JULIANA ABRAGAN ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. RITA G. DE CENTENERA ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

STREET, J.:


By the amended complaint filed in this cause in the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Camarines Sur on January 18, 1923, the plaintiffs, Juliana
Abragan and her daugther, Julieta Abragan, seek to recover from the defendant,
Jose N. Garchitorena, administrator of the estate of Andres Garchitorena,
deceased, three parcels of real property described in paragraph I of the
complaint; to obtain a judicial declaration that said property belongs in
usufruct to the plaintiff, Juliana Abragan, with the nude ownership in her
daugther, Julieta; and further to recover a sum of money as alleged damages for
detention of the said properties. Upon hearing the cause the trial court
absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs appealed.

It appears that Julieta G. Abragan is the natural daughter of Don Andres
Garchitorena, deceased, formerly a resident of the municipality of Tigaon, in
the Province of Camarines Sur. Not long before his death in the year 1921 the
said Andres Garchitorena executed two deeds of gift, Exhibits A and B, bearing
the date of February 10, 1920, though the correct date was evidently 1921. The
first of these documents conveys by way of gift to Julieta G. Abragan and her
mother Juliana Abragan, two parcels of property, namely, first, a piece of land
planted with fruit-bearing coconut trees and having an area of nine hectares,
located in the barrio of Matacla, in the municipality of Goa, Camarines Sur,
valued at P2,000; and, secondly, a building lot in the pueblo of
Tigaon, of an area of 446 square meters, containing a warehouse
(camarin) for commercial use, and having a value of P1,900. The
instrument gives to the mother, Juliana, the lisufruct in these properties and
to the daughter, Julieta, the nude ownership. By the second instrument (Exhibit
B) the same donor gives to the same donees and in the same manner a piece of
hemp land having an area of twenty hectares, and located in the barrio of
Tinawgan, municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Both of these instruments
contain an acceptance of the gifts on the part of Julieta G. Abragan, aided by
her mother Juliana; but owing to circumstances not necessary to be here set out,
neither document was at any time acknowledged before a notary public.

After the death of the donor, Rita G. de Centenera, who is the sole heir of
Andres Garchitorena, qualified as special administratrix of his estate; and on
April 1, 1921, she executed a public document (Exhibit D) in which she recites
that her deceased father had in life made two donations in favor of his
daughter, Julieta G. Abragan, and Juliana Abragan, vesting the nude ownership in
Julieta and the usufruct in Juliana. The declarant then proceeds to give a
description of the two properties described in the deed of gift Exhibit A, but
making no’ mention of the hemp land described in the document Exhibit B; and she
declares that, being the universal heir of all the property left by her deceased
father, she recognizes said donations as his last expressed will, “in order that
they may have full legal effect in the premises” (para que tengan sus
efectos, cuantos en derecho lugar haya).

After this document had been executed and delivered, Rita G. de Centenera
ceased to be special administratrix of the estate of her father and one Jose N.
Garchitorena was appointed as administrator in her stead. The properties
mentioned in the deeds of gift appear to have come into the possession of the
said administrator of Andres Garchitorena, who now refuses to recognize the
validity of the donations. The present action was therefore instituted by the
Abragans, mother and daughter, to test their rights upon the facts above
recited.

It is quite evident, as declared by the trial judge, that these deeds of
gift, Exhibits A and B, had no effect whatever per se, for the reason that the
instruments referred to never took the form of a public document and were not
accepted by the donees in any public document in the life of the donor.
(Velasquez vs. Biala, 18 Phil., 231; Abellara vs. Balanag, 37 Phil., 865.) Nor
can it be said that the donations are onerous and subject to the rules governing
contracts (art. 622, Civ. Code), although said donations are declared by the
donor to rest in part upon consideration of the past services rendered to him by
Juliana Abragan. A gift in compensation for services is considered to have been
made upon an onerous consideration (causa onerosa) only when the
services which constitute the determining cause have not yet been rendered.
(Carlos vs. Ramil, 20 Phil., 183.)

It appears that the deed of conveyance of the hemp land, Exhibit B, imposes
on the donee the duty to pay off a mortgage for P5,000 in favor of the
Philippine National Bank; and it is suggested that this gift should be
considered as having been made upon an onerous consideration from the existence
of this obligation, but it is clear that it cannot be so considered. As was said
by Chief Justice Arellano in Castillo vs. Castillo and Quizon (23 Phil., 364,
367), “A gift of this kind is not in fact a gift for a valuable consideration,
but is remuneratory or compensatory, made for the purpose of remunerating or
compensating a charge, burden or condition imposed upon the donee, inferior to
the value of the gift, * * *” and under article 622 of the Civil Code such a
gift is governed by the provisions relating to gifts and not contracts.

It remains to consider what effect, if any, can be attributed to the deed
executed by Rita G. de Centenera after her father’s death, in which she, in her
own right and as sole heir of her father, recognized the validity of the gifts
contained in Exhibit A (not Exhibit B). Upon this point it is at once obvious
that this act cannot be considered as naving retroactively perfected the gifts
attempted to be made in the Exhibit A. But we are of the opinion that this
document should operate, with respect to the lands mentioned therein, as a
quitclaim on the part of Rita G. de Centenera, and she is estopped from
asserting any right to said properties. In this connection we note that the
commentator Manresa cites a decision of the supreme court of Spain, from June
12, 1896, in which a ratification by the heirs of a deceased donor was given
effect although the deed of gift had never been accepted in the form required by
law. (5 Manresa, 2d ed., 115.) The deed of ratification in the case before us
was based upon a commendable motive, which was the desire of the declarant to
give effect to the wishes of her father. This was a good consideration in law
and sufficient to give legal effect to the instrument, though not precisely in
the sense expressed. It is needless to say that this document could not be given
effect to the prejudice of creditors of the estate of a deceased person, and
while we hold that it is effective for the purpose of raising an estoppel
against the heir, the plaintiffs cannot maintain this action against the
administrator of the donor. It will therefore be necessary for them to intervene
in the proceedings in administration and ask that their rights to the properties
covered by Exhibit A be there recognized.

A judgment of affirmance pro forma must therefore be entered,
without prejudice to the rights of the plaintiffs to assert their rights by a
proper proceeding in the administration of the estate. The judgment will be
affirmed, without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Johnson, Malcolm, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.