brought before it and examined.” And, as amended by section 25 of
Act No. 3210, the provision was changed to read:

“* * * Upon petition of an interested party, or of its own accord
if the interests of justice require it * * *”.

It should be noted that in the last quoted amended provision of that former
Election Law the qualifying phrase “if the interests of justice require it” was
for the first time employed. It will likewise be observed that in that provision
said phrase followed the phrase “of its own accord” without any
punctuation between them, while the preceding phrase “upon petition of an
interested party” was separated by a “comma” from the phrase “of its own
accord”. As the provision was thus drafted, it is clear that the phrase “if the
interests of justice require it” modified only the phrase “of its own
accord”.

Undoubtedly realizing that there was no sound reason for requiring the action
of the court to be controlled by the demands of the interests of justice if it
acted “of its own accord”, and not when it acted “upon petition of an interested
party”, the legislature saw fit to apply the requirement to both cases, drafting
the corresponding provision, both in section 169 of Commonwealth Act No. 357,
the Election Code, and in section 175 of Republic Act No. 180, the Revised
Election Code, in the following terms:

“Upon the petition of any interested party, or motu proprio. if the
interests of justioe so require, * * *.”

In the first part of this dissent I have already tried to analyze
the effect of the above-quoted phraseology with particular reference to its
punctuation, and the consequent interpretation thereof that I believe should be
given.